

Pangaea

The Dalhousie Undergraduate History Journal 2024



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Letter from the Editors

Sitting between the confined concrete walls and endless collection of books on the fourth floor of the Killam Library, the provenant heart of this journal and many of the papers within, it's hard not to feel surreal. For many of us on the editorial board, the Pangaea Undergraduate History Journal has proved something of a monolith, made only more so by last year's unfortunate hiatus. Publication in Pangaea has proved elusive since the Covid pandemic and beyond. This initial disconnect, however, has since proved a blessing in disguise, with this year's editorial team arriving motivated to see the journal revived and thrive. It's been an honour and a pleasure to work with such a devoted editorial board, flowing through the publication process with their passion and insight. It is with great pleasure that we present the 2024 edition of Pangaea, back and better than ever!

Since our first call for papers in the fall, we have been flooded with fantastic submissions representing the study of history in all of its multitudinous glory. From Ottoman Istanbul to contemporary Los Angeles, from Pan-Africanism to Second World War diaspora, mask work to dresses, we on the editorial board have been blessed with papers covering an incredible range of times, places, ideas and events that invoke the power of history on a global scale.

For the first time, Pangaea has gone national, extending our call for submissions to universities across Canada. As the journal's name suggests, Pangaea has always strived to spread across vast worlds of history, incorporating an extensive array of perspectives and areas of study. Perhaps no edition of Pangaea captures this sentiment quite like this year's journal, with the addition of stellar submissions from authors coast to coast and at home in Halifax alike, aiming at incorporating ever-important attitudes of diversity and inclusion upon which our journal was founded. We are incredibly proud to bring forth the absolute best undergraduate writing Canadian universities have to offer, from Dalhousie and beyond. Even now, Pangaea's proverbial continents continue to spread.

As we finally unveil the journal, we in the Maritimes along with much of North America find ourselves in the looming path of a solar eclipse. One is reminded of Annie Dillard's masterful short story, *Total Eclipse*, and her astute assessment of the human condition. Dillard captures a revelation familiar to many scholars, the curious fact that "the mind wants to know all the world, and all eternity". Against the impossibility of infinity, that great void of everything reflected in the total eclipse of the sun, we find the beauty of history offering us an understanding of all of time. History gives us that which we crave most, to know the universe and all it holds, unlocked through the study of mankind's chronicle everything that has ever been. History is, in one form, immortality. Contained within this journal, we offer you a very small piece of that incredible whole.

We are immensely grateful for everything this past year has brought, and hope you enjoy this 'landmark' 2024 edition of Pangaea.

~ Rafe Taylor, Elizabeth Heaton & Kriti Maini

It has Been an Honour: Pangea Op-Ed on Behalf of the Dalhousie Honours History Seminar

Liam Alabiso-Cahill

I started university in September 2020, so most of my courseload was online for two years. I did not meet another history student during my first year; even in my second year, I only met a few. I am facing a whirlwind of emotions as I wrap up my final year of university. It is a surreal feeling to have started my university career in the thick of the COVID-19 pandemic and be graduating in a world that almost seems to forget the whole thing happened. I am eternally grateful to have been allowed to write this pseudo-op-ed for Pangea. It was not until I started writing this that I realized this was the end of a big part of my life. I have done nothing but think about the past for the last four years, and now I am forced to look forward and embrace whatever may lie ahead. It is a hard transition, however, one I am incredibly excited to make. Difficult though it may be, I find solace knowing I am not alone. My fellow honours history classmates share this journey, transitioning from meticulously chronicling the past to envisioning our futures in graduate school applications and cover letters.

The revival of Dalhousie's Undergraduate History Society (UGHS) amidst this emotional period has been particularly noteworthy. I am eternally grateful to those who made that possible. I have thoroughly appreciated being a part of that process. Thanks to the UGHS – specifically Kriti Maini – Pangea has been brought back to life. I gained experience in publishing and became a part of the historical field of study. As a class, the honours history students were tasked with peer-reviewing a record number of submissions as our journal made its first-ever national call-out. I could not have asked for a better team to work with, students and faculty.

My thesis research has been a truly incredible experience. I do not need to go in-depth here, but I am writing about hurricanes. Beyond the academic merit of my paper, I have learned how fragile everything is. Nothing makes you appreciate of what you have more than understanding that it takes truly little for everything to change. It can be easy to read this as doom and gloom. Still, I want you, the reader, to take this as a challenge. First, prepare a go bag if you live in a hurricane zone (like Nova Scotia). The second and more important challenge is this: Keep moving forward. There were times this year when I was incredibly close to dropping out and disappearing into the woods, never to be seen again. What keeps me going is the incredible group of people I am surrounded by both at school and in my personal life. Despite initially navigating isolation upon relocating to Halifax in 2020, perseverance has borne fruit, culminating in a sense of fulfillment and contentment.

I could not be happier than where I am today. Sitting in my favourite café, in a seat next to a window basking in the sun shining on me as I savour my coffee, writing a brief overview of the last four years of my life. It fills my heart that you are about to read some of Canada's best works of undergraduate history research – in my completely unbiased opinion. On behalf of the Honours History class of 2023/2024, it has been an absolute honour to bring these works to you.

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Rooted in Cedar: A Shifting History of Northwest Coastal Mask Work

Ani Phillips

Spanning across the forests and coastline of Oregon up to the Copper River in southern Alaska, the Indigenous groups encompassed within the broader Northwest Coastal cultural region have been stewards of the land since before expanding trade routes triggered colonial conquest across the continent.¹ The nearly two thousand five hundred kilometers of coastal terrain allows passage for Turtle Island's oldest and most extensive trading and communication corridors, to which the population's cross-cultural and artistic cohesion has been attributed. Three nations in this region display a unique proficiency in the carving of intricate ceremonial masks and share in a rich pantheon of deities and spiritual guides. Among them, the Haida nation settled furthest north, on the archipelago of Haida Gwaii, and were considered the forefront of material and visual innovation.² The Kwakwaka'wakw people reside on the north of Vancouver Island, and—to a lesser extent—across the Queen Charlotte strait on the mainland of current-day British Columbia.³ Further south, numerous Nuu-chah-nulth communities line the coast of Nootka Island, the site of first settler contact on the west coast. For centuries, these nations have been stewards of the land, and live in accordance with its teachings. A central tenet of all three groups is the sanctity of movement and dance. Each significant community occasion is marked by a gathering of the community for a time of performance and spirituality. The creation, significance, and use of ceremonial masks—and within that, depictions of the raven—have contributed to the longevity of Northwest coastal traditions, and aid in the efforts of coastal Indigenous groups to reconnect with spiritual and creative practices.

Literature Review - Early Contact

Broader anthropological journals note the resilience of Haida, Nuu-chah-nulth, and Kwakwaka'wakw cultural practice. However, their approach analyzes the physical intricacies of dye composition, wood, and tool choice. Within academic publications, there exists a noticeable lack of regard for the significance of societal cohesion and community bonds as drivers of creation. Haida communities were among the latest subject to contact by settlers, and by virtue of their geographical isolation, the minutiae of Nuu-chah-nulth and Haida material culture was more frequently overlooked. Between the late eighteenth and early nineteenth century, settlers landed on Haida Gwaii, Nootka, and Vancouver Islands in greater numbers, and began cataloguing Northwest Coast artifacts for historical record and sale. Among the documents from his 1878 expedition to Haida Gwaii, Alexander MacKenzie retained a record of descriptive notes on weaponry and certain other implements, noting that it appeared the Haida

¹ Berlo, Janet Catherine, and Ruth B. Phillips, *Native North American Art* (New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 2015), 177.

² Haida Gwaii was colloquially and incorrectly termed the Queen Charlotte Islands until 2010, when the land was officially renamed Haida Gwaii, which it will be exclusively referred to as throughout.

³ The Kwakwaka'wakw people are also referred to as Kwakiutl, though this the name refers to a specific group within the Kwakwaka'wakw people that has been used to identify the nation as a whole.

people “borrowed and more fully developed the arts and customs of neighboring tribes,” but retained the belief that Haida artifacts evolved by virtue of factors beyond inter-tribal communication.⁴

As a season absent of harvest and hunting, winter served as a time for celebration in Haida, Nuu-chah-nulth, and Kwakwaka’wakw cultures. Hereditary chiefs and family leaders hosted elaborate potlatches —community events intended to display familial wealth and share in the spiritual and social bounty of the season— where ceremonial masks were unveiled.⁵ Each mask was meticulously carved, then adorned with cedar bark, feathers, and often the painted ovoid “Formline” designs synonymous with art from the Northwest Coast region.⁶ Due to the diminished trade during those months, few settlers experienced the potlatch, interacting with the masks solely as inanimate carvings. This lack of overlap, in tandem with a persistent absence of desire to understand Indigenous traditions, lead to a significant gap in knowledge regarding Northwest Coastal masks. For generations in academia, the opinions of scholars mirrored Alexander Mackenzie’s belief that “no rule seemed to have been followed in the matter of selection of subjects.”⁷ After analyzing oral histories and accounts by Indigenous scholars, the significance of Northwest coastal mask work and the informed intentions of their creators becomes clear.

Literature Review - Contemporary

Online collections showcasing large quantities of Northwest Coastal artifacts (including the Museum of Anthropology at the University of British Columbia) have garnered criticism for the stagnant, often sterile nature in which their pieces are displayed. Through each step of the creation process, Haida, Nuu-chah-nulth, and Kwakwaka’wakw masks were imbued with movement and spirituality, features which are absent in a glass case or a computer screen. The collections used as reference throughout this text are not exempt from this critique. However, they have been selected in part for their curation by Indigenous artists. Additionally, this analysis strives to avoid treating these collections as two-dimensional viewings, devoid of cultural context and long-standing processes of production and exhibition.⁷

Methodology

In order to convey the degree to which the presence of Northwest Coast mask work and the mythology of the raven have contributed to the longevity of coastal Indigenous cultures, a broad search of scholarly articles was conducted. Once applicable primary and secondary sources were acquired, information was synthesized with prior knowledge to find the balance between academic publications and photographic archives to draw from. Use of the oral history research method and the historical-comparative research method were used, as the topic necessitates an understanding of the settler perspective (more extensively documented) and the Northwest Coast Indigenous experience. It was essential to find images of Haida, Nuu-chah-nulth, and Kwakwaka’wakw masks from the early

⁴ Alexander Mackenzie and George Mercer Dawson, *Descriptive notes on certain implements, weapons, from Graham Island, Queen Charlotte Islands, B.C.* (Royal Society of Canada, 1891), 46.

⁵ Janet Synder Neil, *Masks and Headgear of Native American Ritual/Theatre on the Northwest Coast* (Theatre Journal,

⁶ Margaret B. Blackman, *Facing the Future, Envisioning the Past: Visual Literature and Contemporary Northwest Coast Masks* (Arctic Anthropology, University of Washington press. 1990), 28. ⁷ Mackenzie and Dawson, *Descriptive notes*, 48.

⁷ Anita Herle, *Objects of Transformation in Northwest Coast Museology* (Journal of Museum Ethnography, 2002), 54.

contact period and from contemporary artists to analyze how they have changed over time. With the assistance of oral histories, consideration was placed on how aspects of the physical creation and views regarding mask use evolved over generations. With a baseline of knowledge established, it became easier to assess sources for credibility, analyze biases, and establish an effective thesis.

Thorough study of images from Daina Augaitis' *Raven Travelling* and the Museum of Anthropology's archives provides insight into the conditions in which each piece was made. Additionally, it reveals features of the masks that are consistent with (or deviate from) other works from the same community. The dichotomy between the ways in which Indigenous people and settlers interacted with the pieces is essential in understanding their significance, and was a primary subject of analysis. This juxtaposition provides a central pillar of understanding, upon which supporting evidence regarding our contemporary knowledge of Indigenous artifacts and the field of museology can be built.

Northwest Coast Masks in Motion

Despite the knowledge gap in settler conceptions of Northwest Coast tradition, a detailed record of their rituals and celebrations has been retained through oral histories, and the stories interwoven through masks and regalia. The potlatch was a time for strengthening of social ties, and often denoted the transference of political power between familial groups. Anthropologist Franz Boas observed the classification of social ranking as being “shown through the mirroring of mythological worlds.”⁸ The mythological worlds he refers to are an integral part of coastal Indigenous cultures—the knowledge that a spiritual world exists concurrent to our own and can be called upon through dance and ceremony. During these times of gathering, spiritual leaders (shamans) and designated members of the community adorned themselves in intricately carved and decorated masks in the likeness of animals and important figures in the collective cultural consciousness. This establishes a dichotomy of self/other in which the dancer facilitates a connection with the spirit world through the mask and regalia, and throughout the course of the dance undergoes a transformation into the deity depicted.⁹ The aptly named transformation masks were used in the characterization of an ‘other’ for the audience. Concealing the entire head and face, transformation masks were worn with long furs or cloaks obscuring the entire body, “to more completely embody the historic instances articulated in the song,” as the dancer represents either the animal, or the spirit that appeared to an ancestor.¹⁰ Evidence of these events spans across nearly every coastal community, though the specific deities depicted, and the values they represent vary between villages.

Haida

Despite frequent characterization of Northwest Coast Indigenous carvings as a monolith, distinctions between Haida, Nuuchah-nulth, and Kwakwaka'wakw mask work are evident in their design elements, roles during

⁸ Thom, Brian Thom, . *The Anthropology of Northwest Coast Oral Traditions* (Arctic Anthropology, 2003), 27.

⁹ Neil, *Masks and Headgear*, 457.

¹⁰ Neil, *Masks and Headgear, of Native American Ritual/Theatre on the Northwest Coast*, (Theatre Journal), 458; Boas, Franz Boas, and Aldona Jonaitis. *A Wealth of Thought: Franz Boas on Native American Art*. (Seattle, Washington: University of Washington Press, 2017), 73. ¹² Berlo, Catherine, and Phillips, *Native North*, 185.

ceremony, and the spirits they embody. Master carver Charles Edenshaw (given the name Tahayren) was one of the first renowned Haida carvers, bringing a fluidity to the otherwise strict and disciplined artistic practice. From Skidegate, Haida Gwaii, to a display case in the American Museum of Natural History, Edenshaw's 1895 mask (Figure 1) embodies the distinctive Haida style. Carved from cedar, as the majority of Haida pieces were, this humanoid mask represents the Gagixi't (or Gagiid), wild beings who were said to have drowned, then returned ashore to reside in the forest. These spirits were evoked through dance as warnings —much like the Inuit Qallupilluit— bringing to life the dangers of straying from view of the village. Edenshaw's use of colour is characteristic of Haida mask work, utilizing red and black, and the less common blue pigment to represent the Gagixi't's drowned complexion. The negative space between swaths of blue is filled by distinctive ovoid shapes and flowing patterns termed in 1965 by Bill Holm as formline design.¹² The thick eyebrow shape, in combination with the unpainted section above is likely a representation of a whale, with the slash marks between and below the eyebrows serving as both facial markings and to depict rippling water. These masks were stored in carved boxes between uses, intended to be displayed in low light, as components in a greater performance. As such, Haida masks were rarely finished or sealed to protect against weathering.¹¹ Their value was derived not from their affinity for preservation, but from the stories and collective emotion brought about by their role in ceremonial dance.

Nuu-chah-nulth

Further south, Nuu-chah-nulth carvers across Nootka Island worked in a less rigidly defined style with their masks. Like the Haida, they primarily worked with cedar; using both the wood for the mask itself, and shredded bark for hair, if the piece required. On occasion, carvers would use eagle feathers for hair, or other plant fibers. It is common for Nuu-chah-nulth masks to be geometric in structure, with a greater depth from front-back, obscuring the dancer in a more complete manner than in Haida masks. A minority of carvers were educated in an apprentice system, through which students were encouraged to explore their individual chosen style, a practice not nurtured in the European art education system. Carved by an unknown artist from Yuquot (the southernmost settlement on Nootka Island) A Nuu-chah-nulth human face mask (Figure 2) carved of cedar is rendered in a style unlike Haida or Kwakwaka'wakw pieces. Distinctly different from the broad, ovoid details of formline design, the mask's facial features are exaggerated and sharp, with a low mouth and more angular construction. The carved brow bone, narrow nose, and the unsealed finish of the piece is characteristic of Nuu-chah-nulth masks.¹² In this region, red, black, and blue pigments were used sparsely, and artists drew inspiration from both visual sources (family crests, the natural world) and non-visual sources (dreams, oral histories).¹³

Kwakwaka'wakw (Kwakiutl)

Many masks have been preserved from centuries-old mainland and islander

¹¹ Blackman, *Facing the Future*, 34.

¹² Blackman, *Facing the Future*, 31.

¹³ Blackman, *Facing the Future*, 28.

Kwakwaka'wakw communities. These artifacts, though less meticulously documented than those from Haida villages, allow for an in-depth view into the material and ceremonial practices of the time. The designs and features of Kwakwaka'wakw and Nuuchahnulth masks evolved concurrently, however differences in deities and use of colour have been found and can be attributed to the boundaries of southward spreading artistic innovations. Prior to the late eighteenth century, masks were carved of bare Western red cedar, with simple design elements. Similar to other Northwest Coast masks, shredded cedar bark was used for hair, sometimes long enough to obscure the body of the wearer to provide a more immersive experience. In the late eighteenth and early twentieth century, masks began to feature painted white backgrounds, and fringes of cedar bark dyed red, two key indicators of a change in aesthetic opinion and access to materials.

In addition to their use in potlatches and large gatherings, masks were essential to the Hamat'sa, a sect within Kwakiutl communities. Pieces used in Hamat'sa rituals indicate a tendency towards black-painted masks carved from one piece of cedar, with white eye sockets, and red nostrils and lips.¹⁴ A staple of Hamat'sa winter ceremony, Crooked Beak Masks (Figure 3) remain the most distinctive recurring figure in Kwakwaka'wakw mask work. These masks depict Galokwudzuwis, one of the mythical birds of the spirit world. Crooked Beak masks, and the dances that accompany them are an exaggerated form of Kwakwaka'wakw artistic characteristics, emphasizing the curved beak, wide mouth, and articulating jaw. In Kwakwaka'wakw mythology, Galokwudzuwis is one of four cannibal birds that guard the four corners of the earth, and its likeness is used in the Hamat'sa initiation dance. Each of these masks carries great cultural significance, whether by ownership, or to indicate involvement in one of many exclusive sects.

Colonization and the Tourist Trade

For centuries, the material culture of Indigenous communities across the west coast changed, evolving with time, under the complete creative control of master carvers and dancers. Masks were perfected, stored, donned, and discarded when deemed necessary—for the value of these pieces was derived not from the monetary sum it could gather at an auction, but from its role as a part of a greater narrative. When settlers first arrived at Nootka Island in 1778, establishing trading posts and engaging in battles over land ownership that would persist into modernity, it signaled a shift in the manner in which Indigenous creations were viewed. Masks worn to signal the transition of a child aging into adulthood were viewed as stagnant pieces of art, appraised and judged for the number of abalone shells added, or the rarity of pigmentation used to shade the cheekbones. From that point forward, the dominant cultural perspective in 'Canada' regarding Northwest Coast artwork was that of ownership, exoticism, and curation.

Further north in Haida Gwaii, metal tools traded by colonizers allowed for masks, argillite carvings, and regalia to be made at a greater volume than at any time prior. At the same time as settlers and art connoisseurs received an influx of argillite statues and miniscule plank house recreations from Haida Gwaii, colonizers on assignment from the British crown were removing families from their homes, placing them in nuclear single-family houses in the European style.¹⁵ Missionaries began to regulate daily activity, removing important cultural

¹⁴ Bill Holm, *Crooked Beak of Heaven: Masks and Other Ceremonial Art of the Northwest Coast* (Seattle, Washington: University of Washington Press, 1972), 19.

¹⁵ Paul R. Mullins and Robert Paynter, *Representing Colonizers: An Archaeology of Creolization, Ethnogenesis, and Indigenous Material Culture among the Haida* (Historical Archaeology, 2000), 79.

touchstones to establish complete control over populations still reeling from 1862's devastating smallpox outbreak. In 1885, the federal government's moratorium on potlatches signaled another attempt to alienate Indigenous communities from their spiritual and cultural roots and increase their dependence on the settler-colonial state. Simultaneously, the tourist trade demanded 'authentic' Indigenous art, primarily small-scale stone statues of totem poles, ceremonial boxes, and other imagery deemed exotic enough for consumption. Little reverence or understanding was shown to the Indigenous carvings produced, only the desire for complete ownership.

The imposition of Christian ideals and governmental control operated as an attempt to convert Northwest Coast Indigenous groups to Catholicism and to a capitalist way of life; however, generations of agency over home and craft could not be eradicated by those who didn't understand it. Instead of the intended cultural erosion, a rift was observed in the artifacts created for export, and those made for community use. A division between spiritual and secular designs meant that sacred Haida lineage crests and deities remained within the culture, and secular imagery was instead marketed as authentic Indigenous art. Carvers allowed only a superficial glimpse into village life, while settlers marveled at such oddities as small argillite whales, and tiny plank houses. By leaning into the colonial view of Indigenous art as monolithic, carvers were able to retain agency over their creative endeavors, thereby preserving the sanctity of their mask work and protecting it from rapid commodification or stagnation.

Contemporary Northwest Coast Masks

The early 1980's signified the beginning of a Northwest Coast cultural renaissance, both in the eyes of the dominant western narrative and within the Indigenous artistic sphere. After generations of clandestine gatherings, the potlatch ban was lifted in 1951, allowing Indigenous people to once again exercise their intrinsic right to cultural celebration. Artists and elders were empowered to embark on a long journey of reviving dormant customs and returning to their ancestral practices. This resurgence in carving, weaving, and dance came in part through the need for visual art as a means to amplify the teachings of oral histories. Dances that had, until recently, only been practiced in secret could be experienced as they were intended – in sacred spaces where all could receive teachings and strength through the support of a strong community. In tandem with repatriation and efforts for reconciliation by the federal government, this sudden cultural flare-up persisted, becoming the dawn of a new era in Northwest Coast mask work.

Though the primary desire of the early-contact tourist trade was for statues and other perceived oddities, the demand for masks was such that museum archives contained a near-complete record of Haida, Nuu-chah-nulth, and Kwakwaka'wakw ceremonial masks. Those that were preserved correctly served as a reference point for aspiring carvers, and nations began requesting the repatriation of their masks from government and private collections. While some were returned, the narrative peddled by colonial powers framing artifacts as freely-given was such that collectors were unwilling to give up their artifacts. In several cases, including the Museum of Anthropology, archives acquiesced to the demands of surrounding nations, allowing masks to be borrowed for short periods of time for use in ceremony. Access to these pieces is essential in re-connecting Indigenous elders and children with their history, acting as a surrogate for the generations of family members who were unable to pass on their knowledge. According to Haida carver Bill Reid, "Objects have a way of becoming more than objects, through the skill,

intensity, and love that render them well-made.”¹⁶ Masks, as Reid saw them, are inseparable from craftsmanship, and equally inseparable from thought about the nature of the world and our own role as a part of it.

Reid, whose ancestry traces back to the raven matrilineages of the Haida nation, is recognized as a pioneer of contemporary Northwest Coast carving. Drawing inspiration from Charles Edenshaw and similar Indigenous carvers, Reid combined modern processes and tools with traditional design to bring the Haida story of the raven into modernity. Though depictions of the raven differ in accordance to traditional carving styles, its presence in craft and stories is one that serves as an intra-cultural and cross-cultural adhesive. Lauded as an integral part of the Haida creation story, the raven is a trickster, representing the indomitable human spirit, and he is a cultural hero, bringing light to the Northern tribes. To invoke the raven is to recognize a centuries-long pantheon of deities that traverse both the spiritual and natural planes. Among Reid’s most striking carvings, *The Raven and the First Men* exists as a centerpiece in the Museum of Anthropology, resting on a bed of sand brought from Haida Gwaii by children from the village where the event depicted is said to have taken place.¹⁷ Though not a Haida mask, the faces of each figure in *The Raven and the First Men* were inspired by humanoid and raven masks, and employ the same angularity and formline design. Reid’s carving brings a Haida creation story into modernity, imagining how it must have appeared as the devious raven coaxed the first Haida people out into the world. This origin is one of adversity, of emerging back out into an unfamiliar world, and is reflected in the rebirth of Northwest Coast art and culture taking place at the time of *Raven and the First Men*’s debut.

A co-collaborator in the creation of *Raven and the First Men*, Jim Hart was integral in linking traditional and contemporary Northwest Coast carving. Finished in 1985, his two-headed raven transformation mask (Figure 4) exemplifies the fluidity and adaptability of Haida regalia. Currently in the possession of the Museum of Anthropology, the mask has been danced by both Hart and his son, first at a pole raising in False creek, at several potlatches, and during the closing celebrations of the Vancouver Art Gallery’s “Raven Travelling” exhibition.¹⁸ With its formline designs of black and red, hooked nose, and articulating jaw, the transformation mask is a paragon of Haida ingenuity. Each element has roots in Hart’s matrilineage, seamlessly assembled with the assistance of modern tools. *Raven Transformation Mask* and *Raven and the First Men* are contemporary Indigenous craftsmanship at its finest, interwoven with generations of care and intention.

Concluding Statements

The aesthetic journey of Northwest Coast mask work is overwhelmingly one of overcoming adversity. From the Northern Haida nation, to the Kwakwaka'wakw people spanning the Queen Charlotte Strait, and the Nuu-chah-nulth communities dotting Nootka Island, cultural understanding is instilled into every piece of work. These masks are far from stagnant artifacts, they are a persisting material record of oral traditions and creatures of spiritual significance. When comparing works from each of the three nations, similarities in their creation signify a shared

¹⁶ Bill Reid and Robert Bringhurst, *Solitary Raven: The Selected Writings of Bill Reid* (Vancouver, British Columbia: Douglas & McIntyre, 2000), 10.

¹⁷ Reid, *The Raven*.

¹⁸ Hart sold the mask to the MOA on the condition that it be given back to the Haida nation upon request. Hart, Jim M. Hart, *Raven Transformation Mask* (Museum of Anthropology: Vancouver, 1985).

origin, and centuries of communication. Their differences are a testament to unique value systems created over time, developed to serve the community in whichever manner they desire. Each attempt to eradicate Northwest Coast mythology has proven to be futile, as it is impossible to identify the elements most sacred to a culture without a genuine desire to understand and commune with the people involved. As long as oral histories persist, and celebration is abundant, the spirit and intention of Northwest Coast masks will endure.

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Images

Figure 1



Charles Edenshaw, *Mask Representing Gagixi't (Gagiid)*, 1895, *Raven Travelling: Two Centuries of Haida Art*

Figure 2



Artist Unknown, *Yuquot Human Face Mask*, Date Unknown, Royal BC Museum Figure 3



Hayogwis, *Kwakiutl Crooked Beak Mask*, Date Unknown, Crooked Beak of Heaven, *Masks and Other Ceremonial Art of the Northwest Coast*

Figure 4



Jim Hart, *Raven Transformation Mask*, 1985, Museum of Anthropology

Muskets Made the Ottoman State?: Handheld Firearms and State Formation in the Ottoman Empire from the Fifteenth through Seventeenth Centuries

Gary Chiang

In an anthology on the politics of state formation, historical sociologist Charles Tilly wrote on the relationship between interstate warfare and state formation that “war made the state, and the state made war.”¹ Here, Tilly theorizes that the demands of intense interstate warfare drives state leaders to expand and consolidate their polity’s administrative capacity to mobilize resources needed for the increasingly resource-intensive weaponry and strenuous war efforts that determine war outcomes. These war efforts in turn produce military innovations that alter the tactical landscape, and necessitate additional state capacity to counter or maintain the advantages such innovations provide. Representing a conjuncture between the widespread adoption of an unprecedented weapons technology – namely gunpowder – and the emergence of centralized states, early modern European states have served the exemplars typifying Tilly’s conceptualization of interstate competition and state formation as a positive feedback loop. For instance, military historian Geoffrey Parker has applied Tilly’s theory to formulate his version of the “Military Revolution” thesis, arguing that “because gunpowder weapons were expensive to produce, maintain and supply, only the most wealthy and prosperous political entities were able to afford a gunpowder train large enough both to defend their lands and to attack their enemies,” facilitating the formation of centralized states, as better-resourced monarchs outcompeted the feudal magnates within their realms to consolidate state power.² As these newly centralized states competed for geopolitical power, the tactical pressures of battle demanded they further centralize, expand, and consolidate state capacity to martial an ever-increasing supply of resources for warfighting and military innovation, translating these pressures into drivers of state formation.

As one of the three early modern states dubbed the Islamic “gunpowder empires” alongside the Safavid and Mughal empires, the Ottoman empire would seem to exemplify this dynamic, given the centrality of gunpowder weapons to its conquests suggested by this moniker, and the geopolitical rivalries it faced on at least two fronts simultaneously for much of its existence.³ As such, to what extent did the organizational demands of adopting handheld firearms, and their social and political implications, drive the formation of state capacity of the fifteenth to seventeenth century Ottoman Empire? Though the widespread adoption of handheld firearms by Ottoman forces and their production demands did drive state formation, they always operated alongside other factors and undermined state capacity in the long-term overall, by empowering the Janissaries to pursue parochial interests that burdened

¹ Charles Tilly, ed., *The Formation of National States in Western Europe*, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1975), p. xiv, quoted in Arjun Chowdhury, “The Self-Undermining State,” in *The Myth of International Order: Why weak states persist and alternatives to the state fade away*, (New York: Oxford University Press), 2017, 18.

²Kelly DeVries, “Gunpowder Weaponry and the Rise of the Early Modern State,” *War in History* 5, no. 2 (1998): 128, <http://www.jstor.org/stable/26004330>.

³Rhoads Murphey, “Material Constraints on Ottoman Warfare: The Immutable Context.” In *Ottoman Warfare, 1500-1700*, (London: Routledge, 1999), <https://doi.org/10.4324/9780203015971>, 13.; For much of its history, the Ottoman Empire faced geopolitical rivals on multiple fronts, from the Habsburgs and their Catholic allies in the West, to Shi’ite Safavid Iran in the East, and later with the collapse of the latter, the expansion of the Russian empire into the Caucasus region from the North.

their capacity for fighting, and forced the Porte to rely on *sekban* militias loyal only to the economic gains such firearms brought them.

Contrary to their reputation, handheld firearms did not constitute the sole decisive factor on early modern battlefields, at least for the Ottomans. Surveying several major Ottoman victories traditionally attributed to their deployment of gunpowder weapons, military Ottomanist Gábor Ágoston writes in his article, “War-winning weapons? On the Decisiveness of Ottoman Firearms from the Siege of Constantinople (1453) to the Battle of Mohács (1526):”

However, firearms [...] seldom decided the outcome of military engagements. It was a combination of many factors, including the Ottomans' ability to consistently outnumber their enemies in deployed troops and firearms [...] This, in turn, reflected the strength of the Ottoman administrative-fiscal and logistical systems, which maintained, paid, and supplied one of the largest armies in central and southeastern Europe, Asia Minor, and the Middle East.⁴

Here, Ágoston argues that firearms served only one factor that, combined with others such as superior numbers and logistics, determined the Ottomans' victorious outcomes. For instance, in the 1453 Siege of Constantinople, “careful planning, resourceful leadership, numerical superiority [...] better logistics [...] and lack of Byzantine relief forces all proved crucial in the eventual Ottoman victory,” illustrating how organizational, logistical, and numerical superiority and the lack of Byzantine reinforcements produced this Ottoman victory alongside effective deployment of gunpowder artillery.⁵ Though the 1514 Battle of Çaldıran witnessed the effectiveness of Ottoman firearms against a Safavid army without any, both this battle and the 1526 Battle of Mohács featured massive Ottoman numerical superiority, alongside crucial tactical mistakes by their Safavid and Hungarian opponents respectively, as factors behind these victories. Ottomans' deployment of gunpowder weaponry served alongside these competing factors to produce victory as the use of firearms was not always exclusive to Ottoman armies across every battle; Mohács featured extensive use of such weaponry on both sides.⁶ Numerical superiority in firepower also produced victory at Marj Dahiğ in 1516 against a Mamluk army also heavily-armed with gunpowder weapons.⁷ At Raydaniyya in 1517, defectors informed the Ottomans of the Mamluks' battle plans securing that victory.⁸ Contrarily, Mehmed II's (r. 1444 – 1446, 1451 – 1481) 1456 Siege of Belgrade saw him defeated by John Hunyadi's 28,000-strong force of mostly ill-equipped peasants inexperienced in warfare, against his 50,000-strong besieging army that boasted a first-rate artillery force for its time, demonstrating how numerically and qualitatively superior firearms did not guarantee victory.⁹

⁴Gábor Ágoston, “War-Winning Weapons? On the Decisiveness of Ottoman Firearms from the Siege of Constantinople (1453) to the Battle of Mohács (1526),” *Journal of Turkish Studies* 39, (2013): 142-143.; Eric McGeer, “The Defence of Constantinople,” in *The Cambridge Companion to Constantinople*, ed. Sarah Bassett, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2022), 128.

⁵Ágoston, “War-Winning Weapons?,” 132.

⁶Ágoston, “War-Winning Weapons?,” 135.

⁷Ágoston, “War-Winning Weapons?,” 140.

⁸Ágoston, “War-Winning Weapons?,” 142.

⁹Ágoston, “War-Winning Weapons?,” 138-139.

Importantly, Ottomanist Géza Dávid writes in his chapter in *The Cambridge History of Turkey*, “Ottoman Armies and Warfare, 1453–1603,” that most Janissaries wielded firearms only “by the second half of the sixteenth century,” sometime after the Ottomans had achieved all their major conquests.¹⁰ As such, the Ottomans had not exploited handheld firearms technology to the fullest until after their most significant expansions, limiting their contributions towards Ottoman empire-building to simply one among many factors as opposed to a decisive one. These qualifications to Ottoman firearms’ tactical advantages demonstrate them as less than overwhelmingly decisive on the battlefield and limit the extent their introduction drove the Ottomans’ state formation, by establishing upper bounds to the tactical pressures incentivizing the Ottomans to develop the state capacity for producing and maintaining such weapons, even if they retained significant tactical value.

The Ottoman shift towards an infantry-based army of musketry during the Long Habsburg-Ottoman War of 1593-1606 demonstrated that firearms nonetheless remained advantageous enough to apply sufficient tactical pressure to drive the fiscal-administrative expansion needed to service such centrally commanded infantry armies. However, this pressure hardly fueled the ensuing state formation alone. In his article, “A Contribution to the Military Revolution Debate: The Janissaries Use of Volley Fire During the Long Ottoman-Habsburg War of 1593-1606 and the Problem of Origins,” historian Günhan Börekçi writes how one account of the 1605 Siege of Esztergom “clearly describes the musketeer Janissaries practicing volley fire” in battle well before the first known instance of western armies deploying the tactic in action in 1620.¹¹ As a tactic, volley fire solved the limitation of muzzle-loading muskets and arquebuses whereby enemies could advance during their long reloading intervals, arranging musketeers into rows that fired in rotation. Each row took its turn to fire as a wave, then reloaded kneeling down to allow the rows behind their turn until they had completed reloading to fire again and so forth, enabling a constant barrage at the enemy.¹² Given that volley fire operated most effectively when employed by mass columns of highly-trained, motivated, and disciplined infantry under centralized command, its adoption heavily incentivized states to develop the fiscal-administrative infrastructure needed to service these expansive armies of highly professionalized troops to optimize volley fire’s tactical effectiveness.

As such, proponents of the “Military Revolution” thesis regard the adoption of volley fire as central evidence demonstrating the pursuit of fiscal-military state formation in response to battlefield pressures.¹³ However, in his article, “Firearms and Military Adaptation: The Ottomans and the European Military Revolution 1450-1800,” Ágoston writes that “[Adoption of volley fire] might, at least partly, be explained by the swelling of the corps and the resulting decline of the janissaries’ fighting skills and discipline, which in turn required constant drills to keep their skills up to date and to enhance corps coherence.”¹⁴ Contextualized alongside another passage stating that

¹⁰ Géza Dávid, “Ottoman Armies and Warfare, 1453–1603,” in *The Cambridge History of Turkey*, ed. Suraiya N. Faroqhi and Kate Fleet, vol. 2: 276–319, The Cambridge History of Turkey, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012), doi:10.1017/CHO9781139049047.014, 284.

¹¹ Günhan Börekçi, “A Contribution to the Military Revolution Debate: The Janissaries Use of Volley Fire During the Long Ottoman-Habsburg War of 1593-1606 and the Problem of Origins,” *Acta Orientalia Academiae Scientiarum Hungaricae* 59, no. 4 (2006): 411, <http://www.jstor.org/stable/23658758>.

¹² Börekçi, “A Contribution to the Military Revolution Debate,” 410.

¹³ Gábor Ágoston, “Firearms and Military Adaptation: The Ottomans and the European Military Revolution, 1450-1800,” *Journal of World History* 25, no. 1 (2014): 98, <http://www.jstor.org/stable/43286061>.

¹⁴ Ágoston, “Firearms and Military Adaptation,” 98.

“realizing Istanbul's need for infantry troops, the Janissaries themselves seized the moment and used it to enlist their sons and relatives into the corps. Selling Janissary certificates - that is, ‘entry tickets’ to the corps - became a lucrative business for janissary officers.”¹⁵ Ágoston’s quote illustrates how the adoption of volley fire did not necessarily indicate warfare-driven state formation taking place. The Janissaries exploited the massive manpower demands accompanying the shift to an infantry-based army to induct their relatives into their corps by selling them forged Janissary certifications underneath the Porte’s nose.¹⁶ As the *devşirme* increasingly struggled to recruit enough Janissaries to meet growing demand, the state increasingly recruited through the recommendations of Janissary commanders, who naturally picked their own relatives and personal retinue, creating conditions enabling Janissaries to pass off the relatives they sold forged certificates to as recruited through such avenues.¹⁷ As such, the interests of the increasingly monied Janissaries in filling their corps’ expansion with social connections drove the expansion of military personnel accompanying the shift to an infantry-based army and the corresponding fiscal-administrative expansion as much as the tactical pressures of handheld firearms.¹⁸ These tactical pressures thus hardly consisted of the sole or even primary factor behind the shift to a musketry-based army, even if the much shorter training durations of musketry provided a technological advantage in personnel logistics through enabling combat performance to remain satisfactory despite the lax recruitment standards.¹⁹

¹⁵ Ágoston, “Firearms and Military Adaptation,” 123.

¹⁶ In the wake of Selim II (r. 1566 – 1574) and his brother’s competing enlistment of droves of *levend* militia and landless *Sipahi*, the latter dispossessed by their father Suleyman I’s transition to the *iltizam* tax-farming system the away from the *Timar* land grant system of land tenure, on the promise of admitting them into the tax-exempt *askeri* class upon coronation as princes competing for support for their succession claims, his defeated brother’s supporters resorted to pillaging to satisfy their frustrated expectations in the wake of their patron’s defeat. With the countryside plagued by banditry often conducted by the very *Sipahi* previously charged with policing, Selim II increasingly resorted to sending janissaries to enforce law and order in rural areas, where they complemented their salaries with the fines they collected for legal violations, which they then accumulated to purchase and establish local land and businesses and shore up their income against the rising inflation of the late sixteenth and seventeenth centuries from the influx of Spanish American silver. This marked the beginning of the janissaries developing vested interests that diverged from their once exclusive loyalty to the sultan, to the extent that most refused recall orders from the countryside. As such, previous prohibitions on janissary commerce became much less enforceable, resulting in janissary families seeking to induct kin into the corps for the lucrative opportunities membership could now bring.; See Ágoston, “Firearms and Military Adaptation,” 98.

¹⁷ Ágoston, “Firearms and Military Adaptation,” 118.; Gilles Veinstein, “On the Ottoman Janissaries (Fourteenth-Nineteenth Centuries),” In *Fighting for a Living: A Comparative Study of Military Labour 1500-2000*, ed. Erik-Jan Zürcher, (Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press), 2013. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/j.ctt6wp6pg.7>, 120.

¹⁸ By the mid-seventeenth century, the Janissaries has obtained permission to pursue commercial ventures on the side, to support the spouses and families that the Porte had by now granted them the freedom to have. These ventures included bachelor rooms, inns, public baths, market stalls, and coffeehouses, and entrenched the Janissaries’ political influence by establishing a financial dimension to their clout. Despite its concerns that coffeehouses could easily become institutions for incubating political dissidence against the state, the Porte merely “began to close down a few [coffeehouses] as a deterrent to the others” instead of banning them outright, attesting to how large their capacity to exert political pressure over the Ottoman state had further grown with the addition of their financial interests. See Ali Çaksu, “Janissary Coffee Houses in Late Eighteenth-Century Istanbul.” In *Ottoman Tulips, Ottoman Coffee: Leisure and Lifestyle in the Eighteenth Century*, by Dana Sajdi, (London: I.B.Tauris & Co Ltd, 2007), <http://dx.doi.org/10.5040/9780755608393.ch-005>, 125.

¹⁹ The Ottoman state increasingly recruited older boys averaging sixteen years old that could quickly become old enough for combat, reflecting how recruits could complete musketry training within months, as opposed to years with janissary archery.; See Ágoston, “Firearms and Military Adaptation,” 118.

Furthermore, Ágoston points out that Janissary expansion pre-dates the Long War, suggesting incentives other than the competitive pressures of firearms innovation – such as the manpower demands of occupying vast new conquests in Iraq and the Levant – drove this expansion, even if the Long War did accelerate this trend.²⁰ Considered against all this, the practice of volley fire drills did not necessarily reflect state formation centrally driven by evolving combat environments, but could also reflect the need to maintain cohesion and discipline among the vast influx of inexperienced personnel into the janissary corps. This duality of causation renders these drills equally the effect and cause of state formation. as Servicing the influx of manpower both necessitated and was necessitated by the purposes volley fire served in maintaining troop quality, and the organizational demands imposed on the state by the optimization of musketry tactics. As such, that volley fire drills played both chicken and egg in the relationship between gunpowder warfare and state formation due to its multiple causality qualified the limits of the former in driving the latter as merely one causal factor among others, instead of serving a central one.

The vast expansion of their corps in the wake of the Long War granted the Janissaries, already influential enough to “prompt” Suleyman I (r. 1520 – 1566) to “prematurely” abandon the 1529 siege of Vienna; an increasingly mutinous mood over dwindling supplies had been growing, giving the Janissaries even more leverage over the Ottoman state as the most critical supplier servicing its increasingly demanding manpower needs.²¹ In his article on how Janissary influence obstructed Ottoman efforts at tactical and administrative military reforms in the seventeenth century, “Strong Armies, Slow Adaptation: Civil-Military Relations and the Diffusion of Military Power,” political scientist Burak Kadercan writes that the Janissaries’ “recruitment, socialization, and career advancement strategies produced a strong corporate identity within the Janissary corps” resulted in an often tight solidarity that held even against the sultan, on occasion, when they felt he threatened their interests.²² Here, Kadercan explains how the *devşirme*, their own dedicated institutions such as their exclusive barracks, and the career opportunities within their own dedicated officer corps produced solidarity among Janissaries; this unity could manifest intensely enough to defy even the very sultans in whose service they organized their existence around when they perceived the state might threaten their privileges.²³ The shift to an infantry-based army only exacerbated the weight of their influence as the Janissaries exploited the Ottoman state’s increased manpower demands with their expanded numbers to veto tactical reforms. The adoption of bayonets, which would have overhauled their traditional training regime, was blocked in such a fashion, and the Military Administration was routinely gouged for more privileges, such as during their 1656 revolt in Istanbul in demand of higher wages.²⁴ As Janissaries inducted more and more members without state approval, state budgets became increasingly overburdened by their salaries, which

²⁰ Ágoston, “Firearms and Military Adaptation,” 112.

²¹ Burak Kadercan, “Strong Armies, Slow Adaptation: Civil-Military Relations and the Diffusion of Military Power,” *International Security* 38, no. 3 (2013): 134, <http://www.jstor.org/stable/24480558>.

²² Mesut Uyar and Edward J. Erickson, *A Military History of the Ottomans: From Osman to Atatürk* (Santa Barbara, California: Praeger Security International/ABC-CLIO, 2009), p. 39, quoted in Kadercan, “Strong Armies, Slow Adaptation,” 134.

²³ Kadercan, “Strong Armies, Slow Adaptation,” 133-134.

²⁴ Kadercan, “Strong Armies, Slow Adaptation,” 135.

only worsened Janissary discipline as the Porte struggled to pay them fully or punctually.²⁵ Janissaries even managed to employ their clout to increasingly avoid combat, with the share of their membership serving on campaign declining to seventeen percent by the Russo-Ottoman War of 1710-1711, and those that did fight performed badly given the corps' resistance to tactical reforms.²⁶ Sultans who pushed for reform too hard risked dethronement and even assassination, as Osman II (r. 1618 – 1622) discovered with his beheading by a Janissary revolt for his reform attempts.

This willingness to act as kingmakers not only hamstrung the Porte's capacity to maintain centralized control over the Janissaries and deploy them effectively in combat, but also undermined its fiscal capacity as the state now refused to entertain Janissary financial interests at the risk of armed revolt. The deterioration of the Janissaries, from elite professional slave-soldiers to fraternal pressure group, started with their expansion to supply increasing demand for musketry and highlighted the potential for firearms to undermine state capacity depending on their interaction with pre-existing institutions, nullifying the gains in state formation they otherwise drove.

Forced by Janissary insubordination to search for alternative pools of infantry recruits, the Ottoman state found one in the *sekbān* militias, a solution that soon merely replaced one problem with another. In his book, *The Ottoman Empire: Conquest, Organization, and Economy*, Ottomanist Halil İnalçik writes of the employment of *sekbān*:

After their contract of service had expired, the *sekbān*, usually under the same *bölük-başı* [heads of militia companies], looked for new employment in the service of pasha or the begs. If none was available, they roamed about the countryside, exacting money and provisions from villages and towns without defense. In this case, the *sekbān* were pursued by the government forces as *celālī* [...] the *celālī* disorders recurred, especially during periods of war, because the sultan always needed *sekbān* as *tüfeng-endāz* [musketry] soldiers.²⁷

²⁵ Kivanç K. Karaman and Sevkett Pamuk, "Ottoman State Finances in European Perspective, 1500–1914." *The Journal of Economic History* 70, no. 3 (2010): 612, doi:10.1017/S0022050710000550.; The extent of the Janissaries' influence was great enough that by the turn of the eighteenth century, they had pressured the state into allowing a waiting list of "Janissary candidates" for prospective inductees. Teenage boys who worked as shampooers and male sex workers for the Janissaries could register on this waiting list to receive the privilege of eating and living in the Janissary barracks to better service their clients. Serkan Delice writes that these youths would live on the barracks under the patronage of an older, fellow Janissary who they would stay with and service until they had matured enough to grow sufficient facial hair to style a mustache. The Janissaries could exert their influence to compel the state into maintaining recruitment even as the 'applicants' outstripped demand in order to establish a waiting list, only to use this waiting list to grant access to the barracks for services such as live-in sex work, attesting to the degree their influence over the Porte had grown.; see Serkan Delice, "The Janissaries and their Bedfellows: Masculinity and Male friendship in Eighteenth-Century Ottoman Istanbul," in *Gender and Sexuality in Muslim Cultures*. ed. Gul Ozyegin, (London: Routledge, 2016), <https://doi.org/10.4324/9781315583945>, 125.

²⁶ Gábor Ágoston, "Military Transformation in the Ottoman Empire and Russia, 1500-1800," *Kritika: Explorations in Russian & Eurasian History* 12, no. 2 (2011): 306, <https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&AuthType=shib&db=30h&AN=61339908&site=ehost-live&scope=site>.

²⁷ Halil İnalçik, "The Socio-Political Effects of the Diffusion of Fire-arms in the Middle East," in *The Ottoman Empire: Conquest, Organization, and Economy*, (London: Valorium Reprints, 1978), 201.

Here, İnalçik describes how the *sekban* militias – wage-earning musketry militias usually recruited from the peasantry contracted to serve as military personnel by the state – refused to disarm with their contract’s expiration, searching for employment under a pasha or beg, or resorting to banditry if they could find none. Contextualized against the ongoing *Celali* Revolts, these *sekban* now contributed to the very rural banditry problem arising from the rebellions the state had previously contracted them to suppress. The peasants that comprised these militias found military employment and banditry more lucrative than peasant life and farming during the hardships of the Little Ice Age, one major factor underpinning these rebellions.²⁸ Yet, as İnalçik mentions in his quote, the state continued to recruit *sekban* despite their tendency to participate in the *Celali* rebellions upon discharge because the manpower demands of musketry warfare and the unreliability of the Janissaries. *Sekban* appealed to the Porte as a vast, quickly mobilizable pool of relatively cheap peasant musketeers, even if this perpetuated a self-enforcing loop by suppressing *sekban* who joined the *Celalis* with more *sekban* who would later do the same. The Porte continued hiring *sekban* as a stopgap despite the negative feedback loop this perpetuated, which attested not just to the dearth of reliable sources of disciplined military personnel, but also the capacity of firearms to undermine state capacity by creating this shortage in the first place. By giving the Janissaries a pretext to enhance their bargaining powers *vis-à-vis* the state and driving it to give firearms to those of tenuous loyalty who might wield them against the state itself, firearms exposed how vulnerable Ottoman military institutions were to disruptions to the balance of power between the Porte and its Janissaries.

Moreover, İnalçik writes that the pressures of the *Celali* rebellions drove the Porte to encourage “the pasha and begs governing the provinces” to enlist into their “household forces” as many *sekban* as they could muster, even though this enabled many pashas to join the *Celalis* themselves; the excessive taxation imposed to sustain these forces resulted in their dismissal from office, leading elite officials to join the *Celali* ranks.²⁹ This dynamic attested to how the Porte’s increasing desperation to find a dependable source of musket-bearing troops empowered provincial notables to field their own private armies, further diluting state capacity through military decentralization. These private armies’ potential to threaten the central government already struggling against insurrection and janissary insubordination forced the latter to tolerate their appropriation of military capacity as the recruitment supply of last resort, relying on them as nominal extensions of the military even though their loyalties ultimately

²⁸ The coincidence of the Little Ice Age and the inflationary pressures of Spanish American silver inflows created a web of intertwined crises, where peasants malnourished by the dwindling harvests resulting from the cooling climate left for the cities to find better economic opportunities, leaving the remaining ones increasingly overtaxed by the *timariots* and *sipahi* looking to shore up their wealth against inflation, itself exacerbated by the Porte’s debasement of silver coinage to mint sufficient currency to meet expenditures the wake of this inflation. Dwindling numbers of peasants working the fields and increased urban demand from peasant flight into the cities only heightened inflation, as did the concurrent but ill-timed demographic expansion. Together with the Porte’s decision to make irregular wartime taxes permanent to sustain budgets strained by the ongoing crises, peasants now found employment as *sekban* more economically viable than agricultural work, and refused to disarm when their service contracts ended. Keeping their weapons, they either searched for work as the private troops of provincial notables, or joined in droves the very banditry the Porte previously deployed them to end, as even this proved more lucrative than agrarian life in the seventeenth century context. These factors, among others, resulted in the social unrest and intrastate conflicts known as the *Celali* rebellions.; see Renée Worringer, *A Short History of the Ottoman Empire*, (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2021), 190-197.

²⁹ İnalçik, *The Ottoman Empire*, 201.

remained with their grandee households.³⁰ The private armies of these notables became the final resolution of the Ottomans' military manpower shortage started by the shift towards an infantry-based army in response to the tactical impact of firearms, diffusing state capacity among these grandee households, rendering the Porte beholden to their vested interests, and compromised its ability to implement policy with centralized resolve. That handheld firearms proved crucial in this transition from patrimonial rule to decentralized monarchy demonstrated their potential to equally drive the consolidation and disaggregation of state capacity, depending on the institutional and social contexts they interacted with, rendering them a double-edged sword for the interests of state formation.

One area where increasing firearms adoption did develop state capacity was the Ottoman state's increasing demand for handheld firearms, which drove its direct intervention into the firearms industry to secure a steady supply of firearm components, though only in complementary ways. In his book, *Guns for the Sultan: Military Power and the Weapons Industry in the Ottoman Empire*, Ágoston writes that the Ottomans declared the firearms and munitions industries state monopolies, intervening in various manufacturing areas, particularly in saltpeter production.³¹ The Porte "tried to place villages with saltpeter deposits under the treasury's supervision" to maintain its monopoly, assigned the local *beglerbeg* or *sanjakbeg* to oversee production, which mainly took place in state-run workshops or ones integrated into the *iltizam* tax-farming system, or by villagers conscripted in return for tax exemptions.³² The Porte also managed iron, lead, and copper mines that supplied munitions and firearms manufacturing through state-appointed superintendents or the *iltizam* system, as was the case with the many state-established gunpowder and firearms manufactories across the empire.³³ These industrial interventions attested not only to the Porte's administrative reach for securing provision of these crucial resources, but also their roots in the *timar* land grant system.³⁴ In his article, "Ottoman Military Organization in Southeastern Europe, c. 1420 – 1720", Ottomanist Rhoads Murphey writes:

But thereafter [Murad II's (r. 1421 – 1444, 1446 – 1451) death], the resources available to the state through land registration and control over the revenues deriving from land, coupled with a developing bureaucratic apparatus capable of effectively assessing and extracting the Empire's agricultural, mineral, and

³⁰ İnalçık, 201.

³¹ Gábor Ágoston, *Guns for the Sultan: Military Power and the Weapons Industry in the Ottoman Empire*. (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2005), 104.

³² Ágoston, *Guns for the Sultan*, 105

³³ Ágoston, *Guns for the Sultan*, 129, 170.

³⁴ The *timar* land-grant system of land tenure served as the Ottoman Empire's means of supporting its *sipahi* cavalrymen without maintaining them as a permanent standing army weighing on the state treasury. Intended to allow a *sipahi* to support himself in place of a salary, a *timar* granted a *sipahi* the right to tax the peasants that lived on that land, and a portion within this allotment for his own personal farming use, to support himself as compensation for military service to the Ottoman state. In return, the *sipahi* was expected to serve on the Sultan's campaigns when called upon for service, and provide a pre-established amount of troops, weaponry, and supplies proportionate to their *timar* revenue. If a *sipahi* did not answer summons to serve on campaigns, the Ottoman state might strip him of his *timar*, and by extension, his livelihood, while commendable performance on the battlefield might earn him additions to his *timar*-holdings. Outside of campaigns, *sipahi* were expected to expend their resources on law enforcement over their *timars*. Notably, the *timar* land itself was considered *miri*, or state (sultanic) land – the *sipahi* neither owned the land nor held the right to expel the peasants who lived on it, since the latter held an ancestral right to farm this land. Rather, the Ottoman state itself owned the land, and merely granted a *sipahi* the power to collect taxes and enforce the law over the *timar* as his jurisdiction.; see Worringer, *A Short History of the Ottoman Empire*, 59.

commercial wealth, provided the capacity to lessen dependency on military provision from private sources and to mobilise modestly proportioned armies by drawing on the state's own agents, both the seasonally mobilised *timariots* and permanent standing forces.³⁵

Here, Murphey describes how the need to lessen their dependence on feudal retainers and private sources for troops and provisions drove Murad II and his successor, Mehmed II, to establish land registers that underpinned the *timar* system, which the Porte also repurposed for extracting mineral wealth – such as the saltpeter and metals used to produce gunpowder and ammunition. As such, gunpowder weaponry, which the Ottomans adopted in the 1390's as artillery, constituted a noteworthy driver of Ottoman state formation alongside other factors driving centralization, such as intrastate competition. Moreover, that this institution-building pre-dates the widespread integration of handheld firearms into Ottoman forces limited the contributions of the shift to a musketry-based army towards state formation to enhancing the administrative capacity of pre-existing institutions, rendering them complementary to other drivers of state capacity.

The shift to a musketry-based army interacted with the Janissaries' outsized influence in Ottoman domestic politics to further empower their pursuit of personal interest. This intersection proved a significant detriment to the Porte's capacity to wage war, demonstrating the importance of institutional context in the relationship between military technology and state formation. That the Ottoman experience with handheld firearms diverged so much from the expectations of the "Military Revolution" thesis attests not just to their lack of primacy as drivers of state formation, but also questions the viability of the thesis in asserting that technological factors alone can drive state formation. Additionally, the organizational demands of deploying handheld firearms merely fueled the expansion of pre-existing institutions, attesting the relevance of historical timing in state formation; for perhaps musketry may have played a central role in the establishment of burgeoning Ottoman institutions, had their widespread integration into their military occurred a century earlier. Whether war made the Ottoman state or not, muskets and arquebuses hurt state capacity more than they helped.

³⁵ Rhoads Murphey, "Ottoman Military Organization in Southeastern Europe, c. 1420 – 1720," In *European Warfare, 1350–1750*, ed. Frank Tallett and D. J. B. Trim, 135–58, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), doi: 10.1017/CBO9780511806278.009, 141.

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Memory and the London Chronicler

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The sixteenth century was a period of widespread, fast-paced social, cultural, and religious change in which evolving social structures and emerging technologies altered the way people perceived themselves, their nation, and the past itself. The Reformation was a major driver of these changes. Alexandra Walsham notes in her essay “History, Memory, and the English Reformation” that Protestants, and eventually Catholics, sought to find historical grounds for their religion.¹ These polemics caused unforeseen changes in historical methods; history which had been purely narrative based was no longer suitable for religious cultures that demanded to orient itself as historically correct and moral.² This process required a form of historical methodology that meticulously assessed the facts of the past for interpretations that supported or denied certain frames of thought. John Stow (1525-1605) was an English chronicler and antiquarian who wrote during this time of social transition. Stow’s work was narrative based with little interpretation of events in the past. His work was also intrinsically connected to these changes in historical memory, as he experienced a radically changing historical framework. Stow, who collected items of anecdotes of historical interest was outnumbered by individuals who burned, destroyed, or otherwise damaged relics in hopes of purging a problematic past.³ This essay will explore how chronicles have recorded events of the past as a process of memory keeping and why they were no longer deemed effective historical writings. It will also explore Stow’s observations of London as a space of social meeting and change. This essay will argue that within this space of change, Stow’s work would decline in popularity along with chronicles more broadly as memory was altered by the Reformation and the emergence of a new historiography.

Many of the techniques employed by Stow and other chroniclers of the Early Modern period come from a long tradition of historical writing. Since the medieval period, English history had largely been recorded in chronicles. Beginning with the Anglo-Saxon chronicle, first dated around the 890s CE, history was recorded through writings of prose narrative, poetry, genealogies, and some Latin passages.⁴ There was a clear distinction made between records of natural events in which the memory of community is emphasized, and political records which constituted what the Anglo-Saxons considered to be history.⁵ In these texts, history is relegated to the political machinations and accomplishments of great leaders. In contrast, memory is associated with natural events – such as natural disasters. It was only when many people had remembered an event that it was given credit in a chronicle.⁶ D.R. Woolf notes in his essay “Erudition and the Idea of History in Renaissance England,” that it is unclear exactly

¹ Alexandra Walsham, “History, Memory, and the English Reformation,” *The Historical Journal* 55, no. 4 (2012): 902.

² *Ibid.*, 906.

³ *Ibid.*, 907-908.

⁴ Thomas A. Bredehoft, “History and Memory in the *Anglo-Saxon Chronicle*,” in *Readings in Medieval Texts: Interpreting Old and Middle English Literature*, ed. David Johnson and Elaine Treharne (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005), 112.

⁵ *Ibid.*, 114-115.

⁶ *Ibid.*, 114-115.

when history became about more than politics.⁷ The chronicles in many ways precede this development, as the recording of the politic in the form of the deeds of great men was a persistent idea, laid out in the Anglo-Saxon chronicle.

John Stow began his study of history around the 1560s, publishing his *Summarie of Englyshe Chronicles* in 1565 which was expanded in *The Chronicles of England* in 1580 and later rewritten in *The Annales of England* in 1592.⁸ Stow's final work was 1598's *The Survey of London* in which he walked around the city describing geographical features such as buildings and public monuments, while he recounted the history of their construction. Each of these works were reprinted numerous times during and after Stow's lifetime, with new writers adding to the contents.⁹ Stow's work was primarily written within the chronicle tradition, which was a multifaceted genre with many purposes. Chronicles were public records that could be used to gain information on events of the near or distant past. They were also designed to be used by a wide, general audience, a trend which began with the Anglo-Saxon chronicle, which was written in the vernacular rather than Latin, making it a more accessible text.¹⁰ Alexandra Walsham notes in her essay "Chronicles, Memory, and Autobiography in Reformation England" that the chronicle continued to be the primary form of historical writing into the Middle Ages where it entered the monastic setting.¹¹ The chronicle was a multi-generational artifact in which chroniclers would rely on previous chroniclers; this carried into the Early Modern period. John Stow's 1605 chronicle *The Annales of England* contains a section with 338 entries titled "Authors out of whom these Annales are collected."¹² Out of these entries, which are comprised partly of source documents and archival institutions, most are dedicated to previous chroniclers and antiquarians. This multi-generational approach allowed for a wide range of entries to accumulate over time, giving each new successive writer access to more information about the past. It should be noted that the chronicler did not return to the original sources for their information, instead relying on previous authorities. This implies that they were entirely reliant on human memory, and with no assessment of verisimilitude, events ran the risk of being corrupted over time. Any error on the part of previous writers risked being carried to the next generation. In both conception and function the chronicle was linked to the memory of the common people; it stood both as a record of great deeds and exceptional occurrences in everyday life. Despite its evolution through various contexts the chronicle more or less retained its initial formula.

⁷ D.R. Woolf, "Erudition and the Idea of History in Renaissance England," *Renaissance Quarterly* 40 no. 1 (1987): 12.

⁸ Alexandra Gillespie, "Introduction," in *John Stow (1525-1605) and the Making of the English Past*, ed. Ian Gadd and Alexandra Gillespie (London: The British Library, 2004), 2.

⁹ *Ibid.*, 2.

¹⁰ Bredehoft, "History and Memory in the *Anglo-Saxon Chronicle*," 110.

¹¹ Alexandra Walsham, "Chronicles, Memory and Autobiography in Reformation England," *Memory Studies* 11, no. 1 (2018): 36.

¹² Stow, John, *The annales of England Faithfully collected out of the most authenticall authors, records, and other monuments of antiquitie, lately collected, since encreased, and continued, from the first habitation vntill this present yeare 1605. By Iohn Stow citizen of London.*

John Stow spent his life in the pursuit and writing of history. He was born in the parish of St. Michael Cornhill, London.¹³ Although not much is known about his personal life, it is clear that he spent much of his time in London, moving only once during his lifetime a few blocks from his birthplace in the eastern part of the city.¹⁴ It is likely that Stow never received a formal education, instead teaching himself how to read and write both Latin and English, which he was able to do quite fluently.¹⁵ Stow was a thorough, dedicated writer who went to great lengths to preserve and understand what was happening around him and what had happened long before he was born. This same thoroughness also supported his first pursuit: the collection and preservation of manuscripts and objects of historical interest which brought him to the attention of members of the antiquarian network such as John Leland.¹⁶

Stow's thoroughness in collecting also led him to be investigated by the Elizabethan government.¹⁷ John Strype recorded a list of the banned books Stow was accused of keeping: *The History of the Life and Acts of the Most Reverend Father in God, Edmund Grindal*, including a number of Catholic treatises such as "The Assertion and Defence of the Sacrament of the Altar, &c. by Dr. Smith," and "A Confutation of a certain book called, *A Defence of the True and Catholic Doctrine, &c.* against the late Archbishop of Canterbury; by Dr. Smith."¹⁸ It would be misleading to suggest that the inclusion of these titles in Stow's collection is evidence of a Catholic leaning in a now largely Protestant nation. Stow's desire for thoroughness, for as wide an understanding of history as possible, meant that ownership of any and all material – even controversial or banned material – was warranted and necessary. As Harris notes, Stow's down to earth, street level methods were inspired largely by his involvement with the antiquarian network. A significant part of the antiquarian's job was to interact with the physical monuments, locations, and objects of the past to study them.¹⁹ The results of the investigation characterize Stow as a historian whose interest was in the preservation of memory. In the antiquarian sense, each object he gained could be preserved for the next generation; controversial texts are a part of that history.

Stow's chronicles were as much an attempt to preserve events in collective memory as they were to point out the virtues of people in the past, and to dissuade the reader from immorality and ungodliness. In his preface "to the gentle reader," he tells us: "it is as hard a matter for Readers of Chronicles, in my fansie, to passe without some colours of wisdome, invitements to vertue, and loathing of naughty facts as it is for a well favoured man to walke up and downe in the hote parching sunne, and not be therewith sun-burned."²⁰ For Stow the chronicle is both a retainer

¹³ Barrett L. Beer, s.v. "Stow [Stowe], John," in *Oxford Dictionary of National Biography*, 2004, <https://www-oxforddnb-com.ezproxy.library.dal.ca/view/10.1093/ref:odnb/9780198614128.001.0001/odnb-9780198614128-e-26611?rskey=JJtYCl&result=1>.

¹⁴ Ibid.

¹⁵ Ibid.

¹⁶ Oliver Harris, "Stow and the Contemporary Antiquarian Network," in *John Stow (1525-1605) and the Making of the English Past*, ed. Ian Gadd and Alexandra Gillespie (London: The British Library, 2004), 34.

¹⁷ Beer, *Oxford Dictionary of National Biography*, s.v. "Stow [Stowe], John."

¹⁸ Strype, John, "The History of the Life and Acts of the Most Reverend Father in God, Edmund Grindal, the First Bishop of London, and the Second Archbishop of York and Canterbury Successively, in the Reign of Queen Elizabeth. To which is added, an Appendix of Original MSS. Faithfully transcribed out of the best Archives; whereunto Reference is made in the History." p. 519, Hathi Trust Digital Library, <https://babel.hathitrust.org/cgi/pt?id=umn.319510020146051&view=1up&seq=9&q1=John%20Stow>.

¹⁹ Harris, "Stow and the Contemporary Antiquarian Network," 28.

²⁰ Stow, John, "The Annales of England."

of information and a document of moral merit. Through reading, an individual gains the wisdom necessary to make them godly. Especially interesting is the simile of the well-favoured man under the hot sun, as light and sun is associated with godliness and good grace. Partly, this preface serves as an anticipatory defence against criticisms of Stow's work. As Woolf notes in his essay "Genre into Artifact: The Decline of the English Chronicle in the Sixteenth Century," newer, humanist writers of history looked down upon the chronicles of old as unlearned and biased.²¹ Stow was likely aware of these criticisms, suggesting that his preface could be intended as a defence. Nevertheless, Stow's tripartite model of the chronicle's function – to revere virtue, reveal the ungodly, and commit to memory the deeds of lost workers – suggests that the *Annales* were intended to implant on collective memory events and individuals who would otherwise be forgotten.

Stow's work was focused on the daily life of Londoners, and events which transpired within London. In his entry on the "Sweating Sicknesse" Stow begins with a geographical description of where the disease progressed. He then estimates that "in London in fewe dates 960. gave up the ghost."²² Stow continues:

This was a terrible time in London, for many one lost sodainly his friends, by the sweat, and their money by the proclamation. Seaven honest householders did sup together, and before eight of the clocke in the next morning all of them were dead... wherease this nation has much afeared it, and for the time began to repent and remember God, but as the disease relented, the devotion recalld.²³

This passage is a useful work of social history, not only making note of the number of deaths, but also what impact the sickness had on communities. "Friends" were lost, suggesting a disruption of communities' compatriot to one another. The phrase "gave up the ghost" suggests that the disease easily took the life of the individual. Perhaps the language could also be read as Stow's psychological reaction, as his role of observer placed his own mortality in a position where it could be threatened by the progression of the disease. In any case, this entry in the *Annales* expands on the third function described in his preface; he recorded the sweating sickness so that future generations would know about the disease which happened in 1551, including a rough estimate of the number of people who died.

Walsham argued that chroniclers, especially in the monastic setting of the Middle Ages, avoided claims of causality in historical events; to do so would have been seen as an attempt "to read the mind of God."²⁴ Perhaps this is also a relic of the Anglo-Saxon chronicle, as natural events were recorded through memory as exceptional and extra-human affairs. This providentialism in causality carries into Stow's era. He often suggests that God was an applicable explanation in the face of extraordinary circumstances, especially in cases of large-scale suffering. The sweating sickness, for example, ebbed and flowed as faith in God did. Then, once the whole thing ended, "the devotion recalld."²⁵ In another entry "Darknesse in Paules Church," which took place during the reign of Henry III –

²¹ D.R. Woolf, "Genre into Artifact: The Decline of the English Chronicle in the Sixteenth Century," *The Sixteenth Century Journal* 19, no. 3 (1988): 330-331.

²² Stow, John, "The Annales of England," 1021.

²³ *Ibid.*, 1021.

²⁴ Walsham, "Chronicles, Memory and Autobiography in Reformation England," 36.

²⁵ Stow, John, "The Annales of England," 1021.

in the period between 1216-1272 – Stow provides another extra-human explanation. During a sermon the weather “sodainly waxed darke, that one could scantly see another in the church... and out of a darke cloude came such lightning, that all the church seemed to be on fire... [and] all men thought they should have died.”²⁶ A great storm, which seems to target St. Paul’s church alone, begins and ends suddenly. No one is killed, and afterwards “the multitude came into the church againe, and the bishop made an end of his masse.”²⁷ The entry “Darknesse in Paules Church” shows that Stow, like other chroniclers, maintained a sense of providentialism in events that weren’t normally comprehensible. This is important because it suggests that chroniclers sometimes relied on the fantastical to fill their work. The critique of the humanists’ re-surfaces here, some entries in the chronicles risk displaying a sense of immaturity and un-learnedness. This is compounded by the lack of causal analysis of political events, which complicated Stow’s already paradoxical relationship with the Reformation.

The English Reformation coincided with Stow’s life. He saw the nation become Protestant, then briefly Catholic under Mary, then Protestant again. As Alexandra Walsham notes, the fragmentation of Christendom stimulated the writing of sacred history, from both Catholic and Protestant thinkers, in the sixteenth and seventeenth century.²⁸ Stow’s period, then, was one of great change in how memory was employed by those looking into the past. History was not just a record of the past, as the chronicles maintained, it was also a means of affirming the truth of an identity within a narrative of the past. For this reason, the past also became far more contentious when “the advent of Protestantism dramatically changed the way in which people remembered their deceased ancestors and friends.”²⁹ Communities were fragmented and certain forms of religious devotion became heretical, sometimes changing within the course of a year depending on the region and ruler. Complications in identity, then, were themselves catalysts for rapid developments in the idea of historiography.³⁰ More simply, the chronicle suddenly had more competition than before as a genre of historical record-keeping.

Stow, in contrast, hardly seemed to notice the great social change that was happening around him. His own limitation is symbolic of the chronicle’s own limitation: hardly interested in developing an argument with sources and analysis, a chronicler could choose to negate any aspect of history that they did not find worthy. In the 1633 edition of *The Survey of London*, edited and expanded by other writers, a section is dedicated to the good deeds of Protestants in “A Returne to London: In which most of the Parish Churches have of late yeeres beene Rebuilt, Repaired, or at least Beautified.”³¹ Ian W. Archer notes in his essay “The Arts and Acts of Memorialization in Early

²⁶ Ibid., 274.

²⁷ Ibid., 274.

²⁸ Walsham, “History, Memory, and the English Reformation,” 902.

²⁹ Ibid., 909.

³⁰ Ibid., 906.

³¹ John Stow, “The survey of London containing the originall, increase, modern state, and government of that city, methodically set downe. With a memoriall of those famouser acts of charity, which for publicke and pious vses have bene bestowed by many worshipfull citizen and benefactors. As also all the ancient and moderne monuments erected in the churches, not onely of those two famous cities, London and Westminster, but (now newly added) foure mile compasse. Begunne firs by the paines and industry of Iohn Stovv, in the yeere 1598. Aftewards inglarged by the care and diligence of A.M. in the yeere 1618. And now completely finished by the study and labour of A.M. H.D. and others, this present yeere 1618. Whereunto, besides many additions (as appears by the contents) are annexed divers alphabeticall tables; especially two: the first, and index of things. The second, a concordance of names,” p. 819. The additional writers are not mentioned by name, only by initial “A.M.” and “H.D.”

Modern London” that Stow’s original section for “honourable citizens” in the 1598 edition did not mention any Protestant individuals of note.³² This was because “Stow was horrified by the destruction wrought by the iconoclasts.”³³ The expanded list could be read as an attempt to express regret towards Protestant acts of iconoclasm, especially since it highlights the repair, reconstruction, and aesthetic improvement of church property targeted for the purposes of the Reformation. It was an attempt, through posterity, to repair the reputation of Protestant identity through the direct use of the past.

Stow’s negation of the Reformation continues in his entry on the “Booke of Common Praier” in the *Annales of England*. The entry is devoid of any description of the book’s purpose, or what aspects of prayer had changed. Instead, Stow describes the proceeding: “the new Service book called *Of Common Praier* began in Paules church, and the like through the whole citie.”³⁴ He focuses on the aesthetic changes happening in London, where he likely viewed the initial service. He tells us that the bishop was “without coape or vestment [when he] preached in the quire.”³⁵ The history Stow is recording is a kind of social history which is not cognizant of the theological changes which precipitate it. He concludes by stating that, after the feast of saints, “the upper quire in Saint Paules church in London where the high altar stood, was broken downe.”³⁶ The passage seems to end on a melancholic note, as these were changes happening throughout the “whole citie,” a destruction of the religious tradition which had previously been mutually upheld.

Stow’s decision to ignore the Reformation can be understood in several ways. As Barrett L. Beer argues in “John Stow and the English Reformation, 1547-1559,” Stow was likely trying to avoid censure. Despite the interest from both sides on the use of history as a means of solidifying identity, the Reformation was regardless a contentious topic which was changing rapidly and was hence an unstable subject for a writer.³⁷ It was just as likely that Stow was nostalgic for pre-Reformation days, which Oliver Harris argues in his essay “Stow and the Contemporary Antiquarian Network.”³⁸ In any case, Stow was not an historian of the Reformation at all; he was instead a London chronicler who “never really grasped the significance of the religious revolution through which he lived.”³⁹ His entry on the Book of Common Prayer is best seen through this lens. His disinterest in the theological aspects of the Reformation was further compounded by his horror towards iconoclasm. He seems to display a level of shame towards the vagaries of the Reformation. For a writer with antiquarian leanings, the destruction of property and images was a loss of evidence: of the past itself. It was an erasure of memory, a doctrinal aspect of

³² Ian W. Archer, “The Arts and Acts of Memorialization in Early Modern London,” in *Imagining Early Modern London: Perceptions and Portrayals of the City from Stow to Strype, 1598-1720*, ed. J.F. Merritt (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001), 92.

³³ Archer, “The Arts and Acts of Memorialization in Early Modern London,” 95.

³⁴ Stow, John, “The Annales of England,” 1027.

³⁵ *Ibid.*, 1027.

³⁶ *Ibid.*, 1027.

³⁷ Barrett L. Beer, “John Stow and the English Reformation, 1547-1559,” *The Sixteenth Century Journal* 16, no. 2 (1985): 258.

³⁸ Harris, “Stow and the Contemporary Antiquarian Network,” 34.

³⁹ Beer, “John Stow and the English Reformation,” 1547-1559,” 271.

Protestantism which led to widespread destruction of religious memorabilia – including textual sources.⁴⁰ The Reformation was a direct and very real threat to his collection and his livelihood.

In the sixteenth century, history was a term that carried a variety of meanings. It was not, in the sense that it is understood today, a term associated with the empirical study of the past. As D.R. Woolf notes in his essay “Erudition and the Idea of History,” “history” could be a play, a poem, a chronicle, and various other prose forms.⁴¹ Further complicating the idea of history was that it was placed in distinction with “antiquities.” The ancient world was covered through this term and was linked to the antiquarian undertaking of gathering physical remnants of the past. Especially important is that any writer, whether they are a chronicler or an antiquarian, avoided doing-over narrative history from ancient sources; namely that of Ptolemy, Caesar, Polybius, and others.⁴² Stow’s work was written during a time when many aspects of history were divided into different studies, many of which had preceding social contexts. The chronicle itself had had a long history of development and technique as a genre. In contrast with ancient sources, the chronicle appeared poorly written and less intellectually inclined. During the Early Modern period, history was viewed as a kind of inventory in which all information would be laid out in perfect objective form in chronicles.⁴³ Other projects, such as topographical or antiquarian research, made sideline comments that one should refer to a common annal if any extra context about the past is necessary to understand their work.⁴⁴ Stow was aware of these trends and he was careful in his 1598 publication *The Survey of London* to avoid the terms “chronicle,” and “annal.”

Stow’s choice to name his next publication the *Survey* was not only an attempt to separate his work from specific terminology. The *Survey* was based on the antiquarian work *Perambulation of Kent* (1576) by John Leland, which was an attempt to describe and catalogue the topographical and structural features of Kent through a descriptive map in which places are listed by function and location.⁴⁵ Leland encouraged other antiquarians to continue this project by writing their own survey in other parts of England.⁴⁶ Stow’s *Survey* is a record of his own perambulation which, much like Leland’s text, is a descriptive catalogue of London’s topographical features. He states in his dedication to Robert Lee, mayor of London, that since the publication of Leland’s work “[I] have... essayed to do somewhat for the particular shires and counties where they were born or dwelt ; of which none that I know... have vouchsafed their labour to the common good in that behalf.”⁴⁷ Much like the work of chronicling, the perambulation is a project of multiple observers intended to record as much information about the shires and counties of England. He focuses on London specifically because it is his birthplace and also because he has “seen

⁴⁰ Walsham, “History, Memory, and the English Reformation,” 908.

⁴¹ Woolf, “Erudition and the Idea of History in Renaissance England,” 18-19.

⁴² *Ibid.*, 14.

⁴³ *Ibid.*, 18.

⁴⁴ *Ibid.*, 34-35.

⁴⁵ Harris, “Stow and the Contemporary Antiquarian Network,” 32-33.

⁴⁶ *Ibid.*, 33.

⁴⁷ John Stow, “A Svrvey of London. Conteyning the Originall, Antiquity, Increase, Moderne estate, and description of that City, written in the yeare 1598 by Iohn Stow Citizen of London. Since by the same Author increased, with diuers raree notes of Antiquity, and published in the yeare, 1603. Also an Apologie (or defence) against the opinion of some men, concerning that Citie, the greatnesse thereof. VVith an Appendix, contayning in Latine *Libellum de situ & nobilitated Londini*: Written by William Fitzstephen, in the raigne of Henry the second,” (1603), in *Stow’s Survey of London*. ed. H.B. Wheatley (London: Everyman’s Library, 1956), xxiii.

sundry antiquities myself touching that place.”⁴⁸ There are some broad strokes of the Reformation here, Stow is recording the antiquities of the city because he has seen that people are willing to destroy historical buildings on a large scale for the purpose of religious or political change. In any case, *Survey* is a break from Stow’s earlier works.

Despite the formal departure from chronicles, Stow’s *Survey* still retains many techniques and methods from the genre. This is evident primarily through the change in London over time that Stow notes. He tells us of his own ward that “Cornehill ward, [was] so called of a corn market, time out of mind there holden.”⁴⁹ Similar to the chronicle, information is recorded from memory, from a time long preceding the publication of his work. Perhaps this was unavoidable, as London was a dynamic and evolving city, wherein memory is limited only by what goes unnoticed. Stow also noted change between the 1598 edition and 1603 edition. In Cornhill, “in the middle of the high street, and at the parting of four ways, have ye a water standard, placed in the year 1582... But now no such matter, through whose default I know not.”⁵⁰ The text benefits both from Stow’s walkabout technique, where information can be compounded by new changes relevant in the passing years, and the chronicling technique of cataloguing, in which all information is stored for future generations.

The chronicling methods in *Survey* can also be seen in a passage from the history of Cornhill ward. In 1383 an incident occurred in which:

The citizens of London, taking upon them the rights that belonged to their bishops, first imprisoned such women as were taken in fornication or adultery in the said Tun, and after bringing them forth to the sight of the world, they caused their heads to be shaven... and so to be led about the city, in sight of all the inhabitants.⁵¹

Stow relates to the reader an account of an event in the past which, barring any analysis, is described, and noted as an important event in time. Similar to the work of chronicles, it is reliant entirely upon memory and the importance of posterity. It also suggests that Stow saw London as a space of social contact, in which certain behaviours were viewed as unfavourable and punished in a form of a public shaming ritual. London is described as a space of omniscient publicity; the women are not just shown to the city, they are in the sight “of the world.”

Stow’s fascination with London, his belief that it is a city of the world, extended throughout his career. He was, as Beer labelled him, a London chronicler.⁵² In a passage titled “An Apology, or Defence, against the Opinion of some Men, which think that the Greatness of that City standeth not with the Profit and Security of this Realm,” Stow moves the closest towards argumentative history.⁵³ It is his attempt to establish why London is an important feature of the nation as a generator of profit and security which is grounded in the language of Christian progress: “men, by this nearness of conversation [which London provides] are withdrawn from barbarous feritie and force to a certain mildness of manners, and to humanity and justice.”⁵⁴ London is viewed as a force of modernization, in which

⁴⁸ Ibid., xxiii.

⁴⁹ Ibid., 168.

⁵⁰ Ibid., 169.

⁵¹ Ibid., 170.

⁵² Beer, “John Stow and the English Reformation, 1547-1559,” 271.

⁵³ Stow, “A Svrvey of London,” 482.

⁵⁴ Ibid., 483.

the barbarity of the past is juxtaposed by the healthy social change which occurred through the density and rule of the city. Furthermore, the city is more godly as “the doctrine of God is more fitly delivered, and the discipline thereof more aptly to be executed, in peopled towns than abroad, by reason of the facility of common and often assembling.”⁵⁵ Again, population density is considered, along with geographical density; an individual does not have to travel as far to reach a church in a well populated city as they are more numerous and this allows for greater frequency of sermons. This apology is remarkable because it displays a level of argument that is absent in Stow’s other works. He is using what he knows about London to suggest something qualitative. In this case, that it is a space of modernization and godliness. Stow is referring abstractly to events such as the spectacle of 1383, he is using historical evidence to support a claim, much like antiquarians at large and, in the future, historians who employ empirical and argumentative practices.

Before discussing the decline of the chronicles, it is important to note that despite the fading of the genre, interest in history was not in any way diminishing. It was necessary after the Reformation for Protestants, and to some extent Catholics, to navigate the erratically evolving circumstances in which they found themselves.⁵⁶ If anything, interest in history was increasing in response to these evolving circumstances. Past examples of conflicting religious identity became of great interest to devotees seeking guidance. Stow’s work also remained invaluable to individuals who were searching for historical records. Stow’s *Survey*, as Ian W. Archer notes in his essay “Discourses of History in Elizabethan and Early Stuart London,” was used by some readers to relate events to their own family.⁵⁷ Some readers went as far as updating information missing from the text in successive years, such as the coats of arms of mayors and sheriffs, providing a literal extension of memory.⁵⁸ This suggests that people were still reading Stow’s work, despite the emergence of new forms. They actively engaged with his text, using it not only as a source of information but also as a place to speculate and to update with new information. If any aspect of historical writing was not declining it was a desire to engage with the past on all levels. Stow’s *Survey* was appealing because it provided Londoners with a sense of “place, physically and in time.”⁵⁹

By the late sixteenth century, the chronicle began to fade from the publishing houses as the predominant form of history. The humanist critique that chronicles were unlearned indicates that it was viewed as antiquated relative to the newer, more university-centric humanist histories. Stow’s focus on London seemed antithetical to larger, more argumentative works. Readers were looking for wider histories that not only explained what happened, but why. It very suddenly became clear that the world was ultimately unstable and “that time could change not only dynasties but societies, not only individuals but institutions.”⁶⁰ Chronicles, which avoided causal explanations, were no longer satisfactory in the post-Reformation world, where greater political and social complexity demanded more precise and analytical historiography. In essence, people wanted to understand why the Reformation occurred, and what it meant for society at large. The only way to discover this truth was through historical erudition.

⁵⁵ *Ibid.*, 483.

⁵⁶ Walsham, “History, Memory, and the English Reformation,” 915.

⁵⁷ Ian W. Archer, “Discourses of History in Elizabethan and Early Stuart London,” in *The Uses of History in Early Modern England*, ed. Paulina Kewes (San Marino: Huntington Library, 2006), 206.

⁵⁸ *Ibid.*, 206.

⁵⁹ *Ibid.*, 207.

⁶⁰ Woolf, “Erudition and the Idea of History in Renaissance England,” 28.

Comparatively, Stow ignored the Reformation entirely. Although he was aware of change, as his Cornhill entry in the *Survey* suggests, he was too quick to ignore large political events in favour of the recording of more traditional entries.

Beyond intellectual change, two other developments led to the gradual disappearance of the chronicle. The first development was increased efficiency of printing, which in some ways allowed for greater dissemination of the chronicles, but also led to the development of new forms that met demand at a quicker pace, namely, the ballad, coranto, newsbook, and after the late seventeenth century, the newspaper.⁶¹ Readers were willing to engage with Stow's and other chroniclers work, but once the functions of the chronicle fell into other, more efficient forms, they were no longer as useful. That is, "by the time a chronicler such as Stow had recorded a contemporary event, it was already well known; by the time it passed through the press and reached the bookseller it was no longer news but history."⁶² The chronicle, as an accumulated document which took years to produce, simply could not keep up with newer forms.

The second development was the altered temporality of history after the Reformation. Occurring alongside and as a result of the more efficient methods of print, history suddenly increased in complexity with more social factions and religious doctrines competing for supremacy. The methods of the Anglo-Saxon chronicle were employed during periods where history happened comparatively slower, where the battles and reigns of kings happened over longer periods of time, and the kingdom as a whole was relatively uniform in terms of religion. The Early Modern chronicle, based in the genre of its predecessor, treated history in a similar manner. It used methods that were a relic of a time long past.

Stow's chronicles lost their popularity as a direct result of the changes in memory which were occurring after the Reformation. Although Stow "was in fact one of those most receptive to new ideas, and most imaginative in putting them to work," he was ultimately limited by his role as a chronicler.⁶³ He may have removed the term chronicle from the *Survey*, but he could not separate entirely from familiar techniques which were declining due to the changing needs of the general public. Memory and how it was being preserved was being radically altered by the events of the sixteenth century. The destruction of monuments through iconoclasm meant the literal loss of history. Protestants, as Walsham notes, did not only choose what to remember; for them, memory also meant erasure of the false religion.⁶⁴ Antiquarians had previously "supplemented [their histories] with empirical evidence of antiquities or monuments with a wide range of artefacts."⁶⁵ This trend was threatened by iconoclasm, essentially making any antiquarian record, along with Stow's work, an attempt to preserve these antiquities before their destruction. In conclusion, Stow's limited focus, both geographically and politically, was at odds with the kinds of information people were interested in. The chronicle, already held back by its Anglo-Saxon methods, simply could not keep up with the fast-paced social change.

⁶¹ Woolf, "Genre into Artifact," 332.

⁶² *Ibid.*, 333.

⁶³ Harris, "Stow and the Contemporary Antiquarian Network," 35.

⁶⁴ Walsham, "History, Memory, and the English Reformation," 907-908.

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Floral Silk and Female Labour: Anna Maria Garthwaite's *Robe a L'Anglaise*.

Erin Pottruff

It is a universal truth that nothing can be produced within a vacuum. Every object made by human hands carries information about the social conditions under which it was created. The work of Anna Maria Garthwaite is no exception. Her design for the material of a 1775 red silk gown is only one example. As one of the few known female silk workers (and the only known female silk designer) in the Spitalfields silk industry, Garthwaite's work can say a great deal about the gendered labour taking place in the British silk industry at the time, as well as the social conditions that she and her female peers would have worked under. Garthwaite was distinct amongst her peers in many ways, most visibly the fact that she was a woman working within a male dominated industry. However her work points to evidence of a greater lost culture of female silk workers. This essay will analyze these aspects of the eighteenth century London silk industry through the lens of two primary source artifacts: the scarlet silk robe a l'anglaise produced over a decade after her death and a watercolour silk design created close to the beginning of her career.

Today, Spitalfields is a district in London's east end known for its multiculturalism, lively community, and culture of visual arts. Started in the seventeenth century, its marketplace continues to draw tourists from around the world. Although the neighborhood has existed in some form since 1197¹. It was still considered "relatively rural"² until the eighteenth century. After the 1685 Edict of Nantes, many French Huguenots settled in the area. This was largely due to the fact that Spitalfields already had a history as a neighborhood for minorities and immigrants³. In Spitalfields, as in other areas, the Huguenots quickly became involved with the textile industry. However, the textile industry at Spitalfields was unique because it was one of two major centers of the British silk industry⁴. The Huguenots were eventually overshadowed by the sheer number of other immigrant groups to the area. In the eighteenth century, only between fifteen and twenty percent of the population of Spitalfields were French or descendants of French immigrants⁵. Yet, people continued to "associate Spitalfields silk with French Protestant refugees and their descendants".⁶

The focus of this paper was one of the many industry workers without French ancestry. Anna Maria Garthwaite was a British silk designer living and working in Spitalfields from the 1730s (date unknown) to her death in 1763⁷. She was one of the best-known silk designers in England, with her work being worn across Europe and the British colonies⁸. She produced hundreds of designs over the years she

¹ "History," Spitalfields Official Website, accessed 7 November 2022.

<https://www.spitalfields.co.uk/spitalfields-history/>

² "History," Spitalfields Official Website.

³ Zara Anishanslin, *Portrait of a Woman in Silk: Hidden Histories of the British Atlantic World* (Connecticut: Yale University Press, 2016), 26.

⁴ Anishanslin, *Portrait of a Woman in Silk*, 26.

⁵ Ibid

⁶ Ibid.

⁷ "Design for a Woven Silk," The Victoria and Albert Museum, accessed 14 September 2022.

⁸ Anishanslin, *Portrait of a Woman in Silk*, 27.

worked in Spitalfields⁹. The main primary source artifact discussed in this paper is a scarlet silk *robe a l'anglaise* dating to circa 1775 (see fig 1 & 2). This robe was created over ten years after her death, but the pattern follows one she produced while working at Spitalfields¹⁰. Its low square neckline, pointed waist, and elbow-length sleeves are characteristic of the robe a l'anglaise in this period, as is the pleating at the waist and the distribution of the skirt fabric at center back. The fabric of the gown is a bright red silk damask, a fabric created through the combination of two weaving techniques¹¹. The bulk of the background is woven using a “plain, twill, or sateen weave”¹¹ while the pattern is made using a satin weave. This technique makes the silk both durable and reversible¹². Like much of Garthwaite’s work, this silk features the floral designs that the London silk industry was famed for in this period¹³.



Fig. 1 & 2. Anna Maria Garthwaite, *Robe à L'Anglaise*, c.. 1775, silk damask, The Museum at FIT, New York. This artifact can tell the viewer a great deal about the social conditions it was produced under. The way in which it was created makes it evident of a larger culture of gendered labour and female silk workers, as will be discussed below.

⁹ Natalie Rothstein, *Silk Designs of the Eighteenth Century* (Boston, Toronto, London: Little Brown & Company, 1990).

¹⁰ “Robe A L’Anglaise,” The Museum at FIT, accessed 13 September 2022.

¹¹ “Everything to Know About Damask Fabric: History, Characteristics, Uses, and Care for Damask.” MasterClass, 12 August 2012.

¹¹ “Everything to Know About Damask,” MasterClass.

¹² Ibid.

¹³ Anishanslin, *Portrait of a Woman in Silk*, 28.

Garthwaite was most certainly distinct amongst her peers for a number of reasons. She was the only female silk designer at Spitalfields that there is any surviving historical evidence of.

The evidence that does exist is very limited: mostly made up of her original designs and the reference books she created. Very little from her personal life exists¹⁴. What is known is evidence of a very unusual figure within the industry. First, the simple fact that she was a woman. As Zara Anishanslin observed in her book *Portrait of a Woman in Silk: Hidden Histories of the British Atlantic World*, there were many women involved in the industry, but most took on other positions¹⁵. Garthwaite was also in her forties when she began her career and never married¹⁶. This was unusual as “most women who practiced skilled trades like weaving did so because their father or husband did too”¹⁷. Garthwaite was not introduced to the trade through her husband or father. In fact, her father was a minister from the English countryside with ties to nobility and the Royal Society¹⁸. This made her distinct from her female peers as the regulations passed by the

City of London’s Weaving Company, the weavers’ guild operating in Spitalfields, specified that “generally the only women who might serve formal weaving apprenticeships (and hence become guild members) were daughters of weavers who had no sons”¹⁹; meaning that very few women were permitted to become guild members.

Apprenticeship is an aspect of her career where Garthwaite differed from her male peers but was similar to her female peers. Like many of the women participating in the industry, there is no evidence that she had any type of formal training or served a proper apprenticeship, although she may have completed an informal one²⁰.

Apprenticeship was a vital part of the culture of silk workers. Without an apprenticeship, one could not belong to a guild. Without formally belonging to a guild, one could not claim the credibility that being a guild member gave. This is why many women played other roles within the Spitalfields silk industry, and why Garthwaite once again stands out from both her male and female peers.

Finally, Garthwaite differed from many of her female peers in that she was financially secure and well-educated²¹. This was due largely to her family situation, and yet there is evidence that Garthwaite was financially successful in her own right. She lived in one of the wealthiest areas in Spitalfields, within eyesight of the church the area is named for²²: clear evidence of a very different living situation than many of her female peers would have had. Olwen Hufton states that “the great problem for single working women was the inadequacy of the female wage which provided little more than a basic personal food ration”²³. Although the industry was profitable, many of its workers would have lived in poor conditions. This issue was intensified for women, as they tended to occupy

¹⁴ Ibid.

¹⁵ Ibid.

¹⁶ Ibid.

¹⁷ Ibid.

¹⁸ Ibid.

¹⁹ Ibid.

²⁰ Ibid.

²¹ Ibid.

²² Ibid.

²³ Olwen Hufton, “Women Without Men: Widows and Spinsters in Britain and France in the Eighteenth Century,” *Journal of Family History*, vol. 9 (1984): 361, <https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/abs/10.1177/036319908400900404?journalCode=jfha>.

positions considered less skilled and, as mentioned above, they made a much smaller wage than their male counterparts. It can be argued that all of these factors contributed to Garthwaite's work. Financial situation, formal training or lack thereof, family influence, and of course the fact of her gender all have visible effects in her work because this type of artistic labour is the product of lived experience. This is an argument that can be made about almost any form of art made by human hands: that the lived experiences of the artist shape the final product. Garthwaite's lived experience clearly played heavily into the work she produced. As mentioned above, her floral motifs are characteristic of Spitalfields silk from this period. Thus, one can assume that the experiences she had while living at Spitalfields played into her artistic vision. The people she would have met, the art she would have seen, and the ways in which other silk designers worked all would have influenced the work she produced. As discussed above, there were other women involved in the British silk industry.

Garthwaite simply happens to be one of the very few whom there is solid historical evidence of. Much of this is likely due to the fact of social class. By large, the women involved in the industry would have been working class. Overall there is little surviving archival evidence of them. It is highly unlikely that many of these women would have been literate. Therefore very little personal archival evidence, such as letters or diaries, survives. Many of these women would have been employed in unskilled labour positions, thus the work they did may not have been recorded. If it was, it may not have included their names, meaning that there is no way to definitively link any official archival material to the worker. There is very little surviving clothing or personal objects, again due to the fact that these women would have been working class. Their clothing would have been reworn time and time again, then eventually repurposed. Their personal artifacts may have been sold or given to family or friends. As it is, very little personal material evidence of Garthwaite survives. What is known about her is almost entirely made up of archival material. In this way, she is similar to her female peers. As Anishanslin says:

“Casting historical light on the enigma that is Garthwaite also brings other women out of the historical shadows. She was not the only female producer in the male-dominated silk industry nor was she the only woman to become an arbiter of fashionable taste or participate in the transatlantic botanical networks. Looking at her designs, we see her artistry -- an individual experience not unlike words in a diary that also tells us about the larger cultural history of the world in which she lived.”²⁴

The larger cultural history of eighteenth century Spitalfields has much to do with both female workers and the concept of gendered labour. Gendered labour is a socially and culturally created concept. In eighteenth century Europe, these gender divisions were socially understood as natural - as “defined by nature, in turn created by God”²⁵. Although gender divisions were understood as being created by God, in reality there were many social mechanisms that created, solidified, and controlled concepts of the gender divide²⁶. This control was considered to be necessary for the social and economic organization of society²⁸. In this specific time and place there was a

²⁴ Anishanslin, *Portrait of a Woman in Silk*, 29.

²⁵ Carmen Sarasua, “Technical Innovations at the Service of Cheaper Labour in Pre-Industrial Europe: The Enlightened Agenda to Transform the Gender Division in Silk Manufacturing,” *History and Technology* vol. 24 (2008), <https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/07341510701616865>.

²⁶ Sarasua, “Technical Innovations.”

²⁸ *Ibid.*

desperate need for more labour due to the rapid development of textile making technology. At the same time, however, there was a strong desire to maintain a traditional division of labour²⁷. The traditional division of labor meant that men worked in the public sphere at all levels of society, while women's labour was predominantly in the private sector. This "unpaid domestic labour of women and girls"²⁸ was seen as necessary in order to support the established nuclear family of this time and place.

There was an interesting development taking place with respect to gendered labour at this time: the replacement of male labourers with female ones. This went against the fundamental division of labour in society and yet was a widespread phenomenon. The silk industry was a large, expensive, and "labour-intensive industry, and despite the high costs of the raw materials and machines, wages accounted for a high percentage of total costs"²⁹. The replacement of male labour with female was an effective way to reduce wage labour costs, as it was possible to pay female workers much less³⁰. Reducing costs was a highly attractive idea to the already profitable silk industry. Naturally there was pushback against women entering the industry. But very slowly, and in limited capacity, women became more accepted as participants in the public labour sphere. As long as there were jobs available women continued to take them. Yet it is still true that women tended to take on very different roles than their male counterparts. As mentioned above, it is an inescapable fact that very few female silk workers served formal apprenticeships and became guild members. Married women were also not expected to participate in public facing labour. If they were amongst the lower classes, married women may have worked but among the upper class this was significantly less likely. Married women were generally expected to remain in the private sphere and participate in uncredited and uncompensated labour in the name of the nuclear family³¹. This is not to imply that women participated in the British silk industry only in a limited sense. They were involved in a huge amount of skilled and unskilled labour in most aspects of the industry, from the beginning to the end of the silk making process. Through participation in silk production and within wide-spread silk trade industries, a "larger cultural history"³⁴ of female labour within the British silk industry becomes visible.

How exactly does that silk damask gown fit into these concepts of gendered labour and class division? What does it say about the culture of female labour within the Spitalfields silk industry? Through analyzing the implications of the gown's material composition, ownership, and context, answering this question becomes significantly easier.

It can be assumed that many of the people involved in producing this gown were female. . The dress itself dates to c.1775 , although the design for the silk it is made from would have been done much earlier - considering that Garthwaite died in 1763. By 1775, women would have been more involved in the industry than they were previously. This is because of the gradual acceptance of women into the industry as discussed above. Female workers would likely have been involved in the production, weaving, and dying of the silk, and then eventually in the creation of the gown from that fabric. At all stages, the fabric would have passed through many different sub-

²⁷ Ibid.

²⁸ Ibid.

²⁹ Ibid.

³⁰ Hufton, "Women Without Men," 362-363.

³¹ Anishanslin, *Portrait of a Woman in Silk*, 32.

³⁴ Ibid, 29.

industries and a huge number of female hands would have touched it. Thus, much of the culture of female labour explained above is applicable to this artifact. This gown reveals a story of female labourers who were forbidden from joining official guilds and receiving the protection this would have given them, were drastically underpaid and unable to afford the very product they worked on, and were systematically undervalued in the industry they gave their lives to. They have, in essence, been written out of the story of Spitalfields because they were unable to make the contributions that historians so adore: written records of their lives, their relationships, and their economics. This is the work of material culture. It aims to study items, rather than documents, to reveal more about the hidden side of history. Through material culture analysis, those who have been understudied because no written evidence of their life survives can be understood in their proper historical context.

In addition, the London silk industry was most well-known for the flowered silk that this gown is made from³². Flowered silk was independently designed and created in extremely limited quantities: “usually limited to only four pieces woven from a single design”³³. Therefore it was quite expensive and only available to those with some disposable income. Owning something made of flowered silk would not have been feasible for those involved in its production, and especially impossible for the female laborers who were paid inequally for their work. This is yet another aspect of the gendered division of labour: that it would have largely been impossible for the women who were involved in the public labour sphere to also participate in the industry’s ownership or its product.

The very existence of this gown alludes to a global silk trade or silk-based economy that women participated in. There is widespread surviving evidence of flowered silk found across Europe and many of the nations colonized by European states³⁴. In addition to the sheer range of surviving evidence, many Spitalfields designers, including Garthwaite herself, kept reference books of designs from around the world. Evidence of a global silk trade is also found in the fact that many of these designs have clear Asian and European Baroque influences in their motifs. In spite of this already existing evidence, perhaps the most significant proof of a global silk trade is the sheer amount of money that was present in the British silk industry. This was a massive industry. It would have involved the labour of hundreds of thousands of people across all stages of the production process. The fibres were collected, spun, and dyed. Then they were woven into designs created by hundreds more people, and cut into patterns for everything from home goods to clothing. The amount of people who would have had a hand in the making of silk objects is almost unimaginable, and an industry as large in size as this one requires a constant flow of money into it in order to create profit.

Through analyzing the primary source artifact, it becomes clear that many of the implications of the culture of gendered labour and the female workers within it, including Anna Maria Garthwaite, are present in this type of surviving material culture. This essay has explored the concepts of gendered labour as natural and created by God, as well as the replacement of male labour with female within the silk industry. It has also explored some of the commonalities between women in the industry, and how Garthwaite was similar or different from her peers. In this

³² Ibid, 27.

³³ Ibid.

³⁴ Ibid.

way, the conclusion is drawn that the main primary source artifact can be evident of the culture of gendered labour and the labourers within it.

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The Holodomor: Genocidal Industrialization

George Cade

The famine in Ukraine from 1932-1933 remains one of the most important events in the history of the Soviet Union. While studied extensively, one of the first things readers will take notice of is the lack of consensus surrounding how the famine is understood. Whether or not the famine is considered a genocide is still contested and debated. Some historians argue that it was the unintended results of Stalin's economic policies.¹ Some claim millions perished due to the mismanagement of agriculture, overinflated procurement targets, and insufficient aid provided by the Soviets.² By adhering to the United Nations (UN) definition on genocide, I contend that these interpretations egregiously downplay the harm inflicted on the Ukrainian nation, religion, and culture. To facilitate their new agricultural policy of collectivization which financed their ambitious industrialization goals, the Soviets first attacked the Ukrainian intelligentsia, liquidated the Ukrainian Orthodox Church, and arrested, deported, or killed hundreds of thousands of kulaks. Soviet attacks on the Ukrainian intelligentsia, the Church, and the peasants were intentional, pre-emptive strikes against the Ukrainian people to facilitate Stalin's economic policies, but also to minimize the risk of Ukrainian secession. The Holodomor, therefore, was a genocide.

After Stalin consolidated power, he began to transform his vast, populous, but backward, empire into a modern military power with a strong industrial base, and he was largely reliant on exports of grain to finance these plans.³ In the period between the fall of the Tsarist government and Stalin's First Five-Year Plan, agricultural production in the USSR had drastically fallen, and grain purchased from privately owned farms was too expensive and inefficient for Stalin.⁴ The Soviets needed a more efficient way to produce and export large amounts of marketable grain, and collectivization was the solution. Collectivization turned independent and privately run farms into large-scale, state-operated farms, and facilitated the collection of far greater quantities of grain to export.

In November 1929, only 10.4% of the total 5,144,800 Ukrainian households were members of collective farms.⁵ Through violent policies that cost many lives, a few months later in March 1930, that number rose to 68.5%.⁶ Vigorous campaigns of collectivization and food requisitions incited the peasantry to mass protests, and peasants, especially Ukrainian peasants who were mostly unfamiliar with the Russian *obshchina*, opposed collectivization in any way they could.⁷ The Russian *obshchina* was a peasant institution and a form of collective administration for

¹ R. W. Davies and Stephen G. Wheatcroft, *The Industrialisation of Soviet Russia, 5: The Years of Hunger: Soviet Agriculture 1931-1933*, (Palgrave Macmillan, 2004), 441.

² Ihor Stebelsky, "Did Weather Play a Part in the Great Famine of 1932-1933?," in *Holodomor: Reflections on the Great Famine of 1932-1933 in Soviet Ukraine*, ed. Lubomyr Y. Luciuk and Lisa Grekul, (Kingston: The Kashtan Press, 2008): 14; Davies and Wheatcroft, *Industrialisation of Soviet Russia*," 441.

³ Roman Serbyn, "Holodomor: The Ukrainian Genocide," *Central and Eastern European Online Library*, no. 1, (2010): 207.

⁴ *Ibid*, 207.

⁵ Serbyn, "Holodomor," 209.

⁶ *Ibid*, 209.

⁷ Stebelsky, "Did Weather Play a Part," 9; Serbyn, "The Ukrainian Famine."

villages and farms, which made decisions for the village as a whole.⁸ Farmers slaughtered their animals to prevent them from being confiscated by authorities or used on collective farms. Some refused to work or fled, and Soviet officials were attacked and driven out of villages.⁹ Nearly half of the peasant uprisings against collectivization in the USSR occurred in Ukraine alone.¹⁰

In response to protests and unrest, Stalin initiated a retreat in March 1930. In a *Pravda* article, Stalin placed the blame on local cadres for the excesses and errors in the drive towards collectivization.¹¹ Stalin pulled back on his policies, allowing some farmers to keep small plots of land to operate as they saw fit, and even some animals were retained. In September 1930, after Stalin's retreat and the pressure was lifted, peasants began to leave collective farms, and only 34.8% of arable land in Ukraine remained as collective farms.¹² When local administrators resisted, conflicts began, and entire districts took up arms. Skirmishes between Soviet authorities and peasant rebels left many dead on both sides. However, by late 1931, through much of the same violence during the previous year, 72% of arable land was back in the collective farm system.¹³ While similar policies were undertaken in other areas of the Soviet Union, there seems to have been a particular focus in Ukraine.

Along with collectivization, in January 1930, the Central Committee in Moscow approved a resolution for the 'dekulakization' and the deportation of Ukrainian peasants.¹⁴ Kulaks, or "wealthy" peasants, were peasants who might have been able to employ labour on their farm or owned a certain amount of private land.¹⁵ As they had material interests, they opposed collectivization to the utmost. In the winter and spring of 1930 alone, over 115,000 men, women, and children were deported from Ukraine and were either sent to work camps or to live in inhospitable regions of the Empire.¹⁶ The luckier victims of dekulakization got to remain in their regions, but their land was taken away and placed into collective farms.¹⁷ Dekulakization deprived Ukraine of its most successful farmers, the "custodians of its national culture and spirit," but also of some of their most natural leaders in the event of a conflict with a repressive regime.¹⁸

With dekulakization and collectivization underway, a "Struggle for Bread" was launched, and forced confiscation of grain from the collective farms began. In 1929, Soviet grain exports amounted to a mere 180,000 tons. The following year however, through collectivization, Soviet grain exports reached 5,832,000 tons.¹⁹ Stalin's

⁸ Alan Kimball, "The Russian Peasant Obshchina in the Political Culture of Great Reforms: A Contribution to Begriffsgeschichte," *Russian History*, 17, no. 3. (1990): 259.

⁹ Serbyn, "Holodomor," 210

¹⁰ Hiroaki Kuromiya, "The Great Famine: The Issue of Intentionality," in *Holodomor: Reflections on the Great Famine of 1932-1933 in Soviet Ukraine*, ed. Lubomyr Y. Luciuk and Lisa Grekul, (Kingston: The Kashtan Press, 2008): 123.

¹¹ Serbyn, "Holodomor," 210.

¹² Ibid, 211.

¹³ Ibid, 211.

¹⁴ Serbyn, "The Ukrainian Famine."

¹⁵ Serbyn, "Holodomor," 209.

¹⁶ Serbyn, "The Ukrainian Famine."

¹⁷ Serbyn, "Holodomor," 209.

¹⁸ Serbyn, "Holodomor," 209.

¹⁹ Ibid, 211.

assurance that collectivization would provide more marketable grain was numerically correct, but the human cost that it would come at would affect millions of Ukrainians for generations.

By 1931, production had fallen mostly due to confrontations between state authorities and agricultural producers.²⁰ Peasant conditions had not improved, incompetent chairmen of collective farms had little to no experience running large-scale farms, cattle were poorly taken care of and died in large numbers, and thousands of acres were never plowed and were left to rot.²¹ In 1931, and 1932, Stalin had overestimated how much grain would be produced, and he imposed grain procurement quotas based on that overestimation.²² Collectivization, dekulakization, unrealistic grain procurement quotas, and agricultural production in decline made clear that starvation was looming, and by 1931, reserves of grain had already been depleted.²³ Ukrainians were left without enough food, animal feed, and seed material for the following season.

By the end of 1931, famine had broken out in the Ukrainian countryside and by the summer of 1932, hundreds of thousands of peasants were starving to death. Many fled to neighbouring regions, like Byelorussia (now Belarus) in search of food, worsening the situation in Ukraine as any remaining peasants still capable of farming and producing whatever food possible were leaving.²⁴ Deaths by poisoning after eating rotting animal carcasses rose, and “[c]annibalism became commonplace.²⁵ As Donald Rayfield notes, we will never know the exact number of deaths as death by starvation is much harder to define than say, a bullet wound.²⁶ In official reports, deaths from starvation could be easily disguised as disease caused by malnutrition or even suicide.

The harvest in 1932 was even worse than in 1931. Some historians attribute this to adverse weather, but “[t]he variation in time and place of drought in the Soviet Union did not appear to correlate with the famine of 1932-1933.”²⁷ Weakened by hunger and discouraged by their unsuccessful struggle against collectivization, farmers either refused to, or physically could not, work as they were expected to on collective farms. The Politburo reluctantly cut back in planned collections of grain in early 1933, but it was too little, too late.²⁸ Quotas were reduced by 1.15 million tons, but more authorities would now be sent to villages, not to help with famine relief, but to enforce grain collection, prevent farmers from stealing grain, and to purge local officials accused of siding with the kulaks.²⁹ To meet these quotas, chairmen of collective farms and other local authorities were granted privileges to organize and terrorize the peasants.³⁰ Those who voluntarily gave up their grain risked starvation, peasants who did not have any grain were already starving to death, and peasants who lied and said they had no grain would have their houses searched, which placed them in an even more risky position. As more and more secretaries of grain producing regions were replaced

²⁰ Ibid, 212.

²¹ Lemkin, “Soviet Genocide,” 239.

²² Davies and Wheatcroft, “Industrialisation of Soviet Russia,” 435.

²³ Serbyn, “Holodomor,” 212.

²⁴ Ibid, 212.

²⁵ Lemkin, “Soviet Genocide,” 239.

²⁶ Donald Rayfield, “The Ukrainian Famine of 1933: Man-Made Catastrophe, Mass Murder, or Genocide?,” in *Holodomor: Reflections on the Great Famine of 1932-1933 in Soviet Ukraine*, ed. Lubomyr Y. Luciuk and Lisa Grekul, (Kingston: The Kashtan Press, 2008): 89.

²⁷ Stebelsky, “Did Weather Play a Part,” 14.

²⁸ Davies and Wheatcroft, “Industrialisation of Soviet Russia,” 440.

²⁹ Serbyn, “Holodomor,” 218.

³⁰ Serbyn, “The Ukrainian Famine.”

by incompetent, yet loyal Soviet appointees, through the spring and summer of 1933, millions of Ukrainians starved to death.³¹

Most historians agree that the Holodomor was a man-made catastrophe.³² Weather did not seem to play a role until after the worst of the famine was already over, and as such, many historians will agree that it was murder.³³ The real debate surrounds the question of genocide. Many genocide-denying historians will claim that the famine was a result of unintended consequences of agricultural policies and rapid industrialization.³⁴ Their position being that millions starved to death, not because an intentional genocide was directed against the Ukrainian people, but because the grain being collected was necessary to produce the capital for industrialization. However, the national, religious, and cultural aspects of the attack on Ukraine should not be ignored.

Raphael Lemkin's definition of the term "genocide" would later be used to influence the UN definition of genocide under the Genocide Convention.³⁵ An overwhelming majority of states recognize the Genocide Convention as legitimate international law, therefore, in considering whether the Ukrainian famine was a genocide, I will be using the UN's definition. According to the UN, to constitute a genocide, there must be an intent to destroy "in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group."³⁶

Lemkin viewed the famine as a multi-pronged attack on Ukraine.³⁷ First the Soviets attacked the Ukrainian intelligentsia throughout 1920s and early 1930s.³⁸ Second, religion in Ukraine came under fire, and thirdly, there was an attack on the peasantry in the form of an artificial famine.³⁹ These should be considered as one overarching attack on the Ukrainian people, not separate incidents. By first attacking the intelligentsia and the religion, it made it easier for Stalin to attack the peasantry.

Lemkin argued that the attacks against the Ukrainian intelligentsia, "the national brain," was an attempt to "paralyze the rest of the body."⁴⁰ Beginning in the 1920s, teachers, academics, artists, and political leaders were arrested, deported, or killed.⁴¹ In the fall of 1929, the State Political Directorate (GPU), arrested 700 intellectuals, including former ministers of the Ukrainian national government, and accused them of belonging to a fictitious Ukrainian liberation organization.⁴² Of these 700, 45 were placed on a show trial in the spring of 1930 and charged with encouraging secession from the USSR.⁴³ The infamous show trial of the Union for the Liberation of Ukraine was

³¹ Ibid, 224.

³² Rayfield, "Man-Made Catastrophe," 90.

³³ Stebelsky, "Did Weather Play a Part," 6; Rayfield, "Man-Made Catastrophe," 90.

³⁴ Davies and Wheatcroft, "Industrialisation of Soviet Russia," 441.

³⁵ United Nations General Assembly, "Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide," (Resolution 260 A (III), 1948).

³⁶ United Nations General Assembly, "Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide," (Resolution 260 A (III), 1948).

³⁷ Lemkin, "Soviet Genocide," 237.

³⁸ Ibid, 237.

³⁹ Ibid, 237.

⁴⁰ Lemkin, "Soviet Genocide," 237.

⁴¹ Ibid, 237.

⁴² Serbyn, "Holodomor," 208.

⁴³ Ibid, 208.

an attempt “to terrorize the Ukrainian intelligentsia and prevent it from siding with the peasantry during the regime’s attack on the latter’s way of life.”⁴⁴

Ukrainians, Lemkin argues, due to their history of racial murders, were highly susceptible to Russian threats.⁴⁵ To say nothing of the harm experienced by Ukraine under Tsarist regimes, the beginning of Soviet hostility started with the Red Army’s invasion of Ukraine in 1918 and the murders of Ukrainian nationals in Kyiv.⁴⁶ Ukraine had overwhelmingly voted in favour of Ukrainian national parties during the 1917-1918 constituent assembly elections, and during the civil war, fought against both Red and White forces.⁴⁷ The Ukrainians saw themselves as a separate people, and as such Ukrainian opposition to the Soviets cannot simply be labeled as a socio-economic dispute. By first preventing the intelligentsia – the natural leaders of the nation – from siding with the peasants, collectivization would have been more easily facilitated, and opposition would have been less likely. By deliberately destroying perceived enemies who might or might not have contributed to a Ukrainian nationalist movement would be a direct attack on Ukraine as a nation and therefore would be considered a genocide under the UN’s definition.

Following the attacks on the intelligentsia were attacks on the Ukrainian religion. The GPU forced the Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox Church to proclaim its own liquidation in 1930.⁴⁸ Fearing its influence on the Ukrainian national movement, the Soviets declared the Church “a society detrimental to the welfare of the Soviet state, [and] its members were marked down in the Soviet police files as potential enemies of the people.”⁴⁹ According to the UN definition of genocide, and as I have argued hitherto, if we are to view the attacks on the religion as a pre-emptive strike before the famine began, then the Holodomor would constitute a genocide.

Dekulakization should be considered as a pre-emptive strike before the famine began, much like the attacks on the intelligentsia and the Church. Serbyn makes a similar argument when he claims that when historians write of “victims of dekulakization,” they are erroneously placing the victims of dekulakization and the victims of the famine into two different categories, implying two separate events.⁵⁰ For the Soviets, it was a way to rid themselves of the loudest voices in opposition to collectivization, and in this sense, facilitate the larger goal of rapid industrialization. Ukrainian kulaks in particular presented the strongest opposition, as they not only had material interests, but were unfamiliar and hostile to the Russian *obschchina*.⁵¹ A socio-economic interpretation might argue that the victims of the dekulakization policy were defined by a social and class approach, not a national one. However, only a minority of peasants who died during dekulakization could be considered as belonging to the kulak class.⁵²

In a speech Stalin gave to the Executive Committee of the Communist International on March 30, 1925, he states:

⁴⁴ Ibid, 208.

⁴⁵ Lemkin, “Soviet Genocide,” 236.

⁴⁶ Serbyn, “Holodomor,” 207.

⁴⁷ Kuromiya, “The Great Famine,” 123.

⁴⁸ Serbyn, “Holodomor,” 208.

⁴⁹ Ibid, 238.

⁵⁰ Serbyn, “The Ukrainian Famine.”

⁵¹ Ibid.

⁵² Ibid.

But it is also beyond doubt that, after all, the peasant question is the basis, the quintessence, of the national question . . . that there is no powerful national movement without the peasant army, nor can there be. That is what is meant when it is said that, in essence, the national question is a peasant question.⁵³

Stalin saw the peasants as an essential element of the national movement. He emphasized the importance of dealing with the peasant question, as “there [could be] no powerful national movement without the peasant army.”⁵⁴ It seems as if Stalin was implying that to deal with nationalist movements within the USSR, or Ukrainian nationalism specifically, one must first deal with the peasant question. If one of Stalin’s goals was to put an end to nationalism in Ukraine, we should assume that the starvation of the peasants – a solution to the “peasant question” – was, in his mind, a simple step towards the overarching goal of solving the “national question.” While this speech was made seven years prior to the famine in Ukraine, it should not be taken out of context as an indication of Stalin’s long-term objectives. Serbyn presents a similar argument when addressing the speech, as he writes that “Stalin’s convoluted explanation made one thing clear: [the] peasantry’s potential in constituting a national army had to be reckoned with.”⁵⁵ The starvation of Ukrainian peasants was not only an attack on peasants opposing collectivization, but an attack on those who would have formed the body of resistance that might have fought for secession.

A report sent by Genrikh Yagoda, assistant director of the OGPU (formally the GPU) to top Chekists in January 1933 highlights the national, rather than the class or social aspects of their intentions in Ukraine. Asserting that the exodus of peasants from the countryside was organized by counterrevolutionary movements led by supporters of Symon Petliura (Petliurites), Ukraine’s first sovereign president, Yagoda blamed the exodus of peasants, not on the fact that they were starving and searching for food, but that they were motivated by nationalist sentiments.⁵⁶ It is hard to believe Yagoda’s assertion that starving peasants fleeing Ukraine would have been driven by politics over the desire to eat for the first time in days. In this particular example, the Soviets were taking actions not against Ukrainian nationalists, but rather Ukrainians who were simply hungry.

On December 14, 1932, Stalin issued the decree “On Grain Procurement in Ukraine, the North Caucasus, and the Western Oblast.” The decree outlined three tasks of importance: first, to solve problems of grain procurement; second, to fight infiltration by counterrevolutionary elements; and third, to curtail Ukrainization.⁵⁷ Local authorities were instructed to expel Petliurite and other bourgeois nationalist elements from the party and government and replace them with strictly vetted Bolsheviks.⁵⁸ Further, the Ukrainian language came under attack. On December 15, it was banned in local administration, cooperative society, schools, and print media across the entire Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic (RSFSR).⁵⁹ This was a direct attack on the Ukrainian national language and culture.

⁵³ J. V. Stalin, “Concerning the National Question in Yugoslavia: Speech Delivered in the Yugoslav Commission of the E.C.C.I.,” (Moscow: Foreign Languages Publishing House, 1954).

⁵⁴ *Ibid.*

⁵⁵ Serbyn, “The Ukrainian Famine.”

⁵⁶ Serbyn, “Holodomor,” 225.

⁵⁷ *Ibid.*, 221.

⁵⁸ *Ibid.*, 222.

⁵⁹ Serbyn, “Holodomor,” 222.

For all the reasons already mentioned, Stalin was concerned about the peasants and their opposition to his new economic policies. I have argued that the attacks on the intelligentsia and the Church were pre-emptive strikes to terrorize who would have been Ukraine's natural leaders in a potential nationalist revolt against the Soviets. If the attacks on the intelligentsia and the Church are considered as pre-emptive strikes to prevent any possible opposition to collectivization, then a genocide has been committed, even if the goal was not to destroy the Ukrainians as a people, but to destroy any voice against the Soviet regime. They destroyed, "in whole or in part" Ukrainian "national, ethnical, racial, and religious group[s]" on their way to achieve collectivization.⁶⁰ Stalin was concerned with opposition to collectivization, but he was also concerned with Ukrainian nationalism. While the overarching goal might have been rapid industrialization, the Soviets were also able to curtail any hope of Ukrainian independence in the meantime and as such, deal with the "national question".⁶¹ Ukrainians posed a threat to the Soviet regime as the largest ethnic-minority group in the USSR.⁶² They had a different language, culture, religion, and way of life. The famine, as well as events leading up to the famine, were carried out both to facilitate Stalin's economic policies, and to quash the threat of Ukrainian secession.

However, if we are to follow the UN's definition of genocide, there must be proven intent, which is by far "the most difficult element to determine."⁶³ Most scholars will agree that Ukrainian "national, ethnical, racial, and religious group[s]" were in fact destroyed during the famine.⁶⁴ Whether the Soviets specifically intended to destroy the Ukrainian nation, ethnicity, and religion, is debatable. While there is no smoking gun in the Soviet archives which points to Stalin's direct intention to commit a genocide against the Ukrainians, I believe there are several compelling examples which, at the very least, hint at Soviet intent to destroy the Ukrainian people.

The legal definition of genocide requires specific intent by the perpetrator to be considered as such. Evidently, dekulakization, the attacks on the intelligentsia, and on the Church were deliberate, and if these are to be considered together with the famine as one attack on the Ukrainian people, then the Holodomor was a genocide. Genocide denying historians, on the other hand, will regard dekulakization and the attacks on the intelligentsia and Church as separate events from the famine. For the sake of addressing this argument, I will attempt to answer the question of intent by focusing solely on the famine itself.

In June 1932, the Ukrainian leadership asked Moscow for 16 to 33 thousand tons of grain and claimed if assistance did not arrive soon the peasants would begin picking unripe grain.⁶⁵ Instead, Stalin rejected the calls for help and in a letter to Lazar Kaganovich, Stalin's deputy in the party secretariat, he blamed local mismanagement and "whining" peasants.⁶⁶ Denying his own role in the situation facing Ukraine, Stalin reluctantly made minor concessions. However, these concessions were met with even stricter policies to ensure quotas were met in full. Stalin

⁶⁰ United Nations General Assembly, "Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide," (Resolution 260 A (III), 1948).

⁶¹ J. V. Stalin, "Concerning the National Question in Yugoslavia."

⁶² Serbyn, "The Ukrainian Famine."

⁶³ United Nations General Assembly, "Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide," (Resolution 260 A (III), 1948).

⁶⁴ Ibid.

⁶⁵ Serbyn, "Holodomor," 213.

⁶⁶ R. W. Davies et al., *The Stalin-Kaganovich Correspondence, 1931-36*, (Yale University Press, 2003), 138.

introduced the infamous “Five-Ears-of-Corn” law, which made collective farm property and crops, equivalent to state property; made theft of either punishable by a minimum of ten years imprisonment, and even death; and revoked the right of amnesty for committing these acts.⁶⁷ While the law applied to the entire USSR, just four days later Stalin sent another letter to Kaganovich stating that “[t]he most important issue right now is the Ukraine,” implying that he intended to direct the law against Ukraine specifically.⁶⁸ The law implemented such harsh punishments, even death, for people who were simply trying to save themselves and their families from imminent starvation.

Later in 1932, Vyacheslav Molotov forced a resolution through the Ukrainian government which consisted of actions to ensure the collection of grain and the repression of all opposition.⁶⁹ Collective farms accused of stealing grain or those that did not meet quotas were fined in a meat tax. As was often the case, if the peasants did not have any meat, any other food that could be found would be taken both to feed the industrial workers, but also to punish the peasants for attempting to eat.

Stalin was depending on the agricultural sector to produce the exports needed to finance industrialization, but also to feed his industrial workers. Presumably, he would have needed the agricultural workers – the peasants – just as much as he would have needed the industrial workers. Claiming that actions such as the Five-Ears-of-Corn law and other crackdowns on grain collections were directed at Ukraine is supported by the fact that Stalin made attempts to save Russian peasants, but not Ukrainians. In the spring of 1932, Stalin imported nearly 50 thousand tons of grain for starving Siberian peasants, but as mentioned, a few months later in June, Stalin denied such a request from Ukraine to deliver far less than what was imported for Siberia.⁷⁰

In a letter sent to Kaganovich in June 1932, Stalin wrote that “despite a fairly good harvest, [Ukrainians] have found themselves in a state of impoverishment and famine.”⁷¹ It is unlikely this would have been the earliest Stalin was aware of the situation in Ukraine, but let us assume it is. At this point, hundreds of thousands were already starving, but Stalin did not take preventative measures. In fact, on June 21, a telegram signed by Stalin and Molotov further instructed regions to carry out “at any cost” the plan for grain deliveries.⁷² Furthermore, the harvest in the fall of 1932 was worse as the Soviets were only able to produce and collect 18.5 million tons of grain.⁷³ Yet, there is evidence to suggest that they still decided to export enough grain to feed six or seven million people in 1932.⁷⁴ At this time, it is beyond doubt that the highest levels of Soviet leadership, including Stalin himself, were aware of the situation in Ukraine and still did not take preventative measures like they did in Siberia.

On January 22, 1933, Stalin sent a directive to Ukraine, Byelorussia, and neighbouring regions to prevent the exodus of peasants fleeing Ukraine.⁷⁵ All border crossings between Ukraine, the North Caucasus, and the rest of the USSR were ordered closed, and starving peasants trying to flee in search of food were arrested. By March, 225,024

⁶⁷ Serbyn, “Holodomor,” 215.

⁶⁸ R. W. Davies et al., *Stalin-Kaganovich Correspondence*, 180.

⁶⁹ Serbyn, “Holodomor,” 218.

⁷⁰ Stebelsky, “Did Weather Play a Part,” 11.

⁷¹ R. W. Davies et al., *Stalin-Kaganovich Correspondence*, 138.

⁷² Serbyn, “The Ukrainian Famine.”

⁷³ Serbyn, “Holodomor,” 220.

⁷⁴ *Ibid*, 220.

⁷⁵ *Ibid*, 224.

refugees were detained and of these, 196,372 (87%) were sent back home – into regions the OGPU knew had no food – to starve to death.⁷⁶ The Soviets seemed to have been equally, or perhaps more concerned with Ukrainian nationalism as they were with opposition to collectivization. Stanislav Kosior, Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Ukraine, stated that “Ukrainian nationalism is our chief danger.”⁷⁷ Another Soviet official commented in 1934, that “[s]tarvation in Ukraine was brought about in order to reduce the number of Ukrainians . . . and in this way kill all thought of independence.”⁷⁸ What makes this directive even more indicative of the Soviet intent to commit a genocide is the fact that January 22 was the same day that Ukraine had declared independence in 1918, and the same day that the Ukrainian National Republic and the Western Ukrainian National Republic proclaimed their unification.⁷⁹ While there is so direct evidence which points to Stalin’s intent to issue the directive on January 22, it is hard to imagine that he was unaware of the significance of the day.

Hiroaki Kuromiya suggests that if the Soviets had stopped all grain exports and released whatever stockpiles they had, they could have saved up to eight million lives, however, financing industrialization and feeding the industrial workers was a higher priority than feeding the Ukrainians.⁸⁰ The Holodomor was a genocide to facilitate industrialization, not a murder. The Soviets intentionally attacked the Ukrainian nationality, ethnicity, culture, and religion to facilitate collectivization, and thus industrialization. The ensuing famine caused by rapid collectivization and harsh crackdowns of procurements then provided an opportunity to curtail Ukrainian nationalism, and any hopes of independence.

The Ukrainian famine of 1932-1933 should be recognized as a genocide, but it does not appear that this debate will be ending anytime soon. Competing interpretations, a lack of dependable data, and limited access to Soviet archives all restrain our ability to gain a full understanding of the story. However, the Ukrainian nation, culture, and religion were all deliberately destroyed, “in whole or in part,” and these attacks should be considered as pre-emptive strikes to facilitate collectivization, and through collectivization, rapid industrialization.⁸¹ Stalin was equally, or perhaps more, concerned with Ukrainian nationalism as he was with peasant opposition to collectivization. The famine was the opportunity Stalin was looking for to quash any hopes for independence coming from the largest ethnic minority in the USSR.⁸² According to the United Nations definition of genocide, the Holodomor should be considered as such.

⁷⁶ Ibid, 226.

⁷⁷ Ibid, 206.

⁷⁸ Ibid, 206.

⁷⁹ David Saunders, “The Starvation of Ukrainians in 1933: By-product or Genocide?,” in *Holodomor: Reflections on the Great Famine of 1932-1933 in Soviet Ukraine*, ed. Lubomyr Y. Luciuk and Lisa Grekul, (Kingston: The Kashtan Press, 2008): 99.

⁸⁰ Kuromiya, “The Great Famine,” 118.

⁸¹ United Nations General Assembly, “Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide,” (Resolution 260 A (III), 1948).

⁸² Serbyn, “The Ukrainian Famine.”

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https://shron1.chtyvo.org.ua/Serbyn_Roman/Holodomor_The_Ukrainian_Genocide__en.pdf?PHPSESSID=9khjeeja2vsd12gvf9dvpqae04.
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Internationalisms and the Women's Movement in Japan, Early Twentieth Century to the End of the Second World War

Mia Engelmann

Histories of Japan's role in the Second World War often begin in the latter half of the nineteenth century with the Meiji Restoration. The Meiji Restoration was primarily a political transition; in 1868 the Tokugawa shogunate—a feudal system—ended and was replaced by direct imperial rule under the Meiji emperor. This political transition, though, marked profound economic and social change for Japan as well. The country opened its borders to global capitalism and began a process of adaptation to the Western-dominated international order.¹ Japan “entered the race,” so to speak, the race for modernity, industrial capacity, and the consolidation of power on the global stage. Increasing literacy and access to higher education for both men and women quickly became a part of the Meiji agenda in this race toward modernity, so Japanese women were first sent abroad for higher education in 1871.² It was Japanese women educated in the United States and Europe who became leaders of the country's women's organizations formed in the twentieth century, which made strides in the movements for women's suffrage, labouring women's rights, women's access to birth control, and international peace in the period between the two world wars.³ Japanese women had very limited access to political participation within Japan, but engaging in worldwide women's movements meant they could have political leverage in spaces outside of Japan. In this way, the modern Japanese feminist movement was founded on an international consciousness. Internationalist movements are built on networks which transcend national borders; these networks serve as a means to create power through solidarity and collaboration of similarly affected peoples the world over. Strong race-based and class-based international networks parallel to the international women's movement existed in the interwar period too, but these networks were disrupted by rising nationalism and militarism in the years up to and during the Second World War. Japanese feminist leaders, for instance, had to reconcile the interests of their internationally-connected movements with their sense of national duty. The women's movement in Japan was muted through the war years because of its special dependency on international cooperation, particularly after the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor in December 1941, but in the meantime Japanese feminists engaged in social work and played active roles in maintaining the home front.⁴ The Japanese state only minimally mobilized the nation's women for industrial labour, unlike other major belligerents, but women in Japan supported the war effort in numerous other ways, maintaining their agency and public role. After the war's end in 1945, notions of internationalism had changed, but the networks Japanese feminists worked to build before the war could be revisited to secure suffrage and other movement aims.

¹ Britannica, “Meiji Restoration,” *Encyclopedia Britannica*, September 29, 2021.

² Ann M. Harrington, “Women and Higher Education in the Japanese Empire (1895-1945),” *Journal of Asian History*, 21, no. 2 (1987): 169-170.

³ Taeko Shibahara, *Japanese Women and the Transnational Feminist Movement before World War II* (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 2015), 23.

⁴ Shibahara, *Japanese Women and the Transnational Feminist Movement before World War II*, 104.

At the start of the Meiji period and into the early twentieth century, Japanese women were generally limited to roles within the home. Some women were employed as low-wage labourers and participated in labour organizing, but until contact was established with women's movements around the world the prevailing notion of the ideal Japanese woman remained the "good wife and wise mother." This traditional ideology concerning the role of women likely developed from Confucian teachings, which advanced supporting one's husband through domestic work as a wife's most important duty.⁵ The domestic role of women was also entrenched in law. Japanese women were unable to vote and Article 5 of the 1900 Public Order Police Law made it illegal for women to join political parties, speak at rallies, and even attend rallies.⁶ Because political structures were closed to Japanese women within the country, a need arose for alternative methods outside the country for influencing Japanese policy. This need for outside, alternative methods to change ruling structures was felt elsewhere too, by subjugated peoples and minorities all around the world, and internationalisms presented an answer. The First World War was a catalyst as it was largely fought by peoples living under colonial rule, and though many of them fought under the guise of Woodrow Wilson's doctrine of "self-determination," self-determination was not extended to colonial peoples at the war's end.⁷ Also important, the First World War made the world smaller by connecting peoples from across the globe who would not have otherwise crossed paths. With these combined factors, international consciousness and solidarities blossomed in the interwar period. Various iterations of Pan-Africanism, for example, were particularly strong at this time. Based on the idea that all people of the African diaspora possess a shared history, a shared homeland, and a shared struggle, Pan-African movements connected Black Americans (a minority population) with hundreds of millions of Black peoples worldwide. Further, Pan-African conferences and media publications served as a political outlet for many Black Americans, who remained effectively disenfranchised in the first half of the twentieth century and faced constant threats of violence.⁸

Broader internationalisms of the "darker races" grew in the 1920s and 1930s as well. For instance, the Chicago-based Peace Movement of Ethiopia (PME) was led by Mittie Maude Lena Gordon, a former member of the Black nationalist Universal Negro Improvement Association (UNIA). In her role as founder and president of the PME, Gordon led hundreds of thousands of members and pursued connections with Japanese and Filipino leaders to forge Afro-Asian solidarity in the 1930s. Japan's status as the world's foremost non-white, economically and militarily powerful state in the early twentieth century made Afro-Japanese solidarity appear especially strategic to African Americans.⁹ Several other movements linking the struggles of people of "darker races" around the world existed in the interwar period, including Afro-Indian solidarity movements and international anticolonial

⁵ Woman's Suffrage League of Japan, *Japanese Women*, 3, no. 3 (May 1940): 3.

⁶ Andrew Gordon, *Labor and Imperial Democracy in Pre-War Japan* (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1991), 36.

⁷ Gerald Horne, *Facing the Rising Sun: African Americans, Japan, and the Rise of Afro-Asian Solidarity* (New York: New York University Press, 2018), 37-38.

⁸ Penny Von Eschen, *Race Against Empire: Black Americans and Anticolonialism, 1937-1957*, (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2014), 7-8.

⁹ Keisha N. Blain, "Confraternity of All Dark Races." *Palimpsest: A Journal on Women, Gender, and the Black International* 5, no. 2 (2016): 163.

movements.¹⁰ Similarly, international communism, represented by the Comintern, strove to connect all of the working-class people of the world who shared an experience of subjugation under capitalist systems.¹¹

In each of the above-mentioned cases, oppressed peoples sought larger communities to increase their power against their oppressors. Women's suffrage organizations in the United States and four European countries formed the International Woman Suffrage Alliance (IWSA) in 1904 with this same idea in mind. By 1914 the IWSA had member associations from twenty-six different countries, including China.¹² The IWSA's transcultural unity and sheer number of members made it a force on the international stage; the organization frequently engaged the League of Nations after it was established in 1919.¹³ Japanese women's organizations, however, were slow to agitate for suffrage because of a belief widely-held through the 1910s—articulated by Bryn Mawr College (Pennsylvania, U.S.) graduate and Japanese educator Gauntlett Tsune—that Japan was “not ready” for it.¹⁴ As more women from countries around the world won the right to vote and correspondence between Japanese and Western feminists increased, though, suffrage entered the agenda of women's organizations in Japan. In 1921, Gauntlett Tsune herself and her fellow educator Kubushiro Ochimi led the creation of Japan's first suffrage organization, the Japan Woman Suffrage Council, which became a member association of the IWSA that same year.¹⁵

Despite the establishment of the Japan Woman Suffrage Council, Japanese women's organizations remained focused primarily on social issues rather than political issues, until the Great Kanto earthquake of 1923. The destruction caused by the earthquake, which killed about one hundred thousand people and destroyed or damaged the majority of buildings in Tokyo, served as a catalyst for a period of increased action by Japanese women's organizations and increased work in and with Japan by Western women's organizations.¹⁶ Japanese women mobilized to improve daily life and help with cleanup and repair efforts as an immediate reaction to the catastrophe. Opening new transnational relations and lines of dialogue, Western feminists advised Japanese women leaders on relief work to help make their efforts more effective. Racist attitudes held by Western women towards their counterparts in Asia certainly did not disappear after the earthquake, but the collaboration it brought about did do much to demystify cultural differences between the “West” and the “East.” Within Japan, it was publicly clear that women could be useful, effective members of society after the earthquake. Further, in 1922 (before the earthquake), the Japanese government legalized women's participation in political meetings and rallies.¹⁷ These changes increased support for the pursuit of Japanese women's suffrage, and in 1922 the enduring Women's Suffrage League (WSL) was established under the leadership of Ichikawa Fusae, a journalist and activist for the working class.¹⁸

¹⁰ Nico Slate, *Colored Cosmopolitanism: The Shared Struggle for Freedom in the United States and India* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2012), 7.

¹¹ Von Eschen, *Race Against Empire*, 10.

¹² Shibahara, *Japanese Women and the Transnational Feminist Movement before World War II*, 26-27.

¹³ Shibahara, *Japanese Women and the Transnational Feminist Movement before World War II*, 32.

¹⁴ Quoted in Shibahara, *Japanese Women and the Transnational Feminist Movement before World War II*, 33.

¹⁵ Shibahara, *Japanese Women and the Transnational Feminist Movement before World War II*, 39.

¹⁶ Shibahara, *Japanese Women and the Transnational Feminist Movement before World War II*, 25.

¹⁷ “Women of Japan Play Their Part,” *New York Times*, August 15, 1937.

¹⁸ Shibahara, *Japanese Women and the Transnational Feminist Movement before World War II*, 26.

The 1920s was an exciting time for women's rights movements in Japan. Socialist Japanese women such as Ishimoto Shidzue called for an alliance of women across class boundaries, access to birth control for all women, and the establishment of a Women's Bureau within the government.¹⁹ Ishimoto is thought of as the Margaret Sanger of Japan for her work in improving access to contraception, especially for working-class women. Margaret Sanger is credited as the founder of the birth control movement in the United States. In 1919, Ishimoto traveled to New York City and met Sanger. The two developed a transnational working relationship.²⁰ Both women had a strong international consciousness and an understanding of the potential their collaboration held for women's sexual liberation around the world. In March 1938, Sanger wrote to Ishimoto, "Birth control is not a national problem only, but an international one, and we who belong to this civilization must all help each other."²¹ Before the beginning of the Second Sino-Japanese War in 1937, Ishimoto's work was fairly successful. By the early 1930s, she ran multiple birth control clinics which distributed diaphragms and contraceptive jelly, and she held trainings on contraceptive use as well.²² Radical feminist writings also proliferated in the 1920s. Yamakawa Kikue, a socialist feminist and labour organizer, published her list of "Women's Special Demands" in 1925. The "Demands" pertained mostly to women's rights in the workplace, but Yamakawa also called for "equal rights and responsibility between men and women in marriage and divorce" and "abolition of the patriarchal household system."²³ Finally, in the 1920s the fight for women's suffrage was a major focus, and Japanese feminist intellectuals increasingly understood suffrage as the key to securing various other rights for women. Japanese women participated in numerous international conferences, including the first Pan-Pacific Women's Conference in 1928. At events like these, Japanese women voiced their grievances and helped draft resolutions that ultimately put international pressure on the "modernizing" Japanese state. In fact, this pressure, in combination with the domestic efforts of the WSL, was so effective that in March 1931 a resolution for female suffrage in Japan passed the lower house of the National Diet (the Japanese legislature).²⁴ This was as far as the fight for Japanese women's suffrage got, though, until after the war, as imperialism was becoming the Japanese state's primary objective.

When Japan invaded Manchuria, an ethnically Chinese territory, beginning in 1931, Japanese women's leaders had to grapple with changing national priorities. Japan became more nationalist and militarist throughout the 1930s as it mobilized for war, and as a result certain pillars of the Japanese women's movement up until that point—namely peace, reproductive freedom, and international cooperation—came into direct conflict with the new national agenda. Ichikawa Fusae, WSL president, and others were forced to reconcile their commitment to peace and suffrage with their sense of duty to Japan. These leaders struggled to maintain their connections to the international women's movement, particularly contacts in China, and later contacts in the U.S. In 1933, Japan withdrew from the

¹⁹ Michiko Takeuchi, "At the Crossroads of Equality versus Protection: American Occupationnaire Women and Socialist Feminism in US Occupied Japan, 1945–1952," *Frontiers: A Journal of Women Studies*, 38, no. 2, ERA (2017): 133.

²⁰ Shibahara, *Japanese Women and the Transnational Feminist Movement before World War II*, 85.

²¹ Quoted in Shibahara, *Japanese Women and the Transnational Feminist Movement before World War II*, 82.

²² Shibahara, *Japanese Women and the Transnational Feminist Movement before World War II*, 99.

²³ Takeuchi, "At the Crossroads of Equality versus Protection," 121–122.

²⁴ Gordon, *Labor and Imperial Democracy in Pre-War Japan*, 25.

League of Nations, contributing further to these women's difficulties.²⁵ Advancing women's rights domestically also became increasingly challenging as Japan mobilized for war; the Japanese state put added pressure on Japanese women to have children to add to the nation's population of soldiers and labourers.²⁶ Ishimoto Shidzue's efforts to make birth control accessible to women of all classes were defeated when the Japanese government effectively outlawed contraception with measures implemented from 1935-1941.²⁷ With these mounting challenges, Japanese feminists developed new strategies for staying organized in their domestic efforts and maintaining international connections. One such strategy was the bimonthly publication of *Japanese Women*, an English-language newsletter on the state of the women's movement in Japan distributed to subscribers around the world. *Japanese Women* was published from 1938 to 1940, and Ichikawa was its editor. The newsletter aimed to counteract increasingly negative perceptions of Japan on the world stage with accounts of daily Japanese life, brief histories of Japanese women, and updates on the contemporary obstacles to the Japanese women's movement. In the words of the newsletter's publishers themselves, "We ardently hope at this juncture, when international relations are getting more and more delicate and complicated, that women of different nations may get to know each other better, so that they may be able to cooperate towards the end of establishing a better world order."²⁸ This mission statement was included in the May 1940 edition of *Japanese Women* and demonstrates a continued international consciousness among Japanese feminists, even as the prospect of war with the United States became more and more probable. Another strategy for moving forward was to shift the bulk of Japanese women's organizations' efforts to social work. In the early 1930s Ichikawa wrote, "Even if we do not gain suffrage legally, we plan to exercise a de facto political power."²⁹ "De facto political power" would come from continuing to work in the public sphere: working to maintain a constant standard of living for those on the home front and to advocate for protective policies for women and children.³⁰ This strategy became particularly important when the WSL disbanded in August 1940 and gave up its independence from the Japanese state. At this point, Ichikawa and many other members of the organizations of the 1920s let go of the international women's project for the duration of the war.

Another reminder that Japan had isolated itself from international pressures and tendencies: the Japanese state took an approach to its women in wartime that was markedly different from that of other major belligerents. Like the German and Italian fascist regimes, Japan too encouraged women to use their reproductive capacities and have large families during the war years. However, the Japanese state did very little to mobilize women for their labour in war industry; in fact, women were strongly discouraged from working once they were married—as was the case before the war began.³¹ The state sponsored numerous "official" women's organizations under various government departments for traditional wartime activities, including organizing departures for soldiers and sewing

²⁵ Shibahara, *Japanese Women and the Transnational Feminist Movement before World War II*, 103-104.

²⁶ Thomas R.H. Havens, "Women and War in Japan, 1937-45," *The American Historical Review* 80, no. 4 (October 1975): 920.

²⁷ Shibahara, *Japanese Women and the Transnational Feminist Movement before World War II*, 101-102.

²⁸ Woman's Suffrage League of Japan, *Japanese Women*, 3, no. 3 (May 1940): 4.

²⁹ Quoted in Shibahara, *Japanese Women and the Transnational Feminist Movement before World War II*, 106.

³⁰ Shibahara, *Japanese Women and the Transnational Feminist Movement before World War II*, 106.

³¹ Havens, "Women and War in Japan, 1937-45," 917.

protective charms for them. These organizations were run by men and were a frustration for leaders of the actual women-led organizations who wanted to do real social work.³² Japan did not begin full-scale mobilization of its economy for war production until 1942, but even then high-ranking officials such as prime minister Tojo Hideki balked at the idea of drafting women to alleviate shortages of civilian manpower.³³ During the war years, Britain, Germany, the USSR, and the United States each saw a percentage increase of women in their national workforces several times that of the percentage increase for Japan. In Japan, the size of the female labour force only increased by ten percent from 1940 to 1944, while in the United States, for example, the female labour force increased by fifty percent from 1940 to 1944.³⁴ In the final two years of the war, Japan was in a more desperate situation. The volunteer corps for unmarried women labourers grew to become very large, and there was immense cultural pressure on young women to join and serve their country—but still many women never served and some never even had to enlist.³⁵ The Japanese state stuck with the traditional ideology of women as “good wives and wise mothers,” encouraging them to stay home to maintain the nation’s households and family structures in the absence of men.

As feminist leaders searched for the best ways possible to maintain the women’s movement through the war years and young, unmarried women laboured in war industry, many women lived their lives as best they could from home—even as they were deeply affected by the horrors of the war. Especially in towns and rural areas, women engaged in cleanup and repair efforts and did their best to take care of the injured in their communities after firebombings. Mothers were often left alone to be community caretakers as their older sons and partners departed for war.³⁶ American occupation of Japan began after Japan surrendered in August/September of 1945, and lasted until 1952. The U.S. military was the largest presence in the occupation, but women leaders from the U.S. came as well to assist in the “liberation of Japanese women” ordered by the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers (SCAP) on October 11, 1945 as part of the post-war “democratization of Japan” project.³⁷ Just before the occupiers arrived, Gauntlett Tsune, Ichikawa Fusae, and other Japanese women’s leaders organized the Women’s Committee on Postwar Countermeasures, to get an immediate start on addressing women’s issues in the aftermath of the war. In this way, Japanese feminists sought to preserve their independence and agency, and ensure that change for women in Japan was not externally imposed or “granted.” When American feminists arrived, they formed a policy alliance with Japanese women’s leaders, many of whom they already had relationships with from pre-war transnational collaboration. Suffrage for Japanese women came quickly out of this alliance. By December 1945, women’s right to vote in Japan was officially approved.³⁸ This rapidity was only possible because of the years of work Japanese feminists had put in before the war to build networks with Western feminists and agitate within Japan for suffrage. In the next few years, Japanese and American women worked well together to draft parts of the new Japanese

³² Woman’s Suffrage League of Japan, *Japanese Women*, 3, no. 3 (May 1940): 3-4.

³³ Havens, “Women and War in Japan, 1937-45,” 919-920.

³⁴ Havens, “Women and War in Japan, 1937-45,” 918.

³⁵ Havens, “Women and War in Japan, 1937-45,” 922-923.

³⁶ Edgar A. Porter and Ran Ying Porter, *Japanese Reflections on World War II and the American Occupation* (Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press B.V., 2017), 110.

³⁷ Takeuchi, “At the Crossroads of Equality versus Protection,” 114.

³⁸ Shibahara, *Japanese Women and the Transnational Feminist Movement before World War II*, 126.

Constitution and institute protections for women, but there was without a doubt a power imbalance between the American occupiers and the Japanese occupied, not to mention continued racial prejudice. An example of one manifestation of this power imbalance: Ichikawa was barred from running for the National Diet and holding public office because she had been so active in supporting the Japanese state during the war years. Other women's leaders did assume leadership roles, though. Yamakawa Kikue became the first director of the newly established Women's Bureau in 1947.³⁹ Ishimoto Shidzue, whose name became Katō Shidzue after she remarried in 1944, was elected to the upper house of the National Diet in 1946.⁴⁰

Like the First World War, the Second World War created new transnational networks and a newly fashioned world order. The lines of Cold War solidarities were drawn very quickly after the end of the war, and though they formed solidarities, these lines also affirmed the primacy of the nation-state, because each country was meant to pick one of two sides for its people. In the United States and countries which aligned with it, it became difficult for radical international movements—especially class-based internationalisms—to thrive in the years after the war because they could be so easily persecuted as adjacent to communism. In American-occupied Japan, the SCAP after 1947 began proposing laws which were meant to enforce “American Cold War family ideology,” or a model of the ideal family as heterosexual and nuclear, “with a male breadwinner and a female homemaker.”⁴¹ Despite all these pressures, the Japanese and American women policymakers in alliance in Japan from 1945-1952 were able to work together to successfully resist many of these proposals, and that success can be explained by the enduring strength of their international feminist collaboration before the war.

³⁹ Takeuchi, “At the Crossroads of Equality versus Protection,” 126-127.

⁴⁰ Takeuchi, “At the Crossroads of Equality versus Protection,” 135.

⁴¹ Takeuchi, “At the Crossroads of Equality versus Protection,” 114.

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A Hungarian Tragedy: An Analysis on the Destruction of the Hungarian Jews

Samuel Schonfeld

Jewish security and prosperity in Hungary, prior to the Holocaust, was never certain. Antisemitism, since the middle of the Nineteenth century, plagued Hungarian culture and society. In fact, the most prominent antisemitic movements and sentiments arose in the late 1840's, when Hungary was still a part of the Austro-Hungarian Empire. Antisemitism continued to rise throughout the century, as the uncertainty linked to the creation of the Austro-Hungarian Dual Monarchy and the collapse of Austria-Hungary was blamed on the Jews. Antisemitic policy became rampant in 1938 when Hungary, who was now allied with Nazi Germany and Fascist Italy, began its territorial expansion to reclaim its lost territories from World War I. In March 1944, antisemitic policy and sentiment reached its highest point, and the Nazis transported as many Hungarian Jews as possible to concentration camps. Some individual Jews managed to stay in the Budapest Ghetto until the end of the war, but they were far and few. Nearly one hundred years after the Anti-Habsburg Revolution – a revolt which sought independence from the Habsburgs that included many pogroms against the Jews – half of the Jewish population in Hungary was depleted. My grandfather, George Schonfeld, and his immediate relatives are some of the lucky few who survived this century of antisemitism and Jew-hatred in Hungary.

The purpose of this paper is to illustrate how measures to solve the “Jewish Question” in Hungary evolved over time, through legislative bills, decrees, and societal norms, which in turn culminated in the extermination of the Hungarian Jews; and, it is also to do what my great-grandfather, Adolf Schonfeld, committed himself to doing: “I felt it was my duty to record the years of unspeakable horror, both as a lesson for my own grandchildren and also, hopefully, for future generations, since it seems that the recent past is soon not to be believed.”¹ To begin, this paper will define ‘Jewish Question’ as it was defined in Hungary and the world in order to establish and explain what the driving force was behind the extermination of the Hungarian Jews. Next, this paper will demonstrate how the road to the organized destruction of the Jews saw its roots in 1882, out of the Tiszaeszlár trial. Afterwards, this essay will illustrate how the antisemitic law which Hungary created in 1920 promoted the segregation of Jews from Hungarian society. Later, this document will show how the mass deportations, and the labour forced upon Hungarian Jews during the war, laid the foundations for the elimination of the Jews from Hungary. Lastly, this paper will explore how the final measures taken by the Hungarians and Nazis eradicated most of the Jewish population living in Hungary.

The ‘Jewish Question,’ which is also commonly known as the ‘Jewish Problem,’ traces its origins back to the Enlightenment era and the French Revolution. The ‘question’ arose during this period as a reactionary response to the perceived threat of the Jewish emancipation movement – that is, the elimination and removal of restrictive laws on Jews by certain countries in central and western Europe. To be more precise, the ‘Jewish Question’ was a response to the Haskalah, a Jewish movement for the legal and societal equality of Jews in their places of residence, and the Jewish Naturalisation Act, 1753, an act of parliament in the United Kingdom which allowed Jews who lived

¹Adolf Schonfeld, Written Account, Translated by George Schonfeld, March 1996, p.1.

in Great Britain to naturalise.² In essence, the ‘Jewish Question’ was an antisemitic debate about what Europeans should do to protect themselves and purge themselves of and from the Jews. The public was uncertain, and debates about the ‘Jewish Question’ continued until and after the Holocaust (the existence of the state of Israel, some have said, is itself a response to the ‘Jewish Problem’). In essence, understanding the nature of the ‘Jewish Question’ is important because it allows one to understand how and why individuals in Hungary and Europe responded and reacted in the way that did to Jews. Furthermore, understanding the ‘Jewish Question’ is one of the only ways to understand how and why the Holocaust and the destruction of the Jews occurred – the systematic elimination of the Jews was just one of the many significant and decisive responses to this question.

Nineteenth century Hungary was an unsafe geographical location – especially for Jews. Even before the Anti-Habsburg Revolution, anti-Jewish sentiment existed. However, William O. McCagg, Jr. states that “in 1840 the Magyar noble Diet abolished most residential restrictions upon Jews.”³ Jews acquired better living conditions after 1867, for the “Magyar government sought to keep Jewish support ... by legally emancipating the Jews”.⁴ Nonetheless, the Anti-Habsburg Revolution, in 1848, and the creation of the Austro-Hungarian Empire, in 1867, gave rise to greater waves of antisemitism. Propaganda in newspapers promoted anti-Jewish sentiment; a cartoon from a newspaper, made in 1870, depicted an image of a young Jew stealing boots and running away from a police officer.⁵ Nearly a decade later, antisemitism spread into the political sphere. Indeed, as Randolph L. Braham and Paul Hanebrink write, “it was in fact during the Golden Era [– the period after the creation of the dual monarchy –] that the International Anti-Semitic League was organized in Budapest and a notorious blood libel case was tried in Tiszaeszlár”.⁶ It was in this blood libel case that the first organizational steps towards the elimination of the Hungarian Jews were taken. Robert Nemes notes that organized antisemitism “all began with small-town murder investigations and ended with widespread communal violence, angry newspaper debates, and sustained antisemitic agitation and organization”.⁷ “The catalyst” of much of the organized violence that occurred “was the blood libel case,” for it claimed that “Jews ritually murdered Christian children in order to use their blood in matzos”.⁸ In particular, the case was about “a 14-year old Calvinist Servant girl named Eszter Solymosi [who] disappeared from the village of Tiszaeszlár”.⁹ At the end of the trial, the judge “exonerated” the Jews, but the exoneration led to “a wave of anti-Jewish riots [that] swept the country”.¹⁰ As a result of these riots, a group of parliamentary antisemites founded the National Antisemitic Party in 1883. Although the party did not survive long, it capitalized on the

² Bonnie Latimer, “Samuel Richardson and the ‘Jew Bill’ of 1753: A New Political Context for Sir Charles Grandison,” *The Review of English Studies* 275, no. 66 (2015): 520-539.

³ William O. McCagg Jr., “Jews in Revolution: The Hungarian Experience,” *Journal of Social History* 6, no.1 (Autumn 1972), p.80.

⁴ McCagg, “Jews in Revolution,” p.80.

⁵ Hungarian Trade and Hospitality Museum. Sunday Newspaper - reproduction. Excerpt from the newspaper, the picture shows a gendarme, which is a drawing by János Zahoray (July 17, 1870).

⁶ Randolph L. Braham and Paul Hanebrink, “The Holocaust in Hungary: A Critical Analysis,” *Holocaust and Genocide Studies* 34, no. 1 (Spring 2020), p. 1-17.

⁷ Robert Nemes, “Hungary’s Antisemitic Provinces: Violence and Ritual Murder in the 1880s,” *Slavic Review* 66, no.1 (Spring 2007), p.20.

⁸ Nemes, “Hungary’s Antisemitic Provinces,” p.21.

⁹ Nemes, “Hungary’s Antisemitic Provinces,” p.21.

¹⁰ Nemes, “Hungary’s Antisemitic Provinces,” p.22.

rampant antisemitism in the nation, and it illustrated the extent to which antisemitism had ingrained itself in Hungarian society. Ultimately, by illustrating the extent to which anti-Jewish sentiment could be harnessed for political endeavours in Hungary, the new party laid the foundation for future antisemitic rhetoric in legislature and for the exclusion of Jews from society.

The exclusion of Jews from European society did not begin with the *Nuremberg Race Laws of September 1935* in Nazi Germany. The first instance of legislative discrimination in Europe after World War I occurred in Hungary. *The Numerus Clausus Act of 1920* – the act which placed limits on the number of Jews enrolled in the universities by restricting their enrollment to the percentage of the national population which they represented – was the first manifestation of legislative antisemitism. This law was enacted to secure employment opportunities for Hungarian Christians. Peter Tibor Nagy writes that the Hungarian Christian middle class predominantly occupied “state” and “local government offices, while the Jewish middle classes had sent their sons to work in non-state-controlled sectors”.¹¹ This became an issue “after the 1920 Trianon Peace Treaty, which greatly reduced Hungary’s territory, [so] the country needed far fewer public officials. This meant that the Christian middle classes were obliged to secure positions outside the state-controlled areas”.¹² By preventing entry to higher education for Jews, the government created opportunities for more Hungarian Christians to enter universities. Thus, Christians began to acquire the necessary skills to work in the professions, whereas the Jews began to lose these skills. Also, Béla Bodó, an acclaimed rabbi, claims that the dissolution of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy and the loss “of historical Hungary” caused the importance of the Jewish population to decline.¹³ Indeed, Bodó explained that “the democratic revolution, the Soviet Republic and the Red Terror traumatized the liberal and conservative middle and upper classes. Since Jews played an important role in the democratic revolution and the Communist experiment, they became automatic targets of reprisal after August 1919”.¹⁴ The anti-Jewish sentiments that prevailed in 1883 persisted, and “with the explicit support of the Christian churches and cultural elite,” the *Numerus Clausus Act* became legislation in “September 1920”.¹⁵ The consequences of the *Numerus Clausus Act* were detrimental to the Jewish population. They excluded Jews from the Hungarian workforce because Jews could no longer attend university and, as Mrs. Andai Katalin Erdős stated in her personal testimony, it became difficult for Jews to attend school: “the Jewish High for Girls [were exclusively for the] very good [Jewish] students whose fees were waived [or for] the children of the Jewish elite”.¹⁶ In essence, the antisemitism that was ubiquitous in Hungarian society, in combination with the uncertainty that came with the dissolution of its monarchy and its former nation, promoted the legislative exclusion of Jews from society and education. Eventually, this segregation evolved into the physical removal of the Hungarian Jews.

¹¹ Peter Tibor Nagy, “The Numerus Clausus in Inter-War Hungary,” *East European Jewish Affairs* 35, no.1 (January 2005), p.13-22.

¹² Nagy, “The Numerus Clausus,” p.13-22.

¹³ Béla Bodó, “The Numerus Clausus Law of 1920: Asymmetrical Dependencies, and the “Twisted Road” of Hungarian Jews to Auschwitz,” *Working paper* (August 2022), p.9.

¹⁴ Bodó, “The Numerus Clausus Law,” p.9.

¹⁵ Bodó, “The Numerus Clausus Law,” p.9.

¹⁶ Andai Katalin Erdős, in the exhibition catalogue of “the Numerus Clausus vs. Women,” held at 2B Gallery, Budapest, Aug 2021, p.6.

In 1939, the Hungarian Parliament passed the “Second Jewish Law”. This law was like the Nuremberg Laws implemented in Germany; the law determined who was a Jew based upon racial categorization through an individual’s ancestry.¹⁷ It also placed greater restrictions on the activities which Jews could pursue, and it imposed severe economic sanctions on Jews.¹⁸ However, the “Second Jewish Law” had a unique aspect: it proclaimed that the government had the ability to remove Jews from the country and to expropriate their property.¹⁹ Indeed, “Act IV of 1939 on the Limitation of Jewish Expansion in Public and Economic Spheres (Second ‘Jewish Law’)” stated that “Jewish assets” may be “moved abroad” and that “the government may also issue decrees about customs, as well as other regulations deemed necessary for the protection of national assets in connection with the promotion of Jewish emigration”.²⁰ Furthermore, on June 30, 1941, the Mayor of Rimaszombat, Rimavská Sobota, created city regulations to bar Jews from public life. It became illegal to serve “lard to Jews”; for “Jews and for wholesale buyers to make purchases before 10 a.m.”; and for Jews to assemble “in public places... Two or more persons is considered an assembly”.²¹ Hungarian society expressed no objections to the law, or these regulations, as antisemitism had spread throughout the nation’s culture. Miklós Kállay, who served as the Hungarian Prime Minister during World War II, is also partially responsible for the adoption of antisemitism in Hungarian society and legislatur. Yehuda Don notes that Hungary was able to pursue these measures because Kallay promoted antisemitic feelings: “his oratory in public was as antisemitic as that of his predecessors”.²² The law’s powers did not end at deportation; it created the foundation for Hungary to write legislation which imposed forced manual labour on its Jewish citizens. My great-grandfather, Adolf Schonfeld (we called him Apu), was occasionally compelled to perform this labour. In his account of the events, Apu states that “commandants and taskmasters were a selected group of Hungarian anti-Semitic sadists who took full advantage of their positions”.²³ Apu was forced to stand in for “the eight horses that had been used in summer and winter to carry heavy telegraph poles up the steep mountain slopes”.²⁴ Once again, Hungarian society did not contest the ill-treatment of the Jews. The seeds of antisemitism had already begun to flourish. As a result, the government, by making it legal to deport Jews and to claim their property, promoted the elimination of its Jews from society, and endorsed the usage of Jews as slave labour. By ingraining these antisemitic beliefs into Hungarian society, the law was a stepping-stone in the extermination of the Jews in Hungary. In the end, it led to the Final Solution for Hungarian Jews.²⁵

¹⁷Act IV of 1939 on the Limitation of Jewish Expansion in Public and Economic Spheres.

¹⁸Act IV of 1939.

¹⁹Act IV of 1939.

²⁰ Act IV of 1939.

²¹ City regulations and the attached statement of reasons, issued by the Rimaszombat municipal authorities, June 1941.

²² Yehuda Don, “The Economic Effect of Antisemitic Discrimination: Hungarian Anti-Jewish Legislation, 1938-1944,” *Jewish Social Studies* 48, no.1 (Winter 1986), p.75.

²³ Adolf Schonfeld, p.1.

²⁴ Adolf Schonfeld, p.2.

²⁵ The ‘Final Solution’ is often referred to as the final response to the Jews – that is, the systematic killing, elimination, and obliteration of the Jews in all Nazi and Nazi-allied/occupied territories. It is widely viewed as the outcome of the culmination of antisemitic rules and laws which continued to emerge nearing the end of World War II. It is most often associated with Nazi Germany, but it was a widespread policy in German-allied countries during this time.

Hungary turned to more drastic measures to resolve their “Jewish Question” during World War II. On July 12, 1941, the Hungarian Royal Minister of the Interior declared that “in light of the present foreign affairs situation, it has become possible to remove from the territory of the country unsuitable aliens and foreign citizens against whom the final expulsion order or denial of a residential permit have not, until now, been carried out effectively”.²⁶ The Hungarian government now had the precedent to deport its Jews. Furthermore, Norman J.W. Goda writes that “the first large scale massacre” in Ukraine involved “Hungary”.²⁷ Hungary no longer wanted its Jews and “hoped to dump the Jews from their newly acquired regions into German-occupied Ukraine”.²⁸ It already knew their fate, and “in mid-July 1941, Hungarian police rounded up Jews” and “by August, some 14,000 were crammed into freight cars” and deported to “German-occupied Ukraine”.²⁹ Shortly after this deportation, “on August 26 and 27,” over the course of only seventy-two hours, “German, Ukrainian, and Hungarian policemen murdered 23,600 Jews”.³⁰ However, the greatest period of extermination for the Jews in Hungary began in March, 1944, when the Nazis occupied Hungary. Szabolcs Szita claims that “the German occupation spelled ultimate tragedy for the approximately 850,000 Jews living in Hungary”.³¹ The repercussions of the Nazi’s occupation varied across the nation for the Jews. My great-aunt, Vera, in her account of the Holocaust in Hungary, illustrates the differing repercussions for Jews across Hungary. Vera grew up “in a rural Hungarian town called Derecske”.³² But, “in 1942, [Apu] decided to move to Debrecen, a city 20 km away”.³³ She claimed that her family’s move to Debrecen saved their lives because “not one Jew from Derecske who lived there during the round-ups survived the Holocaust”.³⁴ Vera and my grandfather were some of the few Jews who did not perish during the Holocaust: “at one point, [they] were on [their] way to Auschwitz, but miraculously the train turned back and [they] ended up in Austria until December when [they] were taken to Bergen-Belsen”.³⁵ Many Hungarian Jews, especially those sent at the beginning of the Nazi-occupation, died in Auschwitz: “437,402 Jews [were] sent to Auschwitz in just eight weeks”.³⁶ According to the World Holocaust Remembrance Centre, “by the end of the Holocaust, 565,000 Hungarian Jews had been murdered”.³⁷ Ultimately, it was the mass deportations and the wide-spread massacres which the Hungarians and the Nazis pursued during World War II that culminated in the rapid extermination of over half of the Jewish population of pre-war Hungary. Additionally, the mass murder of the Jews exemplified the continually evolving response to the “Jewish Question” in Hungary; the Hungarian government increased its

²⁶ Decree of the Minister of the Interior, July 12, 1941.

²⁷ Norman J.W. Goda, *The Holocaust: Europe, the World, and the Jews, 1918-1945* (New York: Routledge, 2022), p.175.

²⁸ Goda, *The Holocaust*, p.175.

²⁹ Goda, *The Holocaust*, p.175.

³⁰ Goda, *The Holocaust*, p.175.

³¹ Szabolcs Szit, *Trading in Lives?: Operations of the Jewish Relief and Rescue Committee in Budapest, 1944-1945*, (Budapest: Central European university Press, 2005), p.20.

³² Vera Koppel, Written Account, Translated by George Schonfeld, March 1996, p.17.

³³ Vera Koppel, p.17.

³⁴ Vera Koppel, p.17.

³⁵ Vera Koppel, p.17.

³⁶ Goda, *The Holocaust*, p.292.

³⁷ “Murder of Hungarian Jewry,” The World Holocaust Remembrance Center, accessed December 2, 2022, <https://www.yadvashem.org/holocaust/about/fate-of-jews/hungary.html>.

measures in the Twentieth century as it went from segregating Jews from society, to deporting Jews and using Jews as slave labour, to exterminating the Jewish race.

On 27 January 1945, Auschwitz was liberated by the Red Army. By the end of the war, of the six million Jews who died during the Holocaust, half a million were Hungarian. However, the writing of this paper comes at an important time, as memory of the Holocaust is beginning to fade away. NBC News reports that “a fifth of millennials aren’t sure if they’ve ever heard of the Holocaust”.³⁸ Furthermore, *Le Monde* writes that “according to a survey, 23% of 18-40 year olds believe that the number of Jewish victims has been greatly exaggerated” in the Netherlands.³⁹ Although it is true that elements of the past are often forgotten, the Holocaust is one of the most important events in world history. It shapes and guides the legal precedents of the United Nations International Criminal Court, and it influences the ways in which Jews exist today. Above all, it is important to remember the Holocaust so that atrocities of this nature do not occur again. My great-grandfather’s mission was to tell this story to ensure that it would never happen again – I fear it will also be my great-grandchild’s mission.

The path to the destruction of Hungary’s Jews gradually evolved over time. It began by cultivating organized antisemitism in Hungarian culture through the blood libel case; next, it evolved into the legislative segregation of Jews from Hungarian society; later, it progressed into the deportation of the Jews and the imposition of forced labour on the Jews; and, it concluded with the liquidation of the Jews at the hands of the Nazis and Hungarians. Although the Holocaust may be over in Hungary, antisemitism and Hungarian nationalism still plague the nation. Hungarian Prime Minister, Viktor Orbán, is a prime example of the dangerous forces that persist in Hungary. Hence, the dreadful question persists – the Hungarian “Jewish Question”.

³⁸ Courtney McGee, “Study Shows Americans are Forgetting About the Holocaust,” *NBC News*, 12 April, 2018, <https://www.nbcnews.com/news/us-news/study-shows-americans-are-forgetting-about-holocaust-n865396>.

³⁹ Jean-Pierre Stroobants, “Study Shows Shockingly High Levels of Holocaust Denial in the Netherlands,” *Le Monde*, 1 March, 2024, https://www.lemonde.fr/en/religions/article/2023/01/27/study-shows-shockingly-high-levels-of-holocaust-denial-in-the-netherlands_6013392_63.html.

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Arrest and Deportation: French Jews in the Vel' d'Hiv Roundup, 16-17 July 1942

Kiera Clark

In the early hours of 16 July 1942, over 4000 Paris police officers prepared to begin the largest deportation of French Jews in World War II. “‘Open up, police.’ These two words came up very early in my life,” writes Henri Ostrowiecki, who was nearly five years old when he and his mother were arrested in their home on 16 July 1942 – his father had been arrested in May 1941.¹ For the next two days, police rounded up over 12,000 Jewish men, women, and children, roughly 8,000 of whom were housed for several days in the Vélodrome d'Hiver, an indoor bicycle track in Paris.² Childless couples and single adults were taken directly to Drancy, a concentration camp in the Parisian suburbs.³ Newspaper articles, handwritten letters, and memoirs from the Vél' d'Hiv roundup and the Holocaust demonstrate the heinous conditions to which the Jews were subjected during their arrest, deportation, and imprisonment. On 31 August 1942, for example, the *Globe and Mail* described how “children are snatched brutally from parents, and scenes are occurring reminding one of the slaughter of the children of Bethlehem.”⁴ These first-hand accounts and newspaper articles also emphasize a rise of anti-Semitism in France. The term “Antisemitism” was coined by Wilhelm Marr, a German journalist, in the 1870s to “describe the ‘non-confessional’ hatred of Jews and Judaism that he and others like him advocated.”⁵ However, the roots of anti-Semitism in France extend far beyond the nineteenth- and twentieth-centuries. The Vél' d'Hiv roundup of 16 and 17 July 1942 was part of the implementation of Nazi Germany's ‘Final Solution’ in France, but it was an operation led primarily by Vichy and the French Police, a fact suppressed from collective French memory for decades.

Approximately six million Jews were murdered by Nazi Germany and collaborators in the Holocaust. In 1939, there were an estimated 9,739,200 Jews living in Europe; in 1947, there were 3,920,100.⁶ In less than ten years, Europe's Jewish population dropped by roughly 60 percent. Between 75,000 and 77,000 Jews were deported from France alone.⁷ In 1919, just after the end of World War I, there were 150,000 Jews in France.⁸ Richard D. E. Burton explains that:

¹ Henri Ostrowiecki, “La rafle du Vel' d'Hiv', et après,” *Archives Juives* 51, no.2 (2018): 118. My translation from French, “‘Ouvrez, police.’ Ces deux mots ont surgi très tôt dans ma vie.”

² Michael Dorland, “The Black Hole of Memory: French Mnemotechniques in the Erasure of the Holocaust,” *MediaTropes eJournal* 6, no.2 (2016): 11.

³ Richard D. E. Burton, “Operation Spring Breeze: Rue des Rosiers, Vel' d'Hiv', Drancy (July–August 1942),” in *Blood in the City: Violence and Revelation in Paris, 1789–1945*, (London: Cornell University Press, 2001), 222.

⁴ “Abuse of Jews Likened to ‘Slaughter of Innocents,’” *The Globe and Mail*, August 31, 1942.

⁵ Robert S. Wistrich, “Antisemitism,” in *How Was It Possible?: a Holocaust Reader*, ed. Peter Hayes (Lincoln, NE: Univ. of Nebraska Press, 2015), 23.

⁶ “Statistics: Jewish Population,” *The American Jewish Year Book* 49 (1947): 737.

⁷ The exact number of Jews deported is impossible to determine. The above estimate is based on statistics from the following: approximately 75,000 (Michael Dorland, “The Black Hole of Memory: French Mnemotechniques in the Erasure of the Holocaust”); 75,721 (Richard D. E. Burton, *Blood in the City: Violence and Revelation in Paris, 1789–1945*); 75, 721 (Julian Jackson, “Vichy and the Jews”); approximately 76,000 (The World Holocaust Remembrance Center).

⁸ The Bureau of Jewish Social Research, “Statistics of Jews,” *The American Jewish Year Book* 23 (1921): 280.

Between 1920 and 1930, 70,000 Jews from Eastern Europe settled in Paris, joining the 20,000 still “unassimilated” pre-war foreign immigrants, not to mention 15,000 “other” Jews from the Maghreb and the Levant, with the result that by 1930 foreign Jews constituted a decisive majority in the city’s total Jewish population.⁹

Following this, some 100,000 Jews of various nationalities fled to France between 1933 and 1939.¹⁰ As of 1939, there were over 300,000 Jews in France, approximately 190,000 of them French citizens and the remainder foreign Jews.¹¹ In 1947, two years after the end of World War II, there were 205,000 Jews in France, roughly 64% of the 1939 Jewish population.¹² France had one of the highest Jewish survival rates in Europe. This is a striking contrast to other European countries. For example, Holland had a Jewish population of 150,000 in 1939, but it was 33,000 in 1947.¹³ Due to the rapid increase of Jewish immigration to France in the years leading up to the start of the war, there was an “upsurge of antisemitism after 1933.”¹⁴ On 10 May 1940, Germany began to invade France and the Low Countries, initiating the Battle of France.¹⁵ After losing Paris on 14 July and Verdun on 15 July, Paul Reynaud, the French Prime Minister, resigned the following day.¹⁶ He was succeeded by Philippe Pétain, who “rallied his country at the World War I Battle of Verdun with the cry... ‘They shall not pass.’”¹⁷ Pétain asked Germany for an armistice on 17 June, and the terms of surrender were dictated before Hitler on 21 June 1940.¹⁸ Following France’s surrender, the country was divided into a Free Zone and an Occupied Zone.

The first legislation to specifically target Jews in France was the *Statut des Juifs* passed in October 1940.¹⁹ This *Statut*, dated 27 September 1940, “defined Jews, ordered a general census of Jews, and the affixation of a ‘Jewish Business’ poster in every shop owned or managed by a Jew.”²⁰ However, Julian Jackson notes:

The reaction of most Jews in 1940 was to obey the law and hope for better times. About 90 per cent of Jews in the Occupied Zone registered under the German ordinance of 27 September 1940. Even nine months later, when Vichy introduced a census, and there was mounting evidence of the danger ahead, about 108,000 Jews registered within two months. In total, 287,962 Jews registered in the two zones.²¹

⁹ Burton, “Operation Spring Breeze,” 212.

¹⁰ *Ibid.*, 213.

¹¹ Julian Jackson, “Vichy and the Jews,” in *France. The Dark Years, 1940–1944* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001), 363.

¹² “Statistics: Jewish Population,” 740.

¹³ *Ibid.*

¹⁴ Burton, “Operation Spring Breeze,” 214.

¹⁵ Basil Liddell Hart, “Battle of France,” *Encyclopedia Britannica*, May 3, 2022.

¹⁶ Hart, “Battle of France.”

¹⁷ Hart, “Battle of France.” Translated from French, “Ils ne passeront pas.”

¹⁸ *Ibid.*

¹⁹ “France,” *Holocaust Encyclopedia*, United States Holocaust Memorial Museum.

²⁰ Laurent Joly, “The Parisian Police and the Holocaust: Control, Round-ups, Hunt, 1940–4,” *Journal of Contemporary History* 55, no.3 (2020): 561.

²¹ Jackson, “Vichy and the Jews,” 363.

Hitler's 'Final Solution' was coming to fruition in France. In the following year, twenty-six laws and twenty-four decrees were issued regarding the Jews.²² Then in January 1941, Theodor Danneberg, Adolf Eichmann's representative in Paris, wrote a plan to "accelerate the persecution of Jews for the purpose of their 'evacuation' to the east, notably by internment, 'to start' with 'foreign Jews.'"²³ A second *Statut des Juifs* issued in June 1941:

Widened the definition of Jewishness and introduced more occupations banned to Jews. It was followed by decrees imposing quotas on Jewish lawyers, doctors, students, architects, and pharmacists.²⁴

The economic and financial security of Jews was beginning to waver. In July 1941, Vichy subjected the Jews of the Unoccupied Zone to a census.²⁵ However, the censuses, providing names and addresses, would be used to organize the mass arrests of Jews in France.²⁶ The position of the Jews grew progressively worse as time passed. In June 1940, Heinrich Himmler "decided that Europe should be 'rid' of the Jews within a year."²⁷ On 30 January 1942, Adolf Hitler gave an address in Berlin to his "German Volksgenossen," and stated: "this war will not end as the Jews imagine, namely, in the extermination of the European-Aryan people; instead, the result of this war will be the annihilation of Jewry."²⁸ For Hitler, World War II would not end until the Jews were eliminated and the Aryan race prevailed. As of 7 June 1942, Jews over the age of six had to wear a Star of David in public.²⁹ The star, "made of yellow cloth and as big as the palm of the hand... must be sewn on their clothing on the left side of the breast."³⁰ The stars also had '*juif*' printed in black letters.³¹ On 15 July 1942, the day preceding the roundup, the Dundee Courier reported: "Germans in Paris have banned Jews from public places and gatherings. Ban starts immediately."³² Jackson argues that the first *Statut* was the "start of a thickening web of regulations directed against the Jews."³³ The *Statut des Juifs* issued the first anti-Jewish legislation, which laid the groundwork for the deportations.

There had been mounting evidence and rumors circulating preceding the mass arrests and deportations of Jews in Paris on 16 and 17 July 1942. Yet, many Jews in France chose not to flee. Even during the arrests people refused to leave their families. Eleven year old Joseph Weismann, his two sisters, and his parents were among those rounded up and detained in the Vélodrome d'Hiver.³⁴ Joseph wrote in his memoir:

²² Jackson, "Vichy and the Jews," 355.

²³ Joly, "The Parisian Police and the Holocaust," 561.

²⁴ Jackson, "Vichy and the Jews," 355.

²⁵ *Ibid.*, 356.

²⁶ *Ibid.*, 363.

²⁷ Joly, "The Parisian Police and the Holocaust," 565.

²⁸ *Adolf Hitler: Collection of Speeches 1922-1945* (1945), 845.

²⁹ *Ibid.*

³⁰ "Jews in France Wear Star: Thousands Sent to Labour Camps," *Hull Daily Mail*, July 18, 1942.

³¹ Burton, "Operation Spring Breeze," 218.

³² "Ban on Paris Jews," *Dundee Courier*, July 15, 1942.

³³ Jackson, "Vichy and the Jews," 355.

³⁴ Joseph Weismann, "July 16, 1942," in *After the Roundup: Escape and Survival in Hitler's France*, trans. Richard Kutner (Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 2011), 29.

Throughout the month of May, there were rumors around Paris that hundreds of Jews had been arrested. Policemen had knocked on their doors, just like at our house a short while ago, and taken the men away.³⁵

Weismann kept his traumatic experiences hidden until he was eighty, when he wrote *After the Roundup*.³⁶ Richard Kutner translated Joseph's memoir, and he notes it was Joseph's "fervent desire" that history wouldn't repeat itself that led him to finally share his experiences.³⁷ In the Epilogue, Joseph tells his readers: "I imposed a new trial upon myself, the duty to bear witness. I owed it to my parents, to my two sisters... to the 75,000 French and all 6,000,000 victims of Nazi barbarism."³⁸ Prior to the roundup, senior administrative officials of the Police Prefecture and chiefs of municipal police discussed specifics of the operation: "age limits (16-60 for the men, 16-55 for the women), exemptions, arrests, transfers, and interments."³⁹ For the arrests, the "Prefecture 'Jewish card indexes' were mobilized to identify the stateless aged 16 and older."⁴⁰ Notably, although they prepared approximately 27,000 arrest cards, only 8833 Jews over 16 were arrested, meaning the arrest rate was roughly 32%.⁴¹ Burton suggests that:

Some of the names were leaked to the Rue des Rosiers, and many Jewish men... went into hiding in the naive belief that they, and not their wives and families, would be targeted in the roundup that none doubted would shortly occur.⁴²

There had already been arrests and deportations prior to the Vél d'Hiv roundup. Word of mass arrests had been spreading since 1941, so "those who could afford it, left illegally for the free zone. The others... hid close to home or in their homes."⁴³ The arrests, which had been "planned in meticulous detail, swung into action at four o'clock in the morning of Thursday, 16 July: *jeudi noir*."⁴⁴ Divided into 880 teams, approximately 9,000 French men, the majority policemen, participated in the arrests.⁴⁵ Sarah Lichtsztejn-Montard was arrested with her mother.⁴⁶ On the 75th anniversary of the Vél d'Hiv roundup, Sarah was interviewed for France24, a Parisian television network. Sarah describes how the French Police "put tape across the door as if we were criminals... That was the end of my childhood as I knew it. Until then, I had always thought that grown-ups were always right, but now I knew that was not the case."⁴⁷ Sarah, like thousands of other Jewish children, were robbed of their innocence the moment they were arrested. Sarah was one of few lucky enough to survive.⁴⁸ Henri Ostrowiecki explains that, after being arrested,

³⁵ Weisman, "July 16, 1942," 30.

³⁶ Richard Kutner, "Translator's Forward," in *After the Roundup: Escape and Survival in Hitler's France*, trans. Richard Kutner (Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 2011), x.

³⁷ Kutner, "Translator's Forward," x.

³⁸ Joseph Weismann, "Epilogue: Bearing Witness," in *After the Roundup: Escape and Survival in Hitler's France*, trans. Richard Kutner (Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 2011), 161.

³⁹ Joly, "The Parisian Police and the Holocaust," 566.

⁴⁰ *Ibid.*

⁴¹ *Ibid.*, 567.

⁴² Burton, "Operation Spring Breeze," 221.

⁴³ Joly, "The Parisian Police and the Holocaust," 567.

⁴⁴ Burton, "Operation Spring Breeze," 221.

⁴⁵ *Ibid.*

⁴⁶ Stéphanie Trouillard, "The Vél d'Hiv Roundup: 75 years on, a survivor remembers." France24, July 15, 2017.

⁴⁷ Trouillard, "The Vél d'Hiv Roundup."

⁴⁸ *Ibid.*

he was labeled a Jew before he knew the meaning of the word: “From that moment on, I became a little Jewish boy, without knowing anything about the meaning of this word that I would be careful not to pronounce for years.”⁴⁹ Following the Vél d’Hiv roundup, many Jews fled to the South in hopes of finding safety.⁵⁰ However, not all who fled would evade arrest.

Over 12,000 Jewish men, women, and children were arrested between 16 and 17 July 1942. Roughly 8,000 were interned in the Vélodrome d’Hiver and the rest were sent straight to Drancy.⁵¹ From Drancy, they were deported to Auschwitz and murdered.⁵² The Jews being transported to the Vélodrome were under the impression they were being sent to work in Germany.⁵³ However, as more people arrived, this belief began to change. Joseph Weismann explains:

At first, we don’t dare spread ourselves out too much. First of all, we don’t know how long we’re going to be here. But as the evening wears on, we sense that we’re probably going to spend the night in this place. And other convoys continue to arrive. The doors swing open at a regular pace, and the men in their capes push dozens of people into the Vélodrome.⁵⁴

From the first night it was clear they would be detained in the Vél d’Hiv for an unknown length of time. Despite the presence of some nurses working in tents set up by the Red Cross, the conditions of the Vélodrome worsened as time passed. Sarah Lichtsztejn-Montard described the scene in the Vél d’Hiv:

It was dreadful. There was a horrible hubbub. Children were running around, but the parents in the stands were silent. There was an atrocious smell. The few toilets were quickly clogged. I saw adults go to the bathroom everywhere.⁵⁵

Similar accounts are offered in a vast number of memoirs by and interviews with survivors of the Vél d’Hiv. Arlette Testyler, age eight in 1942, told Radio France Internationale, “I saw a suicide... people mutilating themselves with knitting needles, anything they could get their hands on, hoping they’d get sent to hospital, but it was useless.”⁵⁶ For many Jews, anything was better than being trapped in the Vélodrome, even death. Léon Fellmann, born in 1925, was the eldest of four children.⁵⁷ When Léon and his mother were arrested, his mother convinced the police to let her three youngest children go with their grandmother – Léon and his mother were eventually taken to the Vélodrome.⁵⁸

⁴⁹ Ostrowiecki, “La rafle du Vel’ d’Hiv’, et après,” 118. My translation from French, “À partir de cet instant, je deviens un petit garçon juif, sans rien savoir de ce que signifie ce mot que je me garderai bien de prononcer pendant des années.”

⁵⁰ Jackson, “Vichy and the Jews,” 360.

⁵¹ Dorland, “The Black Hole of Memory,” 11.

⁵² Ibid.

⁵³ Alison Hird, “Survivor of 1942 Jewish roundup tells her story 'for those who didn't come back,’” *Radio France Internationale*, July 16, 2017.

⁵⁴ Weismann, “July 16, 1942,” 30-31.

⁵⁵ Trouillard, “The Vél d’Hiv Roundup.”

⁵⁶ Hird, “Survivor of 1942 Jewish roundup tells her story.”

⁵⁷ “Léon Fellmann,” *Musée de l’Holocauste Montréal*, 2003.

⁵⁸ “Léon Fellmann.”

Léon tried to convince other children in the Vélodrome to escape: “Listen, we will be separated from our parents. You have to flee!”⁵⁹ However, most of the children ignored him. In his interview, Léon explained:

The situation became untenable: no water, all the toilets were clogged, it was crazy! And when my mother saw this, she unstitched my yellow star, because I had a yellow star sewn on my jacket... and when the doors of the Vel d’Hiv opened, I threw myself on the closest policemen who encircled us, I shoved them aside, they ran after me, but at 17 I was street smart... I ran fast, I was strong, I was robust, and I was not afraid of anything. They ran after me but they couldn’t keep up.⁶⁰

Leon was one of the few able to escape the Vélodrome and avoid deportation to Auschwitz. After the Liberation, Léon learned his parents were murdered in Auschwitz, and he returned to Paris to care for his siblings.⁶¹ Like Léon’s mother, after five days, the Jews were shuttled from the Vélodrome to the Austerlitz station in Paris.⁶² An article in *The Times* described the:

Heart-rending scenes [that] occurred at the departure for exile... Womenfolk and children of the unfortunates only saw their menfolk handcuffed in pairs and marching to the trains between files of German soldiers with fixed bayonets.⁶³

The Polakiewicz family were Polish immigrants arrested during the roundup. 20 year old Rachel wrote a letter to the Sebbane family, their neighbors who had avoided arrest, on her first day in the Vél d’Hiv.⁶⁴ Rachel described their situation:

We are all sitting around on the benches, like at a show, except that we are the entertainers. Superfluous to say that it's overcrowded. We are all in an unenviable situation. It is mayhem here, and that's an understatement, with all these children, some get lost, some are sick, and we can hardly hear each other... We do not know how long we'll be staying here, in any case for the first day, I'm sick of it, fed up. All I do is cry.⁶⁵

Rachel, her parents, and her brother Erwin were all murdered in Auschwitz; Léon,⁶⁶ the youngest, was the last to be deported.⁶⁷ The Vélodrome d’Hiver was the holding place for thousands of Jews before they were deported to Auschwitz.

⁵⁹ Léon Fellmann, “Survivant de l’Holocauste, Léon Fellmann - Rafle de Vel' d'Hiv,” *Musée de l’Holocauste Montréal*, 2003.

⁶⁰ Léon Fellmann.

⁶¹ “Léon Fellmann.”

⁶² Hird, “Survivor of 1942 Jewish roundup tells her story.”

⁶³ “7,000 Frenchmen Exiled: ‘Jews and Communists’ Sent to Poland,” *The Times*, July 22, 1942.

⁶⁴ “16 July 1942: Vélodrome d’Hiver,” Letters to 43 Vieille du Temple Street, The World Holocaust Remembrance Center.

⁶⁵ Rachel Polakiewicz, Rachel Polakiewicz to Mrs. Sebbane, Paris, France, July 16, 1942.

⁶⁶ It is not specified whether Léon Polakiewicz survived the deportation or internment camp.

⁶⁷ “The Polakiewicz Family,” Letters to 43 Vieille du Temple Street, The World Holocaust Remembrance Center.

Despite being the largest mass arrest of Jews in France, the Vél d'Hiv roundup was largely suppressed from collective memory. Audrey Brunetaux suggests that, in France after 1945, “the fate of thousands of Jews during the Occupation was omitted from the official national discourse, as this issue reflected one of the most negative aspects of the Dark Years.”⁶⁸ The Vél d'Hiv arrests were meticulously planned by the French Police.⁶⁹ French Jews were arrested by the French Police and handed over to the Nazis even if they had not violated any of the German ordinances.⁷⁰ In his memoir, Weismann comments on a police officer during the Vél d'Hiv roundup who would not tell them any information: “I can sense that this police officer belongs to the next category, the worst: the real cowards. He wants us to believe that he’s only following orders. And he takes us for a bunch of idiots.”⁷¹ Many French policemen carried out their work without regard for the fate of the Jews. However, this was not universal. On 6 September 1942, the *New York Times* published an article, which stated that approximately 300 Parisian policemen were let go for “pro-Jewish tendencies.”⁷² Further, some policemen were quite conflicted about their orders.⁷³ Leaks from the police were another reason so many Jews evaded arrest in France.⁷⁴ The Vel d'Hiv roundup also altered public opinion. Jackson argues:

The real turning point in French public opinion came with the arrests of the summer of 1942. In Paris in July, and then in the South in August, people were shocked by the horrifying scenes of screaming children being arrested with their parents or being forcibly separated from them.⁷⁵

Although not everyone displayed overt sympathy or support for the Jews – during the arrests there were “helpful and indifferent concierges, sympathetic and brutal police” – it was the first time the heinous treatment of the Jews was visible to the Parisian public.⁷⁶ Many French citizens, when given the opportunity, helped the Jews and “hindered the police.”⁷⁷ Some went so far as to wear yellow stars in sympathy and solidarity with the Jews – but they were quickly punished and sent to Drancy.⁷⁸ When the Vélodrome burned down in 1959, it also buried “the memory of thousands of Jewish men, women and children.”⁷⁹ For decades, the Vél d'Hiv roundup was visibly absent from the collective French memory and discourse. Michael Dorland notes that:

The result of this accumulation of trauma, post-1945, was the repression of the French Judeocide from public memory, which lasted, except for occasional symptomatic outbreaks (in which films played a key

⁶⁸ Audrey Brunetaux, “Revisiting the Vel d'Hiv Roundup through the Camera Lens,” *History and Memory: Studies in Representation of the Past* 26, no.1 (2014): 141.

⁶⁹ Joly, “The Parisian Police and the Holocaust,” 567.

⁷⁰ *Ibid.*, 573.

⁷¹ Weismann, “July 16, 1942,” 26.

⁷² “Anti-Jewish Move is Harming Laval: French Aid Victims of Order for Deportation to Germany – 300 Paris Police Ousted: July Raid Details Given: Women Said to Have Thrown Children to the Streets and Jumped After Them.” *New York Times*, September 6, 1942.

⁷³ Joly, “The Parisian Police and the Holocaust,” 567.

⁷⁴ *Ibid.*, 568.

⁷⁵ Jackson, “Vichy and the Jews,” 375.

⁷⁶ *Ibid.*

⁷⁷ “Anti-Jewish Move is Harming Laval,” *New York Times*.

⁷⁸ Jackson, “Vichy and the Jews,” 274-375.

⁷⁹ Brunetaux, “Revisiting the Vel d'Hiv Roundup through the Camera Lens,” 137.

role), well until the mid-1990s when Jacques Chirac in his first term as President formally recognized that the Republic had committed against its Jewish citizens crimes ‘without statute of limitations.’⁸⁰

For fifty years the memory and trauma of the Vél d’Hiv was largely suppressed, but this suppression began to change with President Chirac. A parliamentary bill was introduced to establish a “National Day of Commemoration of the Racist and Anti-Semitic Persecutions” in 1993 and building a monument in 1994, which would provide a site for an annual wreath-laying ceremony.⁸¹ As Peter Carrier argues, the introduction of this legislation “marked a turning point in the official state interpretation of French collaboration.”⁸² A plaque was initially placed at the site of the Vélodrome in 1946 which was then replaced in the 1990s.⁸³ However, Carrier explains the deeper significance behind these inscriptions:

The first inscription represents the perpetrator of the specific events of July 1942 as an external authority, while the second inscription represents the event in general terms as ‘racist and anti-Semitic persecutions’ and the perpetrator as French, but illegitimate.⁸⁴

Regardless of the Vél d’Hiv being one of the greatest roundups by French police, it is still forgotten by many. Brunetaux contends that the roundup “exemplifies a memorial trend that tends to hide the reality of the Occupation and the French role in the deportations.”⁸⁵ Ultimately, the Vichy regime and the French Police held a central role in the mass arrests and deportation of Jews from France during World War II.

Early on 16 July 1942, the French Police began the largest mass arrests and deportations of Jews from France during the German Occupation. Between 16 and 17 July, over 12,000 Jewish men, women, and children were arrested and prepared for deportation to internment camps. Approximately 8,000 of those arrested were detained in the Vélodrome d’Hiver for five days before being deported to Auschwitz.⁸⁶ The remainder, namely single adults and childless couples, were sent straight to Drancy. The central roles played by the Vichy regime and the French police in the Vel d’Hiv roundup is largely forgotten by the general public, or it is suppressed in an attempt to reject responsibility for the tragic events. When the Vel d’Hiv burned down in 1959, it allowed a further suppression of the event through what Audrey Bruneteaux called a “visual void.”⁸⁷ The Vichy regime did not play a passive role in the implementation of Hitler’s ‘Final Solution,’ which is due in part to latent anti-Semitism among the French government prior to the occupation. After the establishment of the Vichy government in the summer of 1940 anti-Semitic policies in France were increasingly introduced. The first legislation specifically targeting Jews

⁸⁰ Dorland, “The Black Hole of Memory,” 2.

⁸¹ Peter Carrier, “Paris: the Vél’ d’Hiv’ and the Promise of National Reconciliation,” in *Holocaust Monuments and National Memory: France and Germany since 1989, 49-98* (New York: Berghahn Books, 2005), 49.

⁸² Carrier, “Paris: the Vél’ d’Hiv’ and the Promise of National Reconciliation,” 49.

⁸³ Carrier, “Paris: the Vél’ d’Hiv’ and the Promise of National Reconciliation,” 52.

⁸⁴ Carrier, “Paris: the Vél’ d’Hiv’ and the Promise of National Reconciliation,” 53.

⁸⁵ Brunetaux, “Revisiting the Vel d’Hiv Roundup through the Camera Lens,” 141.

⁸⁶ Dorland, “The Black Hole of Memory,” 11.

⁸⁷ Brunetaux, “Revisiting the Vel d’Hiv Roundup through the Camera Lens,” 138.

was introduced in October 1940.⁸⁸ Fueled by the persistent anti-Semitism of the Vichy government, Vél d'Hiv arrests were carefully planned and then implemented by the French Police.⁸⁹ In total, approximately 9,000 French men participated in the mass arrests, demonstrating that this was not simply the implementation of German legislation.⁹⁰ For many people, the Vél d'Hiv roundup of 16 and 17 July 1942 “marked the symbolic institutionalization of the Vichy regime and its crimes.”⁹¹ However, it was an event generally suppressed from collective social memory until the 1990s when President Chirac finally acknowledged the heinous crimes against the Jewish people committed by the French Republic. This began with the introduction of a parliamentary bill to create a “National Day of Commemoration of the Racist and Anti-Semitic Persecutions” and construct a monument at the site.⁹² Although the roundup was the implementation of Hitler’s ‘Final Solution,’ the operation itself was at the hands of the Vichy regime and the French Police.

⁸⁸ “France,” Holocaust Encyclopedia, United States Holocaust Memorial Museum, <https://encyclopedia.ushmm.org/content/en/article/france> (accessed 24 November 2022).

⁸⁹ Joly, “The Parisian Police and the Holocaust,” 567.

⁹⁰ Ibid.

⁹¹ Carrier, “Paris: the Vél’ d’Hiv’ and the Promise of National Reconciliation,” 51.

⁹² Carrier, “Paris: the Vél’ d’Hiv’ and the Promise of National Reconciliation,” 49.

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Youth Organization in Post-War Germany: A Primary Analysis Exploring Antifascism in the Kriegskinder Generation

Elena Senecal

In 1946, school-aged children in US-occupied West Berlin were asked to record their opinions on post-war Germany in their German Language exams. Named *kriegskinder*, or children of war, many of them suffered loss of family and identity in the regime transition of fascism to a formation of democracy.¹ A teenaged girl named Gisela said in her exam, ‘‘*The collapse of the old Reich has shaken me deeply and let me keep doubting the world.*’’²

Re-education of adolescents and teenagers in postwar West Germany became an important part of American-directed integration of the German state into a capitalistic democracy. None of the four Allied powers performed re-education the same way, but all were focused on integrating German youth into a post-Nazi society and emphasizing young people’s guilt in the crimes committed during the Third Reich.³ Denazifying youth through education is a useful tool in analyzing the circumstances of the immediate postwar period in occupied Germany, but does not detail the personal experiences of youth in the transition period between Nazism and democracy in the Western zones and communism in the East. This essay will explore through both primary and secondary sources the emotional experiences of Germans under the age of twenty while facing their own deradicalization in both East and West zones, arguing that adolescents and teens struggled with forming a new identity that was not linked to National Socialism, but managed through their own efforts to reconcile with generational trauma and separating themselves from fascism in the post-war era.

The Zero Hour and Former Hitler Youth

The term used to define the immediate post-World War Two years is defined as the *Stunde Null*, or the ‘Zero Hour’, where the main focus for occupying forces in Germany was to cleanse the state and population of Nazism on an institutional and individual level.⁴ In this phase of German history, younger generations were expected to bend to the burgeoning education systems of the new, occupied governments.⁵ Opposed to this American focus on insisting partial responsibility of young people for grassroots violence in Nazi Germany, many teenagers and young adults pointed to the older generation of Germans who held state power during the Third Reich, calling their elders ‘guilty of us’ for making organizations like Hitler Youth (HJ) and the League of German Girls (BDM) mandatory for children over the age of ten.⁶ Generational gaps in current issues are not unique to postwar

¹ Tiia Sahrakorpi & Cherish Watton. ‘‘Coming of Age in Postwar Germany: Young Women’s Search for New Emotional Subjectivities, 1946-50,’’ *Journal of Social History* 56, no. 1 (2022) 168.

² Sahrakorpi & Watton, ‘‘Coming of Age in Postwar Germany,’’ 168.

³ *Ibid.*, 169.

⁴ Karin Priem. ‘‘Seeing, Hearing, Reading, Writing, Speaking and Things: On Silences, Senses and Emotions During the ‘Zero Hour’ in Germany,’’ *Paedagogica Historica* 52, no. 3 (February, 2016) 287.

⁵ Sahrakorpi & Watton, ‘‘Coming of Age in Postwar Germany,’’ 170.

⁶ Stephen Brockman. *German Literary Culture at the Zero Hour* (Suffolk:Boydell & Brewer, 2004) 171.

Germany, but this points to a large, personal rift between youth and older people around them, both relatives and authority figures.

Generational infighting about whose guilt weighs the most does not discount the conformity of youth during the Third Reich. Nazism emboldened the concept of youth as the ideology's guiding light to glory, the essence of National Socialism is rooted in youthful resurgence against the elders, who brought the order of liberal democracy and socialism to Europe.⁷ With the interchangeability between 'Aryan' German and the young person, some adults began to express concern over the indoctrination of youth into Nazism due to the embellishment of their role in Third Reich social engineering. Victor Klemperer, a Jewish survivor who lived in Germany, wrote:

*'The thinking and feeling of this generation has been poisoned from their ABC's on, it has never learned, seen, or inhaled anything but Nazism; in itself it is completely free of guilt, but at the same time it is utterly immersed in the original sin of Nazism and utterly saturated with it.'*⁸

Contrary to the theory of child radicalization surviving the war, an emotional state of historical denial among the German public is also discussed when academic scholarship works to analyze the Hitler Youth generation. Studies on the psychological 'forgetting' of the Third Reich focus on adults in West Germany, but experiences that parents endure often spread to the mindsets of their children in the form of generational trauma. In the immediate post-war, Germans faced a paradox of needing to acknowledge the consequences of Nazism by the order of the international community but also coming to terms with the mental harm caused from the war's destruction, occupation and unconditional surrender.⁹ Scholars in the 1950s, such as Hannah Arendt, responded to the German guilt paradox by stating that there was *no* show of guilt, rather a repression of responsibility for the Holocaust in favour of historical silence during the transition of becoming a western-aligned democracy.

*'But nowhere is this nightmare of destruction and horror less felt and less talked about than in Germany itself. A lack of response is evident everywhere, and it is difficult to say whether this signifies a half-conscious refusal to yield to grief or a genuine inability to feel...'*¹⁰

Concerns that former Hitler Youth were retaining fascist ideology or an emotional inability to mourn and take responsibility at the same time does not encompass the individual experience of young people outside of adult analysis, but what is for certain is that there existed a cultural youth crisis in the first few years after the War. Youth groups formed out of the importance for younger generations were dismantled during the occupation and, as Fisher states, an *'abandonment of youth as a unique and celebrated form of life.'*¹¹ By the end of the war,

⁷ Brockman. *German Literary Culture at the Zero Hour*, 172.

⁸ *Ibid.*, 173, taken from Klemperer, Victor. *Kultur: Erwägungen nach dem Zusammenbruch des Nazismus* (Berlin: Neues Leben, 1946).

⁹ Jaimey Fisher. *Disciplining Germany: Youth, Reeducation, and Reconstruction after the Second World War* (Detroit: Wayne State University, 2007) 6.

¹⁰ Hannah Arendt. 'The Aftermath of Nazi Rule: Report from Germany,' *Commentary* vol. 10 (January, 1950) 342.

¹¹ *Ibid.*, 4.

state-funded groups were totally mandatory, 98% of German children and teens were involved in Hitler Youth or the BDM.¹² External expectations on German youth to accept the horrific actions of their older counterparts yet being separated from social organization creates a cycle where children feel a similar disillusion that their parents were experiencing as adults.

Youth Response in West Germany:

Information on the experience of young people is often analyzed through the primary recordings of adults watching youth exist in post-war West Germany. But the study of children from the minds of adults does not provide accounts of internal experience within the *kriegskinder* generation. This section of the essay will explore different primary sources to show the mindset of young people during American occupation, specifically the readiness by teenagers and young adults to de-Nazify themselves without losing a sense of social community within their generation.

The dissolution of youth groups by Allied forces introduces the first primary source, an advertisement for a new, German youth group focusing on bringing together former members of the Hitler Youth, BDM and other Nazi organizations into a non-fascist social group. The organization, founded in November, 1946, was named *Deutsche Jugendring*, or the German Youth Ring, that aimed to de-radicalize German youth through leisure activities and educational work.¹³ The source is a leaflet describing the intentions of the group, issuing,

*'a unanimous appeal to join together in Youth Rings in the spirit of democracy everywhere in Germany, in city and countryside and in all zones, to work together with the goal of establishing the German Youth Ring. German youth, out of a sense of the highest human and political responsibility toward the youth of all nations, affirms its commitment to democracy, social justice, and the community of nations.'*¹⁴

The leaflet provides a sense of hope for young readers, emphasizing that membership is intended to cross the boundaries of ideology and geography within the zones of occupation so that every young German can contribute to a new cultural identity in a post-Nazi Germany. The leaflet outwardly addresses former members of the Hitler Youth and BDM, urging them to, *'make yourselves available to the newly formed youth leagues and associations. However, we do ask that you dispense with the creation of purely traditional groups.'*¹⁵ In a short advertisement, the German Youth Ring tries to appeal to all younger people who were affected by the Nazi regime but want to start changing the way their generation interacts socially and politically. This document

¹² *Ibid.*, 4.

¹³ German History in Documents and Images. *The German Youth Ring: Programmatic Leaflet (November 19, 1946)*. URL: https://ghdi.ghi-dc.org/sub_document.cfm?document_id=4486.

¹⁴ German History in Documents and Images. *The German Youth Ring: Programmatic Leaflet (November 19, 1946)*.

¹⁵ German History in Documents and Images. *The German Youth Ring: Programmatic Leaflet (November 19, 1946)*.

demonstrates an active intentionality by some young people to come to terms with the post-war consequences of the Third Reich, taking hold of their political responsibility to maintain a free, democratic state.¹⁶

Youth did not always respond to post-war youth organizations, but were as important to understanding the move to antifascist, western-aligned young people rebuilding the cultural map of West Germany. Some student-age adults, who would have been the prime age for Hitler Youth and BDM membership, purposely rebelled against joining groups due to immense distrust over politically-aligned youth groups, even progressive democratic ones like the German Youth Ring. These groups often formed their own, loose cliques similar to casual friend groups instead of organized, community action, and spent time at theatres, concerts and art galleries, pictured below.¹⁷ Mentioning these groups is important because when they attended movies, they often preferred American films, showing a distinct move towards American culture, an idea antithetical to Nazism because of US occupation.¹⁸



Photo source: German History in Documents and Images. *Young People in Front of a Cinema in Hamburg-St. Pauli (1948).*

Youth Movement in East Germany

¹⁶ *Ibid.*

¹⁷ German History in Documents and Images. *Young People in Front of a Cinema in Hamburg-St. Pauli (1948).*

¹⁸ *Ibid.*

At the end of World War Two, the German state was split between four zones of occupation, with the Soviet Union possessing territory in the East. In Berlin, also split four ways, youth culture grew in a similar fashion to the West but with a socialist agenda. Youth Organizations like the western German Youth Ring were also created in East Germany in the form of the *Freie Deutsche Jugend* or the Free German Youth. This was founded in February 1946, with the priority of ‘*rebuilding our homeland on an antifascist-democratic basis...*’¹⁹ The message is the same between the West and East German groups, but there is a distinct difference in language and doctrine. In the Free German Youth document, there remains a nationalistic tone in the commitment to denazification. Following the group’s statement of intent, the document lays out specific points of focus, including, ‘*The active participation of all boys and girls in the rebuilding of our fatherland.*’²⁰

The nationalistic implications of the Free German Youth agenda is not by accident. In all four zones, Allied occupation governments all had their own forms of denazification and re-educating German children and teens, the Eastern, communist side heavily politicized their actions in youth control. Adult communist officials were concerned about forming an official youth group with antifascist sentiments but politically endorsed by the communist government.²¹ Concentrated focus of communist officials against actions of young Germans makes individual testimony from members of communist youth movements less available than the mix of conformity and non-conformity in the West.

The political, militaristic nature of the Free German Youth is exemplified in a photo example, taken several years after the group’s formation in October, 1949, where young men and women carry East German and organizational flags in a formal march.²² Scholars observed that the ‘Stalinization’ of East German Youth prevented any democratic intention associated with the Free German Youth was never to be, because the group was under the total control of the communist party.²³ Some scholars attached the ‘Stalinist’ youth group idea with the concept of a communist ‘master plan’ to exert control over younger German citizens in a step-by-step agenda, but this is not the case. Control over East German youth within their organizations was centralized by communist leadership, but rather than a detailed map of what youth movements were supposed to do, the Soviet control over youth groups was out of political instability and that young East Germans were majority anti-communist.²⁴

¹⁹ German History in Documents and Images. *Founding Resolution of the Free German Youth [Freie Deutsche Jugend] (February 26, 1946).*

²⁰ German History in Documents and Images. *Founding Resolution of the Free German Youth [Freie Deutsche Jugend] (February 26, 1946).*

²¹ Alan McDougall. *Youth Politics in Eastern Germany: The Free German Youth Movement, 1946-1968* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004) 2.

²² German History in Documents and Images. *Demonstration by the Free German Youth at the Marienborn Zonal Border Crossing, Saxony-Anhalt (October 1, 1949).*

²³ McDougall. *Youth Politics in Eastern Germany*, 3.

²⁴ McDougall. *Youth Politics in Eastern Germany*, 5.



Photo source: German History in Documents and Images. *Demonstration by the Free German Youth at the Marienborn Zonal Border Crossing, Saxony-Anhalt (October 1, 1949).*

Youth groups and education are decent examples of youth action against fascism in post-war Germany, and act as a vector for younger people to voice their concerns with coping after the end of Nazism. As seen at the beginning of this essay with testimony from German Language exams, schools in both East German districts in Berlin used the personal emotions of students as a mode for re-education. The Penzlaur Berg was one of the rare school-led projects that aimed to see in a structured way how students were feeling about the chaotic changes happening in the late 1940s.²⁵ These essays are important for understanding the feelings of children and teens in divided Germany, but it should be stated that some of the write-ups were influenced by parents and teachers. Material written for teachers in different classrooms produced multiple results, but the most common feature were the comments on ‘rubble women’, female German citizens responsible for cleaning up Berlin’s bombing debris.²⁶ Public association with women and the reconstruction of Germany became a key component in myth-building in East Germany, away from the chauvinism of National Socialism for all generations, but school essays show the rubble women’s salience in young minds cultivating a new identity.²⁷

²⁵ Benita Blessing. “Methodological Considerations: Using Student Essays as Historical Sources. The Example of Post-War Germany,” *Paedagogica Historica* 43, no. 6 (2007) 761.

²⁶ Peter C. Caldwell & Karrin Hanshew. *Germany Since 1945: Politics, Culture, and Society* (London: Bloomsbury, 2018) 19.

²⁷ Blessing. “Methodological Considerations: Using Student Essays as Historical Sources. The Example of Post-War Germany,” 769.

A second essay demonstrates youth action in school-age adolescents is from twelve year old Walter Giese, who suggested that students would feel more comfortable in the new education system if corporal punishment was removed from school policy.²⁸ Walter went on in his essay, stating that more classrooms needed to be built so students could have a wider variety of classes, demanding a solution from school authorities.²⁹ While not actively mentioning fascism in his assignment, Walter's efforts to improve the lives of children he attends classes with shows an inspiring move to better the new, East German state he lives in.

Walter's essay also shows the poor conditions these children were working in when getting educated under the new curriculum. Many school buildings around Berlin were destroyed by bombing, some rooms and corridors unusable. Another student reported in her work that some of her teachers were living in the schoolhouses because their homes had been lost in raids and served as shelters or infirmaries for Polish refugees.³⁰

Not all schools in East Germany suffered these deficiencies, many students and parents relaying that schools were a safe, warm place for children who would have been playing in bombed out buildings and debris while parents tried to reconstruct their own homes.³¹ Educational institutions in all German zones were integral to the emotional healing of children because schools were safe but also provided structure in a society full of chaos and confusion and allowing youth to obtain social community without the use of National Socialism to bring teens and children together.³²

What these sources show is an important, grassroots effort by youth to deNazify their generational community while the older generation controls the formation of a new Germany without the consultation of youth. Younger people were left with an emotional lack of community that was so heavily emphasized in the Nazi period, and the generational trauma and responsibility for the genocidal consequences of the Third Reich. As seen in this essay, it is clear that a groups of student-aged Germans were making an effort to distance themselves from Germany's fascist past and taking political accountability for shaping their country into a democratic, modern state.

²⁸ *Ibid.*, 770.

²⁹ *Ibid.*, 770.

³⁰ Blessing, "Methodological Considerations: Using Student Essays as Historical Sources. The Example of Post-War Germany," 770.

³¹ *Ibid.*, 772.

³² *Ibid.*, 772.

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“She and I belonged to a world of our own”: Print Media, Literary Communities, and Lesbian Identity in Canada, 1950-1969.

Eleanor C. Daley

The post-World War II period in Canada triggered a crisis of identity across the nation. In the wake of the World Wars and amidst the rapidly changing societal dynamics, Canadians grappled with what it meant to belong to a national community. Questions of gender identity, roles, and expression, particularly those related to manifestations of womanhood, were especially prominent. At this moment in time, the societal ideal for Canadian women was that of the white mother. But what about the women who did not conform to this mold? As post-war nationalism reshaped Canadian identity primarily for those within the nuclear family unit, a parallel shift in identity occurred among non-normative populations. In an effort to highlight these underrepresented histories, this essay traces the development of Canada’s lesbian community in the 1950s and 1960s, emphasizing the importance of print media in the development of lesbian subculture and community.¹ Using the framework established in Benedict Anderson’s *Imagined Communities*, I consider how lesbian identity developed into a national imagined community in itself during the mid-twentieth century. I argue the importance of print media, especially the Canadian periodical *Chatelaine*, in instilling a sense of community, especially for those in remote locations. I examine the critical role of fiction and nonfiction print media during this time with both implicit and explicit lesbian themes, images, and language and how they contribute to Anderson’s framework. I also highlight the role of what Valerie Korinek calls a “perverse” reading of this material in finding queer undertones in otherwise unassuming texts. Furthermore, I demonstrate the influence of print media on the development of Canadian lesbian culture through an examination of several women’s oral histories. This analysis draws on the work of historians Cameron Duder and Valerie Korinek and focuses on lesbian oral histories from remote regions across the country.

Benedict Anderson’s *Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism* offers a foundation upon which the intersection of nationalism and lesbian identity can be understood in relation to print media and material culture. Anderson defines nationality and nationalism as “artefacts of a particular kind” that the historian ought to examine and “consider how they have come into historical being, in what ways their meanings have changed over time, and why, today, they command such profound emotional legitimacy.”² In relation to lesbian print media and material culture, I argue that the emotional legitimacy of a given artefact is essential in defining and preserving a collective identity and therefore in developing an imagined lesbian community. Within the selection of pieces I analyze later, there are prevalent themes, images, and language that have stood the test of time and now, decades later, still command emotional legitimacy within the queer community. I consider the lesbian community of the 1950s and 1960s as an “imagined community” by Anderson’s standards because, to a degree, the development of lesbian subculture mirrors the development of the modern sense of nationalism. Anderson defines a

¹ In adherence with convention in existing literature on the history of sexuality, I use the term “lesbian” in relation to women experiencing same-sex desire and those engaging in same-sex relationships. While this is not the most inclusive definition of lesbianism, it is fitting within the scope of this analysis. I also

² Benedict Anderson, *Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism*, Revised ed., London: Verso, 2016, 3.

nation as “an imagined political community,” imagined because “the members of ... the nation will never know most of their fellow-members, meet them, or even hear of them, yet in the minds of each lives the image of their communion.”³ By such a definition, the lesbian imagined community also becomes an imagined political community: it is far reaching, and members are perhaps unknowing of the breadth of their collective existence, but nonetheless are brought together by cultural artefacts of mutual emotional importance. Within the scope of this essay, these artefacts come from the periodical *Chatelaine*. This publication was the largest—and at times the only—women’s magazine in circulation in Canada in the mid-twentieth century. As such, many queer women, although notably predominantly white middle-class lesbians, would have been consuming the same lesbian-themed articles and stories in the periodical, ultimately bringing them together in an imagined nation-wide lesbian community.⁴

Part I: Perverse Readings and Print Media

In the 1950s, print media often portrayed lesbian themes implicitly through the portrayal of passionate female friendships that were notably nonsexual. Korinek suggests that lesbian readers, through what she calls a “perverse” reading could read between the lines and provide alternate meanings to texts.⁵ Here, Korinek draws upon literary critic Bonnie Zimmerman’s definition of a perverse reader: “a perverse reader is one highly conscious of her own agency, who takes an active role in shaping the text she reads in accordance with her own perspective of the world.”⁶ Essentially, a perverse reading highlights a text as a lesbian story, or at the very least, a story with an intense female relationship and an indifferent female-male relationship.⁷ All of this is to say is that readers are interested in seeing themselves represented in the works they consume, and as such are willing to resist the intended heteronormative meanings of texts and instead reimagine the stories in ways that are relevant to them. Barbara Freeman echoes this in her assertion that lesbians reading these texts may have interpreted “material with ostensibly heterosexual themes, such as friendship between women and girls” with their own meanings “in their quest for self-recognition.”⁸ The “quest for self-recognition” is an integral component of the imagined lesbian community. Essentially, queering or performing a perverse reading of these texts illuminates repeated lesbian language and themes, which connects to Anderson’s idea of imagined communities through pervasive themes.

In January of 1950, *Chatelaine* published Louise Dickinson Rich’s short story “Vixen in the Snow.” To an unsuspecting eye, this appears to be a tale of a fond female friendship alongside of a heterosexual romance. This is nothing out of the ordinary for the periodical. A perverse reading, however, using Zimmerman’s and Freeman’s techniques, uncovers lesbian themes in the story. The story follows Ivy Frazier who visits her elderly uncle in the

³ Anderson, *Imagined Communities*, 5-6.

⁴ Valerie Korinek, “‘Don’t Let Your Girlfriends Ruin Your Marriage’: Lesbian Imagery in *Chatelaine* Magazine, 1950-69,” *Journal of Canadian Studies* 33, no. 3, 1998, 84.

⁵ Korinek, “Girlfriends,” 95.

⁶ Bonnie Zimmerman, “Perverse Reading: The Lesbian Appropriation of Literature,” in *Sexual Practice/Textual Theory: Lesbian Cultural Criticism*, ed. Susan J. Wolfe and Julia Penelope, 139.

⁷ Korinek, “Girlfriends,” 96.

⁸ Barbara Freeman, “‘From No Go to No Logo’: Lesbian Lives and Rights in *Chatelaine*,” *Canadian Journal of Communication* 31, no. 4, 2006, 817.

fantastical Hazen Hollow every week.⁹ In the Hollow she meets Mattie Hazen, the titular “vixen in the snow.” The pair grow to be fast friends, and Ivy tells her uncle that she loves Mattie, and her uncle advises her not to tell her family or friends. Through a normative reading, this seems innocent enough: Uncle Ira is aware of the fantastical nature of the Hollow and its inhabitants, and he does not want his niece to be ridiculed for her belief in what he considers to be imaginary. Should the reader approach the story through a queer lens, however, Ivy’s confession of love and Ira’s words of warning imply that this is a tale of forbidden same-sex desire, and Ira warns his niece to conceal this longing. It is important to note that during this time male homosexuality was deemed deviant, meanwhile lesbians were considered maladjusted and sexually immature.¹⁰ When Ivy reaches the age of sixteen, she is still “always running to the Hollow to *play!*”,¹¹ and she considers that perhaps her “emotional development hadn’t kept pace with [her] age” after having “been so wrapped up in the Hollow and with Mattie for so many years.”¹² Overall, due to the suggestively lesbian themes associated with the language of youth and immaturity, this story is easily subject to a perverse reading, and therefore exemplifies the nature of imagined community through language in print media.

The text also contained lesbian languages that evokes queer imagery. Both the language describing the setting of the Hollow and Mattie’s character carry lesbian undertones due to the fantastical nature of the story. As Korinek asserts, Rich’s “choice of a fantasy or fairytale [sic] genre allows her great latitude in character development, plotting and motivation.”¹³ The Hollow is described as a “queer place” while also using language that evokes aspects of an Edenic paradise, with its overgrown fruit trees and abandoned cottages. The language here is notable because the images of the fruit trees—with fruit, eating, and desire as common motifs in lesbian literature—and other growth symbolizing female fertility and sexuality, while the abandoned cottages represent an opportunity for domestic bliss for these girls away from society’s prying eyes. The Hollow’s status as a queer and feminine location is confirmed by Ivy’s brother Paul’s fear and aversion to the Hollow’s “queerness”—as a man, he is unwelcome in this place and in the girls’ relationship. Korinek asserts that the Hollow appears to be more than just a physical location—its “fecund and particularly female imagery easily invokes sex.”¹⁴ Ivy’s mother’s concern for her immature “playing” in the Hollow could be a metaphor for sex with Mattie or perhaps masturbation, which, like lesbianism, was considered by contemporary psychiatrists to be a sign of immature sexuality.¹⁵

Along with perverse readings of the fantastical setting, Rich also writes fantastical characters that offer possible queer interpretations, specifically when it comes to Mattie’s physical description. The story describes Mattie as “elfin,” with “slanting yellowish eyes” and hair that was “reddish, with a queer dark gloss to it.”¹⁶ Once again, the supernatural setting of the story allows for a fluid definition of what a “queer” appearance might mean.

⁹ Louise Dickinson Rich, *Chatelaine*, no. 01, 1950, 8-9, 30-32, 34-35, 50.

¹⁰ Korinek, “Girlfriends,” 92.

¹¹ Rich, “Vixen in the Snow,” 34, emphasis in original.

¹² Rich, “Vixen in the Snow,” 34.

¹³ Korinek, “Girlfriends,” 96.

¹⁴ Korinek, “Girlfriends,” 97.

¹⁵ Korinek, “Girlfriends,” 97; Korinek, *Roughing it in the Suburbs*, 247-250.

¹⁶ Rich, “Vixen in the Snow,” 8, 31.

For heterosexual audiences, “queer,” in a setting like this, might just contribute to an overall sense of strangeness. Meanwhile, for lesbian readers, Mattie’s queer appearance appears to be a clear reference to her sexuality. Mattie’s supernatural queerness is reminiscent of other literary traditions involving supernatural settings and creatures as metaphors for queerness. For example, consider the literary convention within genre fiction to use supernatural settings and creatures to challenge the boundaries of gender and sexual normativity, such the monsters of Victorian Gothic horror and extraterrestrials of science fiction pulp fiction of the twentieth century. In these cases, the supernatural body is a metaphor for the queer body. As such, in “Vixen in the Snow,” Mattie’s supernaturally-queer body becomes a metaphor for a sexually-queer body. Ultimately, due to the popularity of *Chatelaine* and the paucity of popular women’s periodicals at this time, one can presume that lesbians across the country read this story. The combination of the language and imagery pertaining to characters and setting in Rich’s “Vixen in the Snow” demonstrates the pervasive themes, images, and language that occurred in mainstream print media that contributed to the formation of an imagined national lesbian community in the mid-twentieth century.

Along with fiction, *Chatelaine* also published several lesbian-themed nonfiction articles that are significant in considering the development of a print media-based imagined community during the 1950s and 1960s. The goal of these articles was primarily to educate readers on lesbianism. Renate Wilson’s 1966 article “What Turns Women to Lesbianism?” is notable because of its informative nature and underlying tolerance in contrast to society’s general intolerance of queer folks at this time. The article is primarily informative, seeking to inform Canadian women about the nature of lesbianism and its causes. It highlights contemporary psychiatric theories of the causes of lesbianism and addresses the “recent explosion of homosexuality.”¹⁷ Contemporary experts contributed this “explosion of homosexuality” not to an actual increasing number of gay men and lesbians, but rather increased tolerance that causes “homosexuals [to] find it less necessary to hide . . . They have simply become more *visible*.”¹⁸ Wilson’s comment on visibility is notable because it emphasizes the creation of a physical community as well as an imagined remote community that is strengthened by a shared literature. Furthermore, the explicit lesbian language that Wilson uses is also notable because it proves the pervasiveness of lesbian themes in mainstream media. This pervasion makes it possible for print media to foster the creation of imagined lesbian communities, particularly within remote locations. Wilson’s article describes the failures of modern psychiatry in “curing” lesbianism, especially as compared to success rates of conversion rates in gay men, although this message is surprisingly tolerant and perhaps even inspiring. The article as a whole suggests that there is not anything inherently wrong with lesbianism, and she backs this up with some views from prominent religious organizations who are generally thought to be homophobic. Wilson also likens lesbians to “normal” heterosexual women, which suggests the view that lesbianism is in fact a version of normalcy for women. For lesbians reading this article at the time of publication, it would have perhaps instilled some degree of hope and community, especially with the closing comments which state that the Quakers view sex as a gift of God and that homosexuality alone is not a sin in itself.¹⁹ Overall, though not an entirely positive depiction of lesbianism, the underlying message of tolerance—or at

¹⁷ Renate Wilson, “What Turns Women to Lesbianism?”, *Chatelaine*, October 1910, 130.

¹⁸ Wilson, “What Turns Women to Lesbianism?”, 130, emphasis in original.

¹⁹ Wilson, “What Turns Women to Lesbianism?”, 134.

least not complete intolerance—in “What Turns Women to Lesbianism?” speaks volumes in this era of queer oppression.

Part II: Oral Histories and Reflections on Lesbian Print Media

Valerie Korinek and Cameron Duder conducted oral history projects where they interviewed lesbians who lived during the mid-century. These oral testimonies highlight the role of print media in creating lesbian communities in remote locations across Canada. The story of Evelyn and Lilja’s relationship is particularly significant within the scope of this essay.²⁰ Evelyn Rogers was born in Regina in 1934 but in her adult life lived in Rouleau, a small farming community outside of Regina. Evelyn married her husband at nineteen and had two children. In 1975, Evelyn was “shattered by the revelation of her lesbianism.”²¹ Evelyn’s partner, Lilja Stefansson, was born in 1921 grew up on a farm in Vestfold, Manitoba.²² She moved to Winnipeg as a young adult and got married in 1942 but divorced him in 1948. At this point she had two children and moved to Saskatchewan where she qualified for mothers’ allowance. She got married again to an older man and together with her children they moved to Rouleau where she met Evelyn through volunteering together at the local United Church. The pair reminisced fondly about how they eventually became a couple. In the early 1970s, Evelyn had used *Chatelaine’s* article on lesbianism to initiate a conversation with Lilja about her sexuality and feelings for Lilja.²³ Lilja, until this point, had never heard of homosexuality or the word lesbian. That *Chatelaine* gave Lilja the language she needed to describe her feelings and experience proves the power of the periodical in providing lesbian representation and prompting moments of self-reflection. Evelyn and Lilja’s story also demonstrates the significance of lesbian-themed periodicals in forming a physical embodiment—however small—of an imagined lesbian community, especially in remote locations.

Dorothy’s, Sarah’s, and Ruth’s oral histories also offer critical insight into mid-century Canadian lesbian literary culture. Though neither of these testimonies focus specifically on *Chatelaine*, they emphasize the critical role of lesbian print media in defining and affirming lesbian identity and connecting lesbians with their community, especially for those who were in heterosexual marriages. Dorothy spoke of her heterosexual marriage as a necessity, saying that “marriage for some of us old timers was the only answer to get away from home. You go into a marriage knowing it probably won’t work.”²⁴ Dorothy was keenly aware of her lesbianism and participated in lesbian culture by reading lesbian pulp novels, especially Ann Bannon’s novels.²⁵ She also participated in American lesbian culture and was a member of Daughters of Bilitis—a prominent lesbian organization in the United States—and regularly read the Daughters’ periodical *The Ladder*.²⁶ Eventually Dorothy divorced her husband and received custody of her

²⁰ Valerie Korinek, *Prairie Fairies: A History of Queer Communities and People in Western Canada, 1930-1985*, Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2018, 91-95.

²¹ Korinek, *Prairie Fairies*, 91.

²² Korinek, *Prairie Fairies*, 92.

²³ Though this is outside the immediate scope of my essay (1950-1969), I am including Evelyn and Lilja’s story to illustrate *Chatelaine’s* influence during this era since it is still relatively close. It is also worth noting that neither Evelyn nor Lilja specified what issue of *Chatelaine* that this article was from.

²⁴ Korinek, *Prairie Fairies*, 90.

²⁵ Korinek, *Prairie Fairies*, 91.

²⁶ Korinek, *Prairie Fairies*, 91.

children. After her divorce she became actively involved with the LGBT liberation movement. Dorothy's story proves the necessity of lesbian print media in connecting lesbians with their community when they are otherwise isolated, whether it be by physical location or by heterosexual marriages. Sarah's oral history, documented by Duder, also demonstrates the role of print media in helping lesbians to identify their experiences and define their identities. Sarah, another lesbian in a heterosexual marriage during this time, became aware of her same-sex attraction in the early 1960s and began researching lesbianism and engaging with lesbian print media.²⁷ She read a variety of lesbian literature, including Radclyffe Hall's *The Well of Loneliness*, as her husband's health deteriorated. This setting allowed for her discrete consumption of the material, which ultimately allowed her to engage with lesbian culture despite her circumstances. Ruth B. Sells' story is similar, as she reflects on the isolation she experienced as a "tomboy" in childhood and later a "rather solitary teen."²⁸ She was able to find self-recognition in reading lesbian novels, however, such as *The Well of Loneliness*. Ultimately, these oral histories of lesbian experiences highlight the role of print media in creating a sense of remote imagined community for lesbians who are otherwise isolated from their communities.

Conclusion

To conclude, print media played a critical role in the development of a Canadian lesbian imagined community in the 1950s and 1960s. By using the framework established in Benedict Anderson's *Imagined Communities*, I argue that the proliferation of lesbian-themed print media allowed lesbians to form an imagined literary community that redefines what it means to be Canadian for queer women. I trace this development through fiction and nonfiction print media, using Rich's "Vixen in the Snow" and Wilson's "What Turns Women to Lesbianism?" to synecdochally represent the prevalence of lesbian themes in women's periodicals during the mid-century. I prove the connection between lesbian print media and imagined communities through an analysis of contemporary oral testimonies from a variety of narrators, compiled from interviews conducted by Cameron Duder and Valerie Korinek. Overall, this analysis emphasizes the importance of material culture in preserving lesbian identity for posterity, highlighting the hopeful message from one generation to the next: we have always been here, we will always be here, and we will always find our way back to each other.

²⁷ Cameron Duder, *Awfully Devoted Women: Lesbian Lives in Canada, 1900-65*, Vancouver: UBC Press, 2010, 120.

²⁸ Valerie Korinek, "'We're the Girls of the Pansy Parade': Historicizing Winnipeg's Queer Subcultures, 1930s-1970," *Histoire sociale* 45, no. 89, 2012, 144.

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Thomas Sankara's Legacy: Forging the Burkinabè Cultural Identity

Melanie Warwick

Thomas Sankara was the first president of Burkina Faso, creating the position after seizing power in 1983. His reign ended with his assassination in 1987, ordered by the same man who helped him create and carry out the revolution in 1983: Blaise Compaoré. Sankara achieved much during his time in power, but he is most strongly remembered for his ideology and the impacts it had on the collective cultural identity of Burkina Faso. Sankara's ideology was based in Pan-Africanism, with principles drawing from his stances on anti-corruption, women's emancipation, and decolonization. He used symbolism and symbolic acts to reinforce the policies and laws he enacted, bolstered by his determination to lead by example. His public image was characterized by his selflessness and transparency, which added not only to his authority but to his popularity, both domestically and internationally. Sankara facilitated a thriving Burkinabè culture based in the indigenous cultures of the region, promoted through various policies enacted by his government. After his assassination, Sankara was immortalised through the cultural memory held by the Burkinabè people, which became reinforced as scholars began to study his ideology in depth. Many movements have drawn inspiration from Sankarist ideology, and some are entirely based upon his ideas and goals. However, Sankara's approach to the leadership of Burkina Faso was not without flaws, and draws much criticism even now. Despite this, Thomas Sankara's image and ideology were instrumental in constructing a Burkinabè identity that has persisted in Burkina Faso until today.

France invaded the area now known as Burkina Faso as part of the Scramble for Africa, officially making it a French protectorate in 1896. It became a self-governing colony named the Republic of Upper Volta in 1958, and gained full independence from France in 1960. Upper Volta sustained four coup d'états before the one led by Thomas Sankara in 1983. After this coup d'état, the country was renamed from Upper Volta to Burkina Faso, to both shed French colonization and embrace the indigenous African cultures within the country.

Considerable research has been conducted concerning Thomas Sankara, as he was an unprecedented political figure in contemporary African politics. Many people have attempted to define his legacy, what caused it to be so impactful, and what factors have come together so that it continues to persist to this day.^{1 2 3} Some research looks at Sankara's impact within Burkina Faso;^{4 5} other research investigates his impact in the broader context of the

¹ Harsch, Ernest. "The Legacies of Thomas Sankara: a Revolutionary Experience in Retrospect." *Review of African political economy* 40, no. 137 (2013).

² Yesufu, Shaka. "A Critical Evaluation of Thomas Isidore Noel Sankara's Servant Leadership Style of Government in Burkina-Faso." *Eureka, Social and Humanities (Online)*, no. 2 (2022).

³ Soré, Zakaria. "Balai Citoyen: A New Praxis of Citizen Fight with Sankarist Inspirations." In *A Certain Amount of Madness*, 225-. Pluto Press, 2018.

⁴ Zeilig, Leo. "Burkina Faso: From Thomas Sankara to Popular Resistance." *Review of African political economy* 44, no. 151 (2017).

⁵ Yesufu, "A Critical Evaluation of Thomas Sankara."

African continent.^{6 7} There are several accounts of his life with input from various people who knew him, from his brother Paul Sankara to his widow Mariam Sankara, and other advisors and staff who worked with him during his time as president.⁸ Ernest Harsch is a research scholar at Columbia University's Institute of African Studies, and has written multiple journal articles about Thomas Sankara and topics surrounding him. Harsch spoke with Thomas Sankara himself multiple times during his time as a journalist covering economic developments in Burkina Faso.⁹ While this introduces some bias into Harsch's work, he makes sure to acknowledge it. This also provides a perspective that is sympathetic towards Sankara, which aids in the study of his image and impact. Also consulted during the research of this essay were several papers investigating the political movements that have drawn concepts from or originated from Sankara's ideology.^{10 11 12} Research conducted more recently, specifically after Burkina Faso's 2014 revolutionary activity and 2015 coup d'état, usually touches on Sankara's impact on the events,¹³ even though 27 years had passed from the time of his assassination to the 2014 revolution. Discussion about Sankara as an inspiration, martyr, and critical motivational figure for both Burkinabès and other Africans is significant, although the discussion of his impact on Burkinabè identity is much less common.

Thomas Sankara was born in Yako, Upper Volta, in 1949. His father was a gendarme, and as he was employed by the colonial state, his family lived a relatively privileged life.¹⁴ After primary school, Sankara chose to pursue sixth grade in the secular education system, and was a studious figure throughout his education.¹⁵ When he was 17, he received a scholarship to Prytanée Militaire de Kadiogo, a military academy in Ouagadougou, where he was exposed "to a revolutionary perspective on Upper Volta and the world."¹⁶ After Sankara graduated from Prytanée Militaire de Kadiogo, he was selected for advanced officer training in Antsirabé, Madagascar. Here, he expanded his knowledge base to include agricultural methodology, a variety of political theories, and other non-military subjects.¹⁷ Sankara also witnessed revolutionary change within Madagascar during his time there, that of a military takeover of a conservative, pro-French regime.¹⁸ Thomas Sankara returned to Burkina Faso at 24 years old, trained in both military strategy and revolutionary ideas.

Sankara's first command post in Burkina Faso was at Bobo-Dioulasso, training new army recruits. Here, he implemented the strategies and civic education he had learned in Madagascar.¹⁹ He was quickly transferred to

⁶ Kumah-Abiwu, Felix, and Odeyemi, Olusoji Alani. "Sankara's Political Ideas and Pan-African Solidarity: A Perspective for Africa's Development?" In *A Certain Amount of Madness*. Pluto Press, 2018.

⁷ Soré. "Balai Citoyen."

⁸ Harsch, Ernest. *Thomas Sankara: an African Revolutionary*. Athens, Ohio: Ohio University Press, 2014.

⁹ Harsch, *Thomas Sankara: an African Revolutionary*. 3.

¹⁰ Soré. "Balai Citoyen."

¹¹ Kumah-Abiwu and Odeyemi, "Sankara's Political Ideas and Pan-African Solidarity".

¹² Dragstra, Fiona. "We Are the Children of Sankara: Memories as Weapons During the Burkinabè Uprisings of 2014 and 2015." In *A Certain Amount of Madness*, Pluto Press, 2018.

¹³ Zeilig, "Burkina Faso: From Thomas Sankara to Popular Resistance."

¹⁴ Harsh, *Thomas Sankara: an African Revolutionary*, 12.

¹⁵ *Ibid*, 13.

¹⁶ *Ibid*, 17.

¹⁷ *Ibid*, 18.

¹⁸ *Ibid*.

¹⁹ Harsh, *Thomas Sankara: an African Revolutionary*, 19.

Ouagadougou in 1974, where he was in charge of overseeing the army's engineering corps.²⁰ While in this position, Sankara became aware of how many of the people in authority were "diverting funds, materials, or food or giving their own relatives lucrative jobs."²¹ He openly criticized this, which alienated him from his peers and superiors. Sankara continued to rise through military ranks for many years, purposefully avoiding political positions until 1981, when he was briefly instated as the Minister of Information.²² He spent his time in this position encouraging journalists to reject state intimidation, and left the position with a dramatic speech broadcasted on live radio, criticizing the current party in power for serving the interests of the minority.²³ In 1983, Sankara was appointed Prime Minister, the right hand man to current President Ouédraogo.²⁴ His rousing speeches upstaged President Ouédraogo and alarmed French authorities and conservative officers. This resulted in his arrest in 1983, which subsequently sparked large demonstrations throughout the capital of the country, primarily composed of "high school students, youths from poor neighbourhoods, and some trade unionists."²⁵ A political stalemate continued for two months, until Sankara led a successful coup d'état in August of 1983,²⁶ marking the beginning of Sankara's iconic time as the first President of Burkina Faso.

Sankara was clear in his goals and ideas for the new revolutionary process that had just begun. In October of 1983, he gave a Political Orientation Speech, outlining his plan for the creation of a new Upper Volta. In this speech, Sankara stated his priorities as, in order: the reform of the army, advancement of women's political status, and economic reconstruction.²⁷ The new missions to be undertaken by the national army were as follows: to be "able to fight any enemy inside and out, and participate in military training",²⁸ to participate in agriculture and economic production in order to "live and suffer among the people it belongs to,"²⁹ and finally to arm their soldiers not only with military training, but also with ideological and political training, in order to promote the creation of conscious revolutionaries.³⁰ Advancement of women's political status would be achieved through the creation of "a new mentality in women voltaic allowing it to assume the fate of the country alongside the man."³¹ Finally, Sankara's goals concerning economic reconstruction revolved around land reform, administrative reform, and educational reform.³² Sankara constructed these political priorities with the intention of forging a self-sufficient, independent, and proud decolonized African state. Thomas Sankara's ideology was a unique mixture for the time, which made him a striking political figure to the people of Burkina Faso, as well as to the continent of Africa.

²⁰ Ibid, 20.

²¹ Ibid.

²² Ibid, 28.

²³ Ibid, 30.

²⁴ Ibid, 32.

²⁵ Ibid, 36.

²⁶ Ibid, 38.

²⁷ Sankara, Thomas. "The Political Orientation Speech." Transcript of speech delivered over radio in Burkina Faso, October 2, 1983. <https://www.thomassankara.net/the-political-orientation-speech-thomas-sankara/?lang=en>.

²⁸ Ibid.

²⁹ Ibid.

³⁰ Ibid.

³¹ Ibid.

³² Harsch, Ernest. "The Legacies of Thomas Sankara", 366.

Thomas Sankara's desire for a strong Burkinabè identity situated in a pan-African community is evident throughout the entirety of his time in power, ever present in his strongest ideas and policies. One of the best examples of this is the name 'Burkina Faso', accompanied by the term 'Burkinabè'. Sankara wanted to "kill off Upper Volta in order to allow Burkina Faso to be reborn,"³³ and careful consideration was taken in the choice of the name 'Burkina Faso'. 'Burkina Faso' roughly translates to 'Land of Upright People', and is a composite of several languages indigenous to the region. 'Burkina' comes from Mooré, meaning "worthy people" or "men of dignity". 'Faso' comes from Jula, meaning "house" or "republic". Finally, the 'bè' suffix in 'Burkinabè' was taken from Fulfuldé.³⁴ Efforts to promote the many different indigenous cultures were undertaken even before the name change, with state media actively promoting various languages and cultures beginning when Sankara took power in 1983. This was done by having television news casts stop delivering exclusively in French, and having radio broadcasts in eleven of Burkina Faso's indigenous languages.³⁵ Once in power, Sankara supported all kinds of cultural festivals, and the country saw an "unprecedented blossoming of African cultural and ethnic representations"³⁶ during his era. These efforts to promote indigenous cultures, languages, and appreciation forged a strong Burkinabè identity based in pride for their African heritage and thriving cultural scene.³⁷

Sankara's desire for the Burkinabè identity to be based in cultures indigenous to the region was partially driven by his anti-Western, anti-colonialization stance. He believed that Western interference had stifled the development of culture in most, if not all African countries.³⁸ In order to amend this suffocation of culture, Sankara worked to cut the West out of Burkina Faso's economy, culture, and identity. This would allow the country to develop a self-sufficient economy that the Burkinabè people could be proud of. Sankara's creation of the Burkinabè identity began through his revolutionary efforts, and was continued through the implementation of efforts like those previously stated. His hope that these cultural attitudes would trickle down into the general public was achieved, and his strategy was successful, allowing Burkina Faso to develop a concrete identity with a thriving culture.

Sankara's ideology was based in his strong pan-African ideals, with many ideas surrounding African solidarity, collective identity, and economic independence.³⁹ His stance on decolonization was deeply informed by this pan-Africanist base. Sankara argued strongly for all African countries to refuse to pay their colonial debts, stating that "The debt is another form of neocolonialism, one in which the colonialists have transformed themselves into technical assistants. Actually, it would be more accurate to say technical assassins."⁴⁰ Sankara's outspoken belief was not widely employed in the greater continent, although he made great strides within Burkina Faso to reduce reliance on foreign aid and resources wherever possible.

³³ Sankara, Thomas. 1983. "Asserting our identity, asserting our culture." In *Thomas Sankara Speaks: The Burkina Faso Revolution*. edited by Michel Prairie, 143-146. United States of America: Pathfinder Press, 2007. 143.

³⁴ Harsch, *Thomas Sankara: an African Revolutionary*. 45.

³⁵ Ibid.

³⁶ Ibid, 46.

³⁷ Ibid.

³⁸ Sankara, "Asserting our identity, asserting our culture." 146.

³⁹ Kumah-Abiwu and Odeyemi, "Sankara's Political Ideas and Pan-African Solidarity", 203.

⁴⁰ Sankara, Thomas. 1983. "A united front against the debt." In *Thomas Sankara Speaks: The Burkina Faso Revolution*. edited by Michel Prairie, 373-381. United States of America: Pathfinder Press, 2007. 375.

Sankara was also staunchly anti-corruption. He had openly criticized the corruption of army officers and government officials he had encountered during his time overseeing the Upper Volta Military Engineering Corps, and openly supported the exposure of high-level corruption during his time as Minister of Information. Sankara believed that corruption was “nurtured by imperialism and neocolonialism,”⁴¹ and was determined to shed any and all colonial influences. Once he became President, Sankara had many officials of both previous regimes and current officeholders tried for corruption.⁴²

Another major pillar in Sankara’s ideology was the emancipation of women, made clear in his Political Orientation Speech, where he stated that “Revolution and liberation of women go together.”⁴³ Sankara was sincere in his commitment, and made many reforms concerning women’s rights, including the establishment of a minimum marriageable age, the widow’s right to inherit, and multiple public campaigns against issues such as female genital mutilation and forced marriage.⁴⁴

Sankara’s success as a leader and as an inspiration was greatly reinforced by his use of symbolism and symbolic gestures in his policies, fortified by his determination to lead by example. He purposefully enacted policies that had genuine impact on the economy and the community in a way that was visible and symbolic. In order to help embrace indigenous culture and promote the domestic cotton market, civil servants were required to wear traditionally designed and locally created Faso dan Fani outfits on a regular basis.⁴⁵ For International Women’s Day, Sankara encouraged men to take on the duties of their female counterparts, to understand their role in the community.⁴⁶ He often employed the use of mass public assemblies, in which central government budgets were designed, while the makers of said budgets were subjected to questioning from the public.⁴⁷ This helped demystify how the state functioned, and allowed the public to voice their concerns in an effective and direct manner.

In addition to the symbolism he used to reinforce his policies, Sankara always led by example. Sankara was one of the least paid Presidents in Africa during this period, with his salary being \$450 per month.⁴⁸ Civil servants had similarly reduced salaries, as a reinforcement that they worked for the good of the community, not for monetary gain. Sankara’s projected image was one of sincerity, openness, and humility. He rode a bicycle everywhere, played soccer on the public field with his advisors and staff every week, and discouraged people from chanting his name.⁴⁹ He publicly denounced any form of personality cultism pertaining to himself, refusing to have his picture on display in public buildings,⁵⁰ and discouraged all other forms of personality worship.⁵¹ Sankara’s image was forged with the intention of placing emphasis on the Burkinabè people’s connection with their leader as equals, and remind the

⁴¹ Kumah-Abiwu and Odeyemi, “Sankara’s Political Ideas and Pan-African Solidarity”, 204.

⁴² Harsch, “The Legacies of Thomas Sankara”, 369.

⁴³ Sankara, “Political Orientation Speech.”

⁴⁴ Harsch, “The Legacies of Thomas Sankara”, 366.

⁴⁵ Ibid, 371.

⁴⁶ Ibid.

⁴⁷ Harsch, “The Legacies of Thomas Sankara”, 371.

⁴⁸ Yesufu, “A Critical Evaluation of Thomas Sankara.” 98.

⁴⁹ Harsch, *Thomas Sankara: an African Revolutionary*. 29.

⁵⁰ Smith, David. “Burkina Faso's Revolutionary Hero Thomas Sankara to Be Exhumed.” *The Guardian*. Guardian News and Media, March 6, 2015. <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/mar/06/burkina-fasos-revolutionary-hero-thomas-sankara-to-be-exhumed>.

⁵¹ Yesufu, “A Critical Evaluation of Thomas Sankara.” 97.

people that his leadership was focused on the population, instead of on himself. This image has lasted to the present day, where Sankara is hailed as a hero both within Burkina Faso⁵² and across the continent.⁵³ The greatest strength of Sankara's image is its ability to endure relatively untarnished, which managed to both reinforce his authority during his rule, and support his legacy after his assassination.

Thomas Sankara was killed in a coup d'état in 1987, led by his former ally Blaise Compaoré. Compaoré went on to claim the presidency for himself, and was in power until another coup d'état ousted him in 2014. During his regime, Compaoré did his best to suppress Sankara and the effects he'd had on Burkina Faso's general public. He wanted to build Burkina Faso around the image of himself, rather than Sankara.⁵⁴ Compaoré had Sankara buried in a mass grave with the other men killed at the 1987 coup d'état, with no grave markers and no ceremony.⁵⁵ Sankara was actively slandered on television and on the radio, being called a "traitor", "fascist", "messianic", and a "paranoiac misogynist."⁵⁶ Open mention of Sankara was taboo, and it was even more risky for any Burkinabè to express admiration or appreciation of Sankara, a sentiment which lasted for many years after his assassination.⁵⁷ Unfortunately for Compaoré, his actions had an effect opposite to what he desired. By prohibiting talk of Sankara and his ideology, Compaoré motivated those against his own regime to rally around Sankara, effectively making a political martyr of the former president. Sankara's place in the cultural memory of Burkina Faso was only further cemented with Compaoré's efforts to erase him from the minds of the people. As Compaoré's regime progressed, Compaoré realised Sankara's place in the greater Burkinabè cultural memory was firmly entrenched, and allowed Sankara to be politically rehabilitated and designated him as a national hero in 2000.⁵⁸

One of the factors Compaoré failed to consider in attempting to sully Sankara's legacy was his place in the pan-African consciousness. The former president was not a hero solely to the Burkinabè, but an inspiration across the greater African continent. Sankara's popularity was rooted in what he represented to the whole of Africa, the people of which had been struggling with corrupt leaders ignoring their basic needs since the colonization of the continent.⁵⁹ Additionally, Sankara represented a true split from the West, economically and culturally, which only added to his popularity amongst Africans living on the continent. His legacy is one of inspiration and revolution, both to those fighting Compaoré and those outside of Burkina Faso, living and fighting elsewhere in Africa.⁶⁰ Sankara's sudden assassination immortalised him, and Compaoré's attempts to diminish the effects of the Sankara era on Burkina Faso and the rest of Africa only further cemented Sankara's place in both the Burkinabè and the African cultural memory.

Thomas Sankara was a source of hope for many Burkinabè during his reign, and his legacy continues to provide that same hope for Burkinabè today. His ideas are often given as alternative solutions to crises in Burkina

⁵² Harsch, "The Legacies of Thomas Sankara", 359.

⁵³ Harsch, *Thomas Sankara: an African Revolutionary*. 83.

⁵⁴ Dragstra, "We Are the Children of Sankara", 345.

⁵⁵ Harsch, *Thomas Sankara: an African Revolutionary*. 90.

⁵⁶ *Ibid*, 69-70.

⁵⁷ Harsch, *Thomas Sankara: an African Revolutionary*. 82.; Harsch, "The Legacies of Thomas Sankara", 359.; Dragstra, "We are the Children of Sankara." 344.

⁵⁸ Harsch, "The Legacies of Thomas Sankara", 359.

⁵⁹ Yesufu, "A Critical Evaluation of Thomas Sankara." 101.

⁶⁰ Zeilig, "Burkina Faso: From Thomas Sankara to Popular Resistance.", 161.

Faso both by those who identify as Sankarist as well as those outside his ideological affiliation. The term ‘Sankarist’ in reference to a political alignment was not used while Sankara himself was alive, but emerged with the study of his revolution and rule by scholars after his death.⁶¹ It was further popularized in 2000 when it was first used as an identifier by a political party, which called itself the ‘Union for Rebirth / Sankarist Party’.⁶² Since then, more political parties built on Sankarist ideals have developed, and have elected a few deputies to the National Assembly since 2002.⁶³ However, factionalism and fragmentation between them have caused votes for Sankarist parties to be split, and no majority has been achieved by any one party.

In addition to political parties, Sankarism has been an inspiring basis for many social movements. The *Balai Citoyen*, which translates to ‘Citizen Broom’, is one of the more remarkable social movements based in Sankarism. Their name is communicative of their goal, which is to “rid the country of ‘dirt’, including the greed of political corruption.”⁶⁴ They officially launched in 2013, and their history dates back to 2011. *Balai Citoyen*’s membership is primarily composed of journalists, students, and human rights activists.⁶⁵ They are committed not only to their primary goal of anti-corruption, but also to preserving the legacy of Sankara, through celebration of his actions and preservation of his memory.⁶⁶

Separate from organized movements, it is remarkable that the youth of today still draw on Sankara and his ideology for revolutionary inspiration, despite never having directly experienced his time in power. During Compaoré’s time in power, youth protestors would refer to themselves as ‘des enfants de Sankara’, or ‘the children of Sankara’.⁶⁷ This clear expression of contempt for Compaoré and his regime is made more impactful by the knowledge of Compaoré’s attempts to wipe Sankara from the cultural memory of the Burkinabè people. The youth of Burkina Faso use Sankara, his image, and his words as “contemporary weapons for social and political movements.”⁶⁸ Sankara and his ideologies are a powerful rallying point, bringing together Burkinabè of all ages, and creating a strong sense of national unity and pride. People who were alive during Sankara’s regime draw pride from seeing his policies in action, and the youth claim him as a part of their national heritage, an icon from which they draw motivation and hope.

While Sankara is hailed as a hero to the Burkinabè people, his ideology had flaws that were not dealt with during his time in power. His short ruling period means we will never know if he would have been able to push past them, but they continue to persist in the memory of Sankara and his governing system. In action, many of Sankara’s ideas worked. He executed a vaccination drive that managed to vaccinate two million children in two weeks,⁶⁹ promoted the social standing of women, and was just beginning to implement a plan to advance literacy rates across the country.⁷⁰ However, his visions were vast and ambitious. They often lacked a clear implementation plan, with no

⁶¹ Yesufu, “A Critical Evaluation of Thomas Sankara.” 98.

⁶² *Ibid*, 99.

⁶³ Harsch, “The Legacies of Thomas Sankara”, 359.

⁶⁴ Soré. “*Balai Citoyen*.” 225.

⁶⁵ *Ibid*, 226.

⁶⁶ *Ibid*, 237.

⁶⁷ Dragstra, “We are the Children of Sankara.” 345.

⁶⁸ *Ibid*, 342.

⁶⁹ Harsch, “The Legacies of Thomas Sankara”, 371.

⁷⁰ Yesufu, “A Critical Evaluation of Thomas Sankara.” 95.

basis of evidence provided by other successful references.⁷¹ Sankara was also impatient with anyone who insisted that his sights were set too high for a poor country filled with poor people.⁷² In some situations, he was right to ignore these complaints. UNICEF didn't believe in his vaccination drive, but agreed to support him despite their reservations.⁷³ Sankara managed to achieve the vaccination target despite the misgivings others expressed about the plan. However, his plans often had unintended consequences. For example, the CDRs, or Committees for the Defence of the Revolution, were Sankara's main vehicle for the participation of Burkinabè citizens in the governance of Burkina Faso. They were intended to allow local governance to be directly involved in the development of smaller communities, in addition to compensating for the shortcomings of the military.⁷⁴ Unfortunately, their history is tarnished by the abuses committed by the young and inexperienced activists that comprised most of these units.⁷⁵ Sankara had big dreams, and while many of them worked in his favour, there were more than a few drawbacks to his system of governance.

The modern Burkinabè identity gained much of its cultural shape during the Sankara era, under direct influence of Thomas Sankara. While he was alive, Sankara strove to create a thriving culture within Burkina Faso. The shape of this culture was formed by his anti-colonialism and anti-West ideals. This manifested in the promotion of indigenous languages, festivals, and traditions, while shunning Western norms such as fashion. His pan-African approach allowed for multiple indigenous cultures in the region to weave together in order to create the Burkinabè identity, while still retaining their discrete cultures. This culture was further reinforced by the creation of new holidays, traditions, and customs, introduced through government policy and strengthened by Sankara's practice of himself and his staff leading by example. Even after his death, Thomas Sankara's ideology continues to influence the political thoughts and developments of the Burkinabè people. His assassination gave him the status of a martyr, and the study of his ideology has inspired many people, especially Burkinabè youth, to pursue Sankarism as a political alignment. Sankara may have only served four years as Burkina Faso's first President, but his impact has been felt throughout the continuation of the country. He will continue to motivate and inspire the Burkinabè people as an upstanding political figure and virtuous national hero, for as long as he remains in the cultural memory.

⁷¹ Harsch, "The Legacies of Thomas Sankara", 371.

⁷² Ibid.

⁷³ Ibid.

⁷⁴ Harsch, *Thomas Sankara: an African Revolutionary*. 35.

⁷⁵ Harsch, *Thomas Sankara: an African Revolutionary*. 34.

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You Are Now About to Witness the Strength of Street Knowledge: N.W.A's *Straight Outta Compton* Album

Mikayla Calabretti

Introduction

On September 28th, 1990, Arsenio Hall stepped on stage to host his nightly show. It started like any other show – with a standup monologue and jokes. As the show came back from a commercial break, Arsenio introduced his new guests, “Everything about the four young men I’m about to introduce to you is controversial. From the name to the music, which last year the FBI accused of encouraging violence against the police.”¹ Hall was referring to the infamous and iconic gangsta rap group, N.W.A, from South-Central/Compton, Los Angeles. The four (originally five) members introduced themselves to the live audience: DJ Yella, Dr. Dre, MC Ren, and Eazy E, who sported a hockey mask and a straitjacket. The crowd roared. As the interview continued, Hall asked the group about their polemical song “Fuck Da Police.” Dre answered, “The song we made about the police, you know a couple years ago. I’m sure everybody’s aware of that.”² Hall remarked, “We can use the initial of the first word,” the gang interjected, “F Tha Police.”³ The clapping of the audience echoed in the studio. Ren explained, “Once in everybody’s lifetime they get harassed by the police for no reason and everybody wants to say it, but they can’t say it on the spot because something happened to them.”⁴ Ren asserted that members of the Black community are frequently harassed by law enforcement, especially because of the clothing they wear. Ren elaborated: “And nine times out of ten you can’t help what you got on cause that’s all your family can afford you to wear... You stereotyped as a gang member.”⁵

During the 1980s in Los Angeles, the crack epidemic and gang violence was at an all-time high.⁶ The African American community of South-Central/Compton, and in particular Black men, suffered greatly from police brutality, waves of murder, male depopulation, racism, among other socio-economic problems. According to US health officials, it was a crisis equal to the crack epidemic.⁷ Ren’s explanation of “Fuck Tha Police” to Hall reverberated from the struggle the Black community experienced in the South-Central/Compton region of Los Angeles. The track was a single off their 1988 sophomore album, *Straight Outta Compton*. The album included original member Ice Cube, who wrote most of the group’s lyrics before departing on acrimonious terms in 1989.⁸ With Dre’s innovative producing that sampled funky beats and Cube’s incendiary lyrics that harnessed Malcolm X’s political rhetoric, the album was a force to be reckoned with.⁹ At the same time, the group’s violent and often

¹ “N.W.A On Arsenio Hall,” Broadcast date: September 28, 1990, (*YouTube*, September 21, 2007),

² *Ibid.*

³ *Ibid.*

⁴ *Ibid.*

⁵ *Ibid.*

⁶ Times Editorial Board, “Editorial: 1980s crack epidemic was a fork in the road. America chose racism and prisons over public health,” *Los Angeles Times*, June 10, 2020, Opinion Section..

⁷ Times Editorial Board, “Editorial: 1980s crack epidemic was a fork in the road. America chose racism and prisons over public health.”

⁸ The Defiant Ones, “Episode 2,” *Netflix*, July 9, 2017.

⁹ *Ibid.*

misogynistic lyrics, glorifying gang life, and crime, shocked mainstream Black and White audiences alike.¹⁰ Consequently, N.W.A. received virtually no radio promotion.¹¹ While it would become a cultural sensation, *Straight Outta Compton* had a specific intended audience—N.W.A.’s fellow outlaws in South-Central/Compton and similar areas of hardscrabble urban America. These were people who had intimately experienced racism, alienation, police brutality, and engaged in illicit activities such as drug dealing, theft, or other criminal activity as a means to survive—both economically and mentally.

N.W.A.’s work and its impact must first be understood, then, within the distinctive context of later twentieth century urban outlaw culture. Imani Perry writes in her book *Prophets of the Hood: Politics and Poetics in Hip-Hop*, “Hip-hop embraces the outlaw. Outlaw status is conferred only metaphorically through lawbreaking, but on a deeper, more symbolic level, it is achieved through a position of resistance to the confines of status quo existence.”¹² But Perry also goes a step further from this contention, arguing that hip-hop utilizes “thug mimicry” to subvert white supremacy and speak on its targeted audience’s behalf. Perry defines this provocative term as “a becoming of, a turning into, Black American stereotypes. The figures of the brute, the thief, the drug dealer, the sloth, the pimp, and the prostitute are all present in hip-hop music... Thug Mimicry... dislocates the authority for defining the black underworld and manipulating the negative images of black America in order to serve the interests of White America.”¹³ Although not all of its members were drug dealers, robbers, or in gangs, N.W.A utilized “thug mimicry” to lend the authority of firsthand authenticity to their marginalized and oppressed targeted audience’s narrative and, at the same, to critique the socioeconomic issues that contributed to such illicit outlaw lifestyles.

This essay provides a historical analysis of N.W.A’s *Straight Outta Compton*, demonstrating how the album exposed the grim realities and struggles faced by N.W.A and the Black community in the impoverished and dangerous streets of South-Central/Compton Los Angeles. By using “thug mimicry,” N.W.A achieved their goal of celebrating and instilling pride in their targeted audience, while also solidifying their sociopolitical concerns and defying White supremacy. Consequently, N.W.A’s *Straight Outta Compton* stood as the ultimate soundtrack to the social-protest discourse of the album’s primary targeted audience. The album’s aggressive style of lyrics and music production cemented gangsta rap as the hardcore rap sub-genre that unflinchingly voiced the truths and struggles of Black men. In this respect, *Straight Outta Compton* stands as an indispensable primary source toward gaining a deeper, more complex understanding of this important period of gangsta rap, African American history, and US history more generally.

This paper will begin, necessarily, with a concise summary of the socio-economic problems in Los Angeles that affected the Black community, setting the scene for the development of a musical idiom shaped by that milieu. This is then followed by a short summary of the development of gangsta rap. Subsequently, the paper will delve more specifically into N.W.A and analyze their album, *Straight Outta Compton*. It will explore the negative perceptions

¹⁰ Jonathan Gold, “N.W.A: A HARD ACT TO FOLLOW,” *LA WEEKLY*, December 4, 2007 (originally published: May 5, 1989). White is capitalized throughout this paper to reflect and invoke thought on the critical significance and political existence of racial identity, particularly Whiteness and its survival.

¹¹ Fernando Orejuela, *Rap and Hip Hop Culture* (New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 2015), 124.

¹² Imani Perry, *Prophets of the Hood: Politics and Poetics in Hip Hop* (Durham: Duke University Press, 2004), 102.

¹³ Perry, *Prophets of the Hood*, 109.

surrounding the album at the time of its release and its significance as a primary source. In pursuit of this goal, the paper will strive to address two key questions: What were the repercussions of N.W.A's Straight Outta Compton? And did it open a window of conversation to the world, particularly regarding Los Angeles and its Black Community? To answer these questions, an analysis will be conducted on N.W.A songs, interviews, and contemporary newspaper articles.

The socio-economic conditions that bred L.A gangsta rap

Despite the strides the Civil Rights Act of 1964 attempted to make by disbanding discrimination on the basis of race, colour, sex, religion or national origin, wounds of racism, inequality and oppression still haunted the Black communities.¹⁴ The following year President Lyndon B. Johnson undermined his war on poverty campaign when he called 1965 'the year when this country began a thorough, intelligent, and effective war on crime.'¹⁵ In 1971, Johnson's successor, President Richard Nixon, followed a similar narrative with his "war on drugs" campaign to overcome his critics who threatened his presidency- antiwar activists and the Black community.¹⁶ The 1980s offered a glimmer of hope to African Americans with the welcoming of President Ronald Reagan and his economic policies, known as Reaganomics or Reaganism.¹⁷ These policies aimed to promote equal job opportunities for all, with the goal of curbing devastating inflation and rising living costs.¹⁸ However, Reaganomics ultimately favored the powerful and wealthy through tax reductions for high-income Americans, increased military funding, deregulation of government, and crackdowns on unions.¹⁹ Moreover, Reagan cut funding for welfare programs and Medicaid, exacerbating poverty among low-income Black communities. During his presidency, Reagan faced a crippling issue that plagued America: drugs.²⁰

In 1982, Reagan reinvented Nixon's "war on drugs" that arose from the crack-cocaine epidemic that plagued cities such as Los Angeles—"the epicenter of the U.S crack economy."²¹ Supported by Democrats and Republicans nationwide, Reagan's "war on drugs" strengthened law enforcement and enforced stricter sentencing for possession, consumption, and distribution of narcotics in hopes of ending the epidemic.²² Consequently, Reagan's reinforced law enforcement led to more Black people being apprehended by aggressive police officers, resulting in a disproportionately high number of deaths among Black individuals, with twenty-two Black people being killed for every White person in the 1980s.²³

¹⁴ Brian Ward, *Just My Soul Responding: Rhythm and Blues, Black Consciousness and Race Relations*, (London: Routledge, 2004), 45.

¹⁵ Ibram X. Kendi, *How to be an Antiracist*, (NY: One World, 2019), 25.

¹⁶ Ibid.

¹⁷ Joseph Vogel, "Freaks in the Reagan Era: James Baldwin, the New Pop Cinema, and the American Ideal of Manhood," *Journal of popular culture*, 48, no. 3, (2015): 3.

¹⁸ Ibid.

¹⁹ Kendi, *How to be an Antiracist*, 27.

²⁰ Donna Murch, "Crack in Los Angeles: Crisis, Militarization, and Black Response to the Late Twentieth-Century War on Drugs." *The Journal of American history*, 102, no. 1 (2015): 163-164.

²¹ Ibid.

²² Ibid.163.

²³ Kendi, *How to be an Antiracist*, 27.

Towards the end of 1983, Los Angeles County officials testified before the US Congress about the crack and gang crises that haunted the city and its county environs.²⁴ Los Angeles Police Department Deputy Chief James Bascue attested, “Rock cocaine had exacerbated the gang wars and drug-related crimes of armed robbery, kidnapping, and murder that surrounding communities were permeated by violence and terror.”²⁵

Crack became a lucrative opportunity for the Black gangs, who profited substantially by associating with drug traffickers and by constructing their own intricate distribution networks.²⁶ Additionally, as these gangs attempted to expand sales and protect themselves against competitors, they deemed it necessary to secure themselves with drug houses, military-grade guns, and the use of violence to control their markets and territories.²⁷ Competition between gangs for crack profits often turned fatal, contributing to a doubling of the murder rate among adolescent and young adult Black males.²⁸

Los Angeles sought to address the interconnected problems of gangs and drugs through a militarized campaign led by the LAPD. This campaign involved allocating additional funds to elite command units and bolstering the manpower of the LAPD’s Specialized Weapon and Tactics Team (SWAT). It also entailed the removal of all social-service components and the implementation of racially targeted policing.²⁹ LAPD Chief Daryl Gates exemplified this policing strategy when he escalated the force by distributing armoured cars to rupture the “so-called crack houses,” as well as coordinating large weekend raids that led to the arrests of hundreds of young Black men, whose cars would be impounded and searched.³⁰ Lower-class Black communities that had historically experienced neglect now witnessed a staggering investment of public resources, in the form of brutal and unjust policing.³¹ The *Baltimore Sun* reported on March 9th, 1991 that citizens’ complaints about the unrestrained force used by LAPD officers rose by 33 percent from 1984 to 1989.³² This article noted that “[m]ore than 3.5 million in taxpayers money was used to settle 16 lawsuits that involved bodily injury claims of assaults or shootings by officers.”³³ In 1984, the LAPD received 187 complaints of unrestrained force by their officers, as compared to 250 such complaints in 1989.³⁴

Rather than ending the violence of gangs and the crack epidemic, law enforcement’s brutal tactics created another problem among Black communities, that of mass incarceration.³⁵ In 1990, drug offences accounted for 34.2 percent of new admittances to California prisons. By 2000, the combined percentage of Blacks and Latinos surpassed 64 percent of the overall population of California’s Correctional facilities.³⁶ On May 21st, 1995, the *Los Angeles*

²⁴ Felecia Angeja Viator, *To Live and Defy in LA: How Gangsta Rap Changed America*, (MA: Harvard University Press, 2020), 19-20.

²⁵ *Ibid.*, 20.

²⁶ *Ibid.*

²⁷ *Ibid.*

²⁸ *Ibid.*

²⁹ Murch, “Crack in Los Angeles,” 165-167.

³⁰ Times Editorial Board, “Editorial: The 1980s crack epidemic was a fork in the road.”

³¹ Times Editorial Board, “Editorial: The 1980s crack epidemic was a fork in the road.”

³² “L.A. police brutality reports rose in a 5-year span,” *Los Angeles Daily News and Baltimore Sun*, March 09, 1991, <https://www.baltimoresun.com/news/bs-xpm-1991-03-10-1991069058-story.html>, (Accessed November 22, 2022).

³³ *Ibid.*

³⁴ *Ibid.*

³⁵ Times Editorial Board, “Editorial: The 1980s crack epidemic was a fork in the road.”

³⁶ *Ibid.*

Times observed that the “[w]ar on crack targets Minorities over Whites.” This article revealed that between 1991 and 1993, more Whites nationwide smoked crack cocaine than Blacks and Latinos did.³⁷ In the L.A. area specifically, 99,000 Whites used crack, in comparison to 36,533 Blacks. The *Times* also reported that Black and Latino crack dealers were charged with ten-year mandatory federal sentences, in comparison to Whites who were charged at the state level with a maximum of five years, usually serving no more than a year in jail.³⁸ In a parallel to the moral upheaval witnessed in 1970s Britain amidst the punk rock movement's scathing critique of the establishment, the United States found itself grappling with a comparable moral crisis in the 1980s.³⁹ During this era, it was the disenfranchised Black male youth of Los Angeles who boldly articulated their harsh realities through the fiercely charged lyrics of hip-hop's burgeoning sub-genre—gangsta rap.

Development of gangsta rap

Although gangsta rap came to be closely associated with the West Coast, it was born and bred in the streets of New York and Philadelphia during the 1980s. Its early trailblazers were themselves gang members (e.g., Schooly D from Philadelphia), and, from its inception *avant la lettre*, gangsta rap directly connected itself to the rapper himself and his daily life experiences in socioeconomically disadvantaged neighbourhoods.⁴⁰ At the time, other styles of rap distinguished themselves as more “conscious,” focusing on social and political issues within the impoverished Black community.⁴¹ It emphasized non-violent responses to problems of racial prejudice and socioeconomic inequality.⁴² For instance, Grandmaster Flash and the Furious Five's “The Message,” released in 1982, vividly depicted urban poverty, violence, and social decay, shedding light on the daily struggles and injustices experienced by Black individuals.⁴³ The chorus, “Don’t push me cause I’m close to the edge / I’m trying not to lose my head... It’s like a jungle sometimes / It makes me wonder how I keep from going under,” encapsulated the psychological turmoil inherent in the impoverished Black experience.⁴⁴ In contrast, gangsta rap emerged as a stark departure from this approach. Characterized by its aggressive tone and direct targeting of perceived enemies, gangsta rap rejected the more introspective and socially conscious outlook of its predecessors.⁴⁵

During what many consider the “golden age” of gangsta rap – the late 1980s and 1990s— gangsta rap was male-dominant, explicit, veracious, and untainted by the media and corporate power.⁴⁶ As the gangsta rap style/subgenre developed, it became, for some, the ferociously raw voice of a generation of alienated and infuriated

³⁷ Dan Weikel, “War on Crack Targets Minorities Over Whites: Cocaine: Records show federal officials almost solely prosecute non-whites. U.S. attorney denies race is a factor,” *Los Angeles Times*, May 21, 1995.

³⁸ *Ibid.*

³⁹ Matthew Worley, “Punk into Post-Punk,” *Museum of Youth Culture*.

⁴⁰ Charis E. Kubrin, “Gangstas, Thugs, and Hustlas: Identity and the Code of the Street in Rap Music,” *Social Problems* Berkeley, Calif. 52, no. 3 (2005): 361.

⁴¹ Craig S. Watkins, *Hip Hop Matters: Politics, Pop Culture, and the Struggle for the Soul of a Movement*, (Boston, MA: Beacon Press, 2005; 2006), 45; Kubrin, “Gangstas, Thugs, and Hustlas: Identity and the Code of the Street in Rap Music,” 361.

⁴² *Ibid.*

⁴³ Grandmaster Flash and the Furious Five, “The Message,” Englewood: NJ (Sugarhill Records, July 1, 1982).

⁴⁴ *Ibid.*

⁴⁵ Kubrin, “Gangstas, Thugs, and Hustlas,” 361.

⁴⁶ *Ibid.*

Black youths.⁴⁷ Gangsta rap provided a new poetic perspective in rap music, one that embraced the figure of the outlaw. It revealed the evident realities of the Black cultural experience and daily lifestyles in the rough community conditions where illicit activities flourished, which also highlighted the corrupt effects of ruthless policing, surveillance, and harassment.⁴⁸ Therefore, gangsta rap mobilized radical counter-discourses and strong anti-repression imagery.⁴⁹ Scholar Mich Nyawalo, in his article “From “Badman” to “Gangsta” Double Consciousness and Authenticity from American Folklore to Hip-Hop,” asserts that the celebrated outlaw of the “gangsta(z)” in gangsta rap stemmed from the historical and cultural forces of the “badman” and trickster from Black folklore narratives.⁵⁰ During the era of Trans-Atlantic slavery, trickster stories emerged as an alternative to present a more positive image of slaves and challenge the narratives of their oppressors.⁵¹ In a manner reminiscent of blues musicians from earlier generations who utilized the trickster in their music to express themselves and convey the daily struggles they faced, rappers similarly adopted a distinctive and purposeful construction of the “gangsta(z).” In this regard, gangsta rappers carried on the Black oral traditions of their Black musical predecessors, while asserting their context-specific truths and representing their particular communities.

These historical and cultural attributes are especially evident in gangsta rap of the West Coast. When gangsta rap migrated westward from its origins in New York and Philadelphia, it inaugurated a new chapter in the development of this rap subgenre.⁵² An East coast transplant by the name of Tracy Morrow, known by his stage name Ice-T, heightened the West Coast gangsta rap style with his self-proclaimed “crime rhyme.”⁵³ Ice-T, inspired by the former pimp turned novelist Iceberg Slim, depicted gang life and addressed the socioeconomic issues plaguing the Black community of South-Central/Compton, Los Angeles, through his eloquent lyrics.⁵⁴ Although gang life and culture had long existed in Los Angeles, the worsening of the crack epidemic fundamentally changed the course of West Coast gangsta rap.⁵⁵ Rather than relying on old-school rap’s ideology of ‘Escapism will help us deal with the bad elements of the ghetto,’ West Coast gangsta rap’s ideology commanded, ‘We are not going to ignore these bad elements in the ghetto anymore.’⁵⁶ Although Ice-T was one of the first gangsta rappers to establish himself as a West Coast proponent of this subgenre, a group of combative performers were emerging out of South-Central/Compton, Los Angeles. Far from tame, this group came with a vengeance; they did not demand one’s attention, one surrendered it to them.

⁴⁷ Ibid.

⁴⁸ Murray Forman, “Things Done Changed: Recalibrating the Real in Hip-Hop,” *Popular Music and Society* 44, no. 4 (2021; 2020): 457.

⁴⁹ Ibid.

⁵⁰ Mich Nyawalo, “From “Badman” to “Gangsta” Double Consciousness and Authenticity, from African American Folklore to Hip Hop,” *Popular Music and Society* 36, no. 4 (2013), 464.

⁵¹ Ibid., 469.

⁵² Orejuela, *Rap and Hip Hop Culture*, 118.

⁵³ Ibid.

⁵⁴ Ibid.

⁵⁵ Ibid., 136.

⁵⁶ Orejuela, *Rap and Hip Hop Culture*, 136; although I stay faithful to the sources' use of pejorative language, it does not indicate my language usage. For the purpose of understanding the past, I believe it is important to include the language cited.

N.W.A & *Straight Outta Compton*

In his track “Compton,” fellow Compton rapper Kendrick Lamar rapped, “Now we can all celebrate / We can all harvest the rap artists of N.W.A / America target our rap market, as controversy and hate / Harsh realities we in made our music translate / To the coke dealers, the hood rich / And the broke n****s that play / With them gorillas that know killers / That know where you stay.”⁵⁷ Lamar’s track celebrates and honours rap group N.W.A for paving the way for the future of West Coast gangsta rap, himself included. N.W.A (short for N****s With Attitude) was formed by founding member Eazy E in 1987.⁵⁸ The original group was comprised of party rap DJ Andre “Dr Dre” Young, Antoine “DJ Yella” Carraby, Lorenzo “MC Ren” Patterson, and O’Shea “Ice Cube” Jackson.⁵⁹ Cube grew up in South Central, Los Angeles, while the other members came of age in the neighbourhood of Compton. As Dre reflected, “We had the perfect combination, ‘cause we had Eazy, he was coming from this hardcore, drug-dealing street perspective. And Cube would come in with the more Malcolm X, political voice, the angry rapper sort of speak. I was trying to be street, but commercial at the same time. I wanted the records to sell. And Ren was the voice that bridged these two perspectives.”⁶⁰ Although the majority of the members were not involved in gangs (Eazy E was the exception in this regard), N.W.A channelled the outlaws of their community through “thug mimicry” so as to explain their actions.

Funded by Eazy’s drug sales, N.W.A’s first album *N.W.A and the Posse* was released in 1987 and its single “Boyz-N-The-Hood” was a breakthrough hit. As portrayed by Eazy, the track takes the listener on a journey through a day in Compton, vividly illustrating the prevalent sexist and degrading views of women, as well as the gang, drug, and racial-policing violence that characterized daily life.⁶¹ Eazy’s “Boyz-N-The-Hood” celebrated his fellow “gangsta(z)” and outlaws—N.W.A.’s targeted audience.⁶² To raise capital for N.W.A.’s next project, Eazy signed and managed the all-female rap group JJ Fad to his and business partner Jerry Heller’s Ruthless Records label.⁶³ JJ Fad’s single “Supersonic” became a radio hit and achieved commercial success, thereby providing the funds needed for N.W.A.’s sophomore album—*Straight Outta Compton*.⁶⁴

In a Los Angeles Times article, Heller proclaimed, “I just think that Ruthless owes them [JJ Fad] a great debt of gratitude.”⁶⁵ Despite N.W.A.’s lyrics brimming with misogynistic views of women, JJ Fad never felt disrespected by the group. In the same article, JJ Fad member Baby D reflected on the group touring with N.W.A, stating, “They treated us like little sisters... I was only 15. I was everyone’s little sister, and everyone looked out for me. They looked out for the other girls too. ...”⁶⁶ She recalled those days as, “the best experience of our [JJ Fad’s]

⁵⁷ Kendrick Lamar, “Compton,” *Good kid, M.A.A.D City*, LA: CA, (Top Dawg Entertainment. October 22, 2012).

⁵⁸ Orejuela, *Rap and Hip Hop Culture*, 124.

⁵⁹ Ibid.

⁶⁰ The Defiant Ones, “Episode 2.”

⁶¹ N.W.A, “Boyz- N- The- Hood,” *N.W.A and the Posse*, LA: CA, (Ruthless Records. November 6, 1987).

⁶² The Defiant Ones, “Episode 2.”

⁶³ Ibid.

⁶⁴ Ibid.

⁶⁵ Randall Roberts, “Jerry Heller on the other women ‘Straight Outta Compton’ forgot,” *Los Angeles Times*, August 27, 2015.

⁶⁶ Ibid.

life, because we had opportunities to go other places”⁶⁷ Additionally, JJ Fad played a significant role in forging partnerships for Ruthless Records due to the group’s catchy pop sound.⁶⁸ With “Supersonic” already having gone gold, on route to its platinum status, it made it easier for N.W.A’s *Straight Outta Compton* album to break through. Despite the pivotal role JJ Fad played in financing *Straight Outta Compton* and forging commercial partnerships for Ruthless Records, N.W.A distanced themselves from the female group due to the “gangsta” image N.W.A portrayed, fearing JJ Fad might soften it.⁶⁹ Nevertheless, it was an all-female rap group that opened the pathway for N.W.A’s *Straight Outta Compton*.

In August 1988, N.W.A released the album that would profoundly transform gangsta rap. Their ruthless and vulgar lyrics, and especially their anti-authority track, “Fuck Tha Police,” resulted in a conspicuous absence from mainstream radio, a warning from the FBI, and intense public scrutiny.⁷⁰ The intimidating album cover shows, from a worm’s eye-view, N.W.A standing in a circle, with Eazy pointing a gun down, ready to pull the trigger and murder the listener’s ear with his group’s raps.



Figure 1. N.W.A’s *Straight Outta Compton* Album.⁷¹

The opening title track provides an immediate and visceral glimpse into the real underbelly of Los Angeles.⁷² Each verse of this track is sprinkled with references to homicides, sexual violence, threats, gang life, and firearms. Dre starts the track solemnly stating: “You are now about to witness the strength of street knowledge.”⁷³ Cube’s verse follows. His voice is deep and slightly aggravated, but keeps his rhythmic flow smooth and steady as he delivers his verse.⁷⁴ As the menacing beat sounds off, Cube roared: “Straight outta Compton, crazy motherfucker named Ice Cube / From the gang called N***z With Attitude / When I’m called off, I got a sawed off / Squeeze the trigger, and bodies

⁶⁷ Ibid.

⁶⁸ Ibid.

⁶⁹ Ibid.

⁷⁰ Watkins, *Hip Hop Matters*, 45.

⁷¹ N.W.A, “Straight Outta Compton,” *Wikipedia*.

⁷² N.W.A, “Straight Outta Compton,” *Straight Outta Compton*, LA: CA, (Ruthless Records. August 8, 1988).

⁷³ Ibid.

⁷⁴ Ibid.

are hauled off / You too, boy, if ya fuck with me / The police are gonna have to come and get me / Off yo' ass, that's how I'm goin' out / For the punk motherfuckers, that's showin' out.”⁷⁵ MC Ren’s verse followed, rhyming, “...But I don't give a fuck, I'ma make my snaps / If not from the records, from jacking or craps / Just like burglary, the definition is jacking / And when I'm legally armed it's called packing / MC Ren controls the automatic / For any dumb motherfucker that starts static / Not the right-hand 'cause I'm the hand itself / Every time I pull a AK off the shelf / The security is maximum and that's a law.”⁷⁶ Eazy E’s verse finishes the song with his high-pitched voice: “Straight Outta Compton / Is a brotha that'll smother yo' mother ...I see a motherfuckin cop I don't dodge him / But I'm smart, lay low, creep a while /And when I see a punk pass, I smile / To me it's kinda funny, the attitude showin a n****a drivin ... This is the autobiography of the E, and if you ever fuck with me / You'll get taken by a stupid dope brother who will smother / Word to the motherfucker, straight outta Compton.”⁷⁷ In this track, Cube, Ren, and Eazy channel their fellow outlaws through “thug mimicry” to delve deeper into the lyrical themes mentioned above that also resonate with the Black daily experience of N.W.A and their targeted audience. By portraying these images, N.W.A demonstrates how “Straight Outta Compton” stands as a quintessential gangsta rap classic, shedding light on these pervasive socio-economic elements and refusing to overlook them. This underscores the track's significance in revealing its role as social-protest discourse music aimed at its intended audience. N.W.A vividly exposes the harsh realities of Compton, instilling pride and showcasing the city to the world—ultimately revealing the strength of street knowledge that permeates their music.

The music video of the track centers on N.W.A and their posse mobbing around Compton. Throughout the video, scenes alternate between a White cop who hunts down, and brutally arrests N.W.A, members Cube, Dre, Yella, and Ren and images of Compton/South-Central evincing the racial disparity and poverty that blighted these parts of Greater Los Angeles.⁷⁸ MTV banned the track’s music video in March 1989 on the grounds that it was too violent and glorified crime.⁷⁹ N.W.A’s intent for this music video was essentially autobiographical. It was meant to visually document the violence, oppression, racialized police brutality, and the daily struggle to survive in the tough streets of South-Central/Compton that had shaped the group’s members and their perspectives.⁸⁰ In a 1989 interview with *LA Weekly*, MC Ren commented on the MTV ban, “the video ain’t half of what go on for real. It’s just a little sweep, no guns. MTV is into all that crazy devil-worshipping shit ... To me there’s more violence on a motherfucking cartoon than in our music. Little kid sees a cartoon character with a gun, he going to want to carry a gun, right? GI Joe, all that shit. But they aren’t even playing our video on the MTV *rap* show.”⁸¹ The “Straight Outta Compton” music video effectively amplified and mirrored the themes explored in the track, and showcased the racial police brutality experienced by N.W.A and their audience.

Other tracks on the album, such as “Gangsta Gangsta,” featuring Cube and Eazy, emphasize the apparent realities of life on the streets of South-Central/Compton through the lens of their targeted audience: the outlaw figure

⁷⁵ Ibid.

⁷⁶ N.W.A, “Straight Outta Compton.”

⁷⁷ Ibid.

⁷⁸ “N.W.A Straight Outta Compton (Official Music Video),” 1989, (*YouTube*. February 27, 2009).

⁷⁹ Gold, “N.W.A Hard Act to Follow.”

⁸⁰ Ibid.

⁸¹ Gold, “N.W.A Hard Act to Follow.”

of the “gangsta.”⁸² The track “Dopeman-Remix” serves to illustrate the paralyzing effects that the crack epidemic has had on the Black community, exploring the epidemic from different points of view within the spectrum of the group’s presume audience.⁸³ Cube reasoned, “The song deals with the pusher himself, the way he looks and the way he acts, and also with a girl who’s hooked and the things she has to go through to get her hit. The American public supposedly wants to know about crack, but they don’t wanna hear the kind of detail we go into.”⁸⁴ Cube narrated the track, telling the story of the “dopeman” and Strawberry, the neighbourhood “hoe.” Eazy’s verse follows, depicting himself as the “dopeman” and provides his point of view.⁸⁵ Although hip-hop is often accused by critics of promoting violence and criminal activity – and some hip-hop *does* outright romanticize such things – many of the best rap tracks creates and describes a case for its listeners to assess.⁸⁶ The deployment of “thug mimicry” in “Gangsta Gangsta” and “Dopemax-Remix” allows the listener to assess, on their own terms, the perspective illustrated by the character tropes that Cube and Eazy channel. Although the listener may not agree with the narrators’ perspective, the tracks give the “gangsta” and “dopeman” a voice to speak their particular truths. The chorus of “Gangsta Gangsta” evidently reveals this: “Gangsta! Gangsta! That’s what they yellin’ / It’s not about a salary, it’s all about reality.”⁸⁷ Here, N.W.A omits that they were making music not for financial gain but to reveal the harsh truths of the most pressing issues that affected their communities.

Other tracks such as “Parental Advisory,” “Compton N The House,” and “Express Yourself” celebrate N.W.A’s city of Compton and instilled pride in their marginalized audience.⁸⁸ In “Express Yourself,” Dre raps: “Some drop science, well, I’m droppin’ English.”⁸⁹ Here, Dre alludes to the rejection of East Coast hip-hop’s custom of “droppin’ science” – i.e., the act of revealing wisdom or skill in a rhyme, as opposed to rapping about materialistic things, women, or illicit activities. Dre’s emphatic rejection of the former custom shows how gangsta rap came to differ starkly from earlier hip-hop artists’ “conscious” rhymes. It condemns or reflects philosophically on the oppressive and grim realities of Black people living in socioeconomically disadvantaged neighborhoods. N.W.A. aestheticized and, at times, celebrated those harsh realities.⁹⁰

The most defiant track on N.W.A’s *Straight Outta Compton* is their single “Fuck Tha Police,” a song infused with the same attitude of protecting oneself against unjust authority that the Black Panther Party championed in the 1960s.⁹¹ Such hostility towards authority was a direct consequence of the enduring distrust of the law, viewed as a repressive state structure used antagonistically against the Black community.⁹² Similar to the figures of the “badman” and trickster, the “gangsta” is a by-product of the symbolic manufacturing of race and social alienation enforced by

⁸² N.W.A, “Gangsta, Gangsta.” *Straight Outta Compton*. LA: CA, (Ruthless Records. August 8, 1988).

⁸³ N.W.A, “Dopeman Remix,” *Straight Outta Compton*. LA: CA, (Ruthless Records. August 8, 1988).

⁸⁴ “NWA Street Hassle,” *Melody Maker*, (August 5, 1989).

⁸⁵ N.W.A, “Dopeman Remix.”

⁸⁶ Perry, *Prophets of the Hood*, 110.

⁸⁷ N.W.A, “Gangsta Gangsta.”

⁸⁸ N.W.A, *Straight Outta Compton*. LA: CA, (Ruthless Records. August 8, 1988).

⁸⁹ N.W.A, “Express Yourself,” *Straight Outta Compton*, LA: CA, (Ruthless Records. August 8, 1988).

⁹⁰ Perry, *Prophets of the Hood* 148.

⁹¹ Orejuela, *Rap and Hip Hop Culture*, 124.

⁹² Nywalo, “From “Badman” to “Gangsta,” 472.

the US legal system.⁹³ The track vividly portrayed the rampant police brutality in Los Angeles's South-Central/Compton area, serving as a direct response to grappling with the crack epidemic and escalating gang violence. These issues were themselves ideological and practical offshoots of Reagan's "war on drugs."⁹⁴

Cube wrote the song in response to Dre, Eazy, and Yella getting arrested after Dre and Eazy were shooting paintballs at cars on the Harbour Freeway.⁹⁵ The police pulled them over with their guns drawn and had the group face down on the ground. The men were treated as if they committed a robbery.⁹⁶ Cube wrote the song out of boredom since Dre had to go to jail every weekend, which eliminated the parties the group had regularly attended to see Dre perform.⁹⁷ When Cube presented the song to the other group members, Dre was hesitant to release it. He didn't want to put a target on his back for the police.⁹⁸ However, remaining true to the essence of gangsta rap, the group eventually released the track, serving as a raw and unfiltered voice of realism for their targeted audience. It addressed the injustices and police brutality that the Black community in socioeconomically disadvantaged neighborhoods experienced daily.⁹⁹

Perry highlights that narratives of the law and critiques of it cohere with hip-hop.¹⁰⁰ She asserts that both scholars and hip-hop artists engage with discourses "about being framed, about linguistic differences, critiques of legal procedures, and observations about the devaluation of Black life within the criminal justice system."¹⁰¹ Perry further argues that "[s]ometimes a Black rapper's voice will occupy that of a police officer or judge, thereby subverting the usual courtroom situation in which a White person's voice represents the Black."¹⁰² Perry implicitly acknowledges N.W.A.'s "Fuck Tha Police," with her statement of a Black rapper occupying the police office or judge. In "Fuck Tha Police," Dre takes on the role of the judge, while Cube, Eazy, and Ren take the role of the prosecuting attorneys. While the group does not directly mimic their targeted audience in this track, they still employ "thug mimicry" to represent their audience while challenging White supremacy and authority. "Fuck Tha Police" contributes to Straight Outta Compton being the social-protest discourse music of their targeted audience, revealing the unjust racialized police brutality enforced in Los Angeles.

Straight Outta Compton's repercussions

In his essay, "A Functional Approach to the Rhetoric of Social Movement," Charles J Stewart argues: Societal movements must attempt to alter the self-perception of target audiences so that supporters and potential supporters come to believe in their self-worth and ability to bring urban change. Efforts such as replacing old labels attached to groups by their oppressors are designed to instill feelings of pride and power, to help audiences discover themselves as substantial human beings, and to encourage them to question social

⁹³ Mich Nywalo, "From "Badman" to "Gangsta."

⁹⁴ Ibid.

⁹⁵ The Defiant Ones, "Episode 2."

⁹⁶ Ibid.

⁹⁷ Ibid.

⁹⁸ Ibid.

⁹⁹ Nywalo, "From "Badman" to "Gangsta" 471.

¹⁰⁰ Perry, *Prophets of the Hood*, 111.

¹⁰¹ Ibid.

¹⁰² Ibid.

relationships and coalitions. Social movements often hope that self-discovery may result in a new ‘personal identity’ and in the realization of a ‘people.’¹⁰³

N.W.A exemplifies Stewart’s argument with “Straight Outta Compton.” Even their name, abbreviated to N****s With Attitude, evokes a word that bears the weight of the deeply painful racist rhetoric once (and to some extent, still) used by the oppressors of the Black community. N.W.A reclaimed this problematic word to foster a sense of rebellious pride and empowerment among their targeted audience. In a *Los Angeles Times* interview, Eazy asked the question, “Why do you think the fans like us— why they prefer our street raps over all that phony stuff out there?”¹⁰⁴ Answering his own question, Eazy asserted: “Because we’re telling the real story of what it’s like living in places like Compton. We’re giving them reality. We’re like reporters. We give them the truth. People where we come from hear so many lies that the truth stands out like a sore thumb.”¹⁰⁵ Here, Eazy emphasized how N.W.A’s Straight Outta Compton offered an impartial account of the oppression, racism, and violence that they and members of their intended audience experienced in their everyday lives. The songs discussed in this essay demonstrate how this album ignited a sense of pride among its target audience, implicitly encouraging them to believe in their own self-worth despite social circumstances that may have suggested otherwise.

Many White and Black audiences found N.W.A disturbing. Democratic and Republican politicians condemned the track “Fuck Tha Police,” as well as N.W.A.¹⁰⁶ These leaders ubiquitously labeled N.W.A. as a group that promoted gang violence, assault on law enforcement, and drug use, thereby contributing to the moral panic surrounding gangsta rap and its violent lyrics.¹⁰⁷ In a 1989 interview, Cube addressed these claims, arguing that “[t]he parents, the police and the people of the local community are scared of what we say... In the Black community, the ministers and teachers don’t deny that the problems we rap about exist, but they’d rather sweep it under the rug... Our raps are documentary. We don’t take sides.”¹⁰⁸ In reality, N.W.A paved the way for gangsta rap and pressured politicians to address the injustices faced by their targeted audience through their music.

In response to the album, N.W.A received a letter on August 1st, 1989 from the FBI’s assistant director of public affairs, Milt Ahlerich. The letter centred on the bureau’s concern that N.W.A was sponsoring violence against local police with their track “Fuck Tha Police.”¹⁰⁹ Although not explicitly stated in the letter, Ahlerich told the *Los Angeles Times* that he was indeed referring to the track.¹¹⁰ Ahlerich’s letter reflected the stance mainstream White society shared and its call for immediate censorship of Black artists who defied White authority.¹¹¹ Ahlerich

¹⁰³ Charles J. Stewart, “A Functional Approach to the Rhetoric of Social Movements,” in *Readings on the Rhetoric of Social Protest*, edited by Charles E Morris and Stephen Howard Brown, State College, PA: Strata Pub, 2006, 156.

¹⁰⁴ Hunt, “The Rap Reality,” *Los Angeles Times*.

¹⁰⁵ Ibid.

¹⁰⁶ Asawin Suebsaeng, “The FBI Agent Who Hunted N.W.A.,” *Daily Beast*, April 14, 2017.

¹⁰⁷ Suebsaeng, “The FBI Agent Who Hunted N.W.A.”

¹⁰⁸ Mark Cooper, “NWA: ‘Our raps are documentary. We don’t take sides,’” *The Guardian*, Originally Published in *Rock’s Backpages*, October 1989 issue, August 7, 2013.

¹⁰⁹ Steve Hochman, “Compton Rappers Versus the Letter of the Law: FBI Claims Song by N.W.A. Advocates Violence on Police,” *Los Angeles Times*, October 5, 1989.

¹¹⁰ Ibid.

¹¹¹ Ibid.

stated, “My intent was that those representatives for the licensing, distribution and publishing of the record should have the benefit of knowing the facts of police violence.”¹¹² American Civil Rights Liberty Union chairman Danny Goldberg was appalled by the letter. He argued, “(N.W.A) is a positive role model about how you can get out of poverty, and then the FBI writes them a letter...The result [of the letter] is to add to the feelings of alienation and separation from society, and those are the things that give rise to violence. . . Rap is one of the most positive role models, a positive way for poor people using their energies, making art and poetry out of their social dilemmas. They N.W.A should be applauded by the police.”¹¹³ Goldberg's words emphasize the importance of recognizing the positive impact of rap music, specifically that of N.W.A, particularly in addressing the social issues faced by Black marginalized communities.




Figure 2. Alherich's Letter to N.W.A¹¹⁴

Despite Alherich's attempt to discredit N.W.A's music, Goldberg's statement solidifies how N.W.A reimagined their audience's self-perception to gain the support of Goldberg and others. This further reflects N.W.A's role as representatives of a larger societal movement. N.W.A emphasized that they were not pro-gangs,

¹¹² Ibid.

¹¹³ Ibid.

¹¹⁴ "August 1: The FBI Warns NWA. (1989) - On this Date in Hip Hop," *On This Date in Hip-Hop*, Image, <https://onthisdateinhiphop.com/news/august-1-the-fbi-warns-nwa-1989>, (Accessed November 25, 2022).

nor did they intend to serve as role models. The group declared, “We’re not glorifying anything... We’re just rappers who are speaking from the heart. It’s just a job like being a mailman or a garbage collector we’re no better than anyone else, we’re not stars, we’re simply being ourselves and saying what we feel.”¹¹⁵ In essence, N.W.A’s music and message challenged critics and uplifted their targeted audience, ultimately solidifying *Straight Outta Compton* as the social-protest music of their fellow outlaws.

***Straight Outta Compton’s* value as a primary source**

In effect, *Straight Outta Compton* revealed to listeners far beyond N.W.A.’s target audience the dire and unjust socioeconomic conditions that pervaded the Black community of South-Central/Compton, Los Angeles. The album facilitated substantial conversation regarding racial tensions in Los Angeles, which had escalated from the city’s attempt to quash the crack and gang crises through racist police brutality. These simmering tensions exploded into full-blown race riots on April 22nd, 1992. This occurred as a direct result of the acquittal by an all-White jury of the police officers who had viciously beaten Black male Rodney King on March 3rd, 1991.¹¹⁶ Much of Los Angeles County was pure chaos for a week.¹¹⁷ Mobs of angry protestors ignited fires, assaulted motorists, and looted stores and offices.¹¹⁸ More than 150 fires fumed, as guns erratically fired throughout the night.¹¹⁹ Protesters shouted, “This is for Rodney King.”¹²⁰ Although Los Angeles was in shambles, the Race Riots of 1992 were a reminder of the fragility and upheaval that arose from the constant alienation of one of the city’s largest constitutive communities.¹²¹ *Straight Outta Compton* spotlighted both the furious strength and ever-precarious vulnerability of people who looked like and had grown up alongside N.W.A. The group’s employment of “thug mimicry” provided a platform for their fellow outlaws to speak their truths directly to the group’s listeners. N.W.A’s *Straight Outta Compton*, with its vile and angry lyrics paired with hard-hitting drum patterns or funk music samples, cemented gangsta rap while also documenting and preserving this tumultuous chapter of Black history and, by extension, American history from the point of view of the oppressed. Consequently, the album stands as a valuable primary source for understanding the socio-political landscape of its time and the experiences of the disenfranchised Black community.

Conclusion

On May 25th, 2020, an African American man named George Floyd died at the hands of Minneapolis police officers. Protests surged across the world in response to the unjust murder and police brutality that continued to be tragically common occurrences in the US.¹²² As protesters gathered, digital streams of N.W.A’s “Fuck Tha

¹¹⁵ “NWA Street Hassle.”

¹¹⁶ Victor A. Matheson and Robert A. Baade, “Race and Riots: A Note on the Economic Impact of the Rodney King Riots,” *Urban Studies*, 41, no. 13 (2004), 2691.

¹¹⁷ *Ibid.*

¹¹⁸ Mark Lacey and Shawn Hubler, “Rioters Set Fires, Loot Stores; 4 Reported Dead: Rampage: 106 are wounded or injured and more than 150 blazes are ignited. Bradley considers a curfew,” *Los Angeles Times*, April 30, 1992.

¹¹⁹ *Ibid.*

¹²⁰ *Ibid.*

¹²¹ Annette Ejiofor, “The L.A. Riots as Told Through Rap and Hip-Hop,” *NBC News*, April 29, 2017.

¹²² Kory Grow, “How N.W.A’s ‘Fuck Tha Police’ Became the ‘Perfect Protest Song,’” *Rolling Stone*, June 9, 2020.

Police” skyrocketed by 272 percent.¹²³ MC Ren responded, “A lot of people would be happy that they song gets streamed, but it’s unfortunate.”¹²⁴ The 32-year-old album continued to be the social-protest discourse music of a new societal movement that wanted justice. N.W.A’s *Straight Outta Compton* album exposed the poverty, violence, and racism that haunted African Americans in South Central/Compton, Los Angeles. Through the discursive strategy of “thug mimicry,” N.W.A. embodied the perspective of their audience, which allowed them to critique how these conditions and their consequences contributed to them becoming outlaws of their communities.

N.W.A followed their Black musical predecessors by carrying on the Black oral tradition of speaking their truths. Ultimately, they created an album that stands as an essential primary source for comprehending this complex chapter of Black history specifically and US history generally. N.W.A galvanized the West Coast gangsta rap movement, and by doing so, reshaped the landscape of gangsta rap itself. They defied the boundaries imposed by the socioeconomic conditions that entrapped the Black community within their disadvantaged neighborhoods. In an interview, esteemed Compton rapper The Game discussed present hip-hop culture and N.W.A’s influence, observing, “Everything that N.W.A did was sort of what you embody as a Compton resident... They talked about all the violence. Before N.W.A was hip-hop, after N.W.A was gangsta rap. It was rebellious and violent. It was the minorities speaking their minds.”¹²⁵ The legacy of N.W.A’s *Straight Outta Compton* still lives on through its immediate audience of outlaws, gangsta rap successors, and in hip-hop culture— their everlasting legacy of street knowledge and its unrefined truth.

¹²³ Ibid.

¹²⁴ Ibid.

¹²⁵ “The Game reflects on N.W.A. in this interview from the Art Of Rap festival, with scenes from “Straight Outta Compton,”” *Daily Motion*, July 15, 2015.

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